Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO1177
2007-05-30 11:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - INSIDE THE MIND OF KOMSIC'S CHIEF OF STAFF

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR MARR BK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9827
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #1177/01 1501138
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301138Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6301
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0133
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001177 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SECDEF FOR FATA AND BEIN, DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),D
(SMITH),P (BAME),EUR/SCE (HOH, SAINZ, FOOKS),S/WCI,
PM/WRA, L, AND EUR/RPM (BROTZEN),NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR
WIGHTMAN AND MCLANE, USNATO FOR REID, UNDERWOOD, SHAFFER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - INSIDE THE MIND OF KOMSIC'S CHIEF OF STAFF

REF: A. SARAJEVO 863

B. SARAJEVO 674

Classified By: DCM Judith Cefkin. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001177

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SECDEF FOR FATA AND BEIN, DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),D
(SMITH),P (BAME),EUR/SCE (HOH, SAINZ, FOOKS),S/WCI,
PM/WRA, L, AND EUR/RPM (BROTZEN),NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR
WIGHTMAN AND MCLANE, USNATO FOR REID, UNDERWOOD, SHAFFER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - INSIDE THE MIND OF KOMSIC'S CHIEF OF STAFF

REF: A. SARAJEVO 863

B. SARAJEVO 674

Classified By: DCM Judith Cefkin. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On July 6, Zeljko Komsic, the Croat member of
Bosnia's Tri-Presidency, will take over the rotating
chairmanship of the Presidency from the Serb member, Nebojsa
Radmanovic. Radmanovic has, in our estimation, turned in a
solid performance. Komsic's chairmanship comes at a
particularly sensitive time given Bosnia's heated political
environment and our expectation that the Presidency will take
up several issues of crucial importance to our bilateral
relationship, including issues associated with Bosnia's Iraq
deployment. Our dealings with President Komsic and his staff
to date raise questions in our mind about how effective
Komsic might be as Presidency Chairman. Recent conversations
with Komsic's Chief of Staff Amir Ibrovic, during which he
outlined what he claimed was Komsic's political strategy,
have done nothing to allay those concerns. END SUMMARY.

Radmanovic Turns in Positive Performance
--------------


2. (C) The rotating chairmanship of the Bosnian
Tri-Presidency will shift from Bosnian-Serb President Nebojsa
Radmanovic to Bosnian-Croat President Zeljko Komsic on July

6. While the position carries few additional
responsibilities, the Presidency Chairman plays an important
role in setting the Presidency's agenda. Ideally, the
Chairman should also play the role of consensus builder among
his colleagues. While the political climate in Bosnia has
steadily worsened since the 2006 elections, we have been
largely pleased with Radmanovic's performance. Although he
overreacted to Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris
Silajdzic's attempts to confront Serbia over the February 26
International Court of Justice (ICJ) verdict (Ref A),

Radmanovic has been instrumental in securing Presidency
approval for several key items on our bilateral agenda,
including extending the Bosnian military deployment to Iraq,
arranging the Presidency visit to Iraq, and donating of
surplus arms to the Afghan National Army. We have also found
his staff to be competent and professional.

Komsic Prepares to Take Charge
--------------


3. (C) We expect our engagement with the Presidency to be at
least as intense under Komsic's chairmanship as it was under
Radmanovic's. There will be a continuing need to encourage
the Presidency to a play a constructive role in the myriad
political crises plaguing Bosnia. We also anticipate dealing
with Komsic on a range of important bilateral issues, such as
possible change of mission scenarios for Bosnia's Iraq
deployment, further implementation of defense reform, and
insulating Bosnia from political fallout associated with the
Kosovo final status process. Thus far, our dealings with
Komsic and his staff do not suggest that they possess the
political maturity or gravitas required to manage effectively
these or other issues. His staff are politically
inexperienced and several hold second jobs, which appear to
take priority over their presidential responsibilities. They
are also often unable or unwilling to engage in serious
substantive discussions (Ref B). Our concerns have been
reinforced by our exchanges with Radmanovic's and Silajdzic's
aides, who complain to us regularly about the performance of
Komsic's staff - one of the few matters on which they agree.

Amir Ibrovic - Komsic's "Strategist" and Chief of Staff
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Komsic's Chief of Staff, childhood friend, campaign
manager, and owner of Sarajevo's popular "Tito Bar," controls
Komsic's "cabinet." Komsic gave Ibrovic carte blanche to
assemble his Presidency team, and Ibrovic freely admits he
chose to hire close friends rather than experienced political
operatives, most of whom do not have strong ties to Komsic's
Social Democratic Party (SDP). In several exchanges with us,
Ibrovic claimed that Komsic does not view himself as
particularly indebted to SDP, one reason Ibrovic felt no
obligation to staff his office from within the party. He

SARAJEVO 00001177 002 OF 003


also said that Komsic has often rebuffed requests by SDP
Chairman Zlatko Lagumdzija to toe the party line. According
to Ibrovic, Komsic wants to be seen as a unifying political
figure capable of serving as President or Prime Minister of a
post-Dayton Bosnian state. Ibrovic argued that this is
possible if Komsic exploits his image as a "war hero" and
presents himself as a decisive leader, who rises above the
country's ethnic divisions a la Tito (Note: Komsic has cited
Tito as a role model, and his office is decorated with a
large portrait of Tito. End Note.)


5. (C) Ibrovic pointed to several recent events that were
designed to demonstrate this, including Komsic's appearance
at a military ceremony wearing his Golden Lilly decoration
from the Bosniak Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ABiH) and his
trip to Iraq with other members of the Presidency, during
which he wore a specially-designed military uniform. Even
before the Presidency returned from Iraq, the weekly
newsmagazine Slobodna Bosna prominently featured Komsic's
"Diary from Baghdad," that included an almost minute by
minute summary of his travel along with numerous pictures of
Komsic -- in uniform -- in Iraq. Ibrovic also sees Komsic
repeated calls for a full investigation into allegations of
war crimes in Bugojno in 1993 as crucial to establishing his
cross-ethnic appeal, particularly among Croats, many of whom
consider him a traitor for fighting with the ABiH rather than
the Croat Defense Council (HVO) during the 1992-1995 war.
The Bugojno case, which involves the disappearance of
Bosnian-Croats from the town, has repeatedly ensnared Defense
Minister Selmo Cikotic, who was serving as ABiH commander in
the region at the time.

The World According to Komsic (According to Ibrovic)
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Ibrovic, echoing previous statements by Komsic to the
Ambassador, told us that Komsic believes it would be foolish
to openly challenge Silajdzic at this time. Political
reality required Komsic enable rather than confront the
Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency, Ibrovic explained.
Komsic's strategy was "to wait out" Silajdzic, who he
anticipated would inevitably overreach, which he was already
perilously close to doing over Srebrenica. Ibrovic argued
that feelings of moral and political culpability were behind
Siljadzic's position on Srebrenica. Ibrovic claimed that
Bosnian lawyers managing the ICJ case against Serbia had
access to documents from the Yugoslav Defense Council,
despite their public assertions to the contrary, but that the
lawyers chose not to use them because the documents included
references to discussions about territorial divisions between
Belgrade and former Bosnia President Alija Izbetgovic and
Silajdzic. (Comment: Accusations that the Bosniak leadership
"sacrificed" Srebrenica to the Serbs surfaced immediately
after the enclave's fall. Regardless of their truth,
Silajdzic may feel some guilt for presiding over Srebenica's
fall - he was PM and FM at the time. Ibrovic's claims that
Bosniak lawyers intentionally covered up documents that would
have incriminated Silajdzic do not strike us as credible. End
Comment.)

Radmanovic the Communist
--------------


7. (C) Ibrovic said that he and Komsic respected Radmanovic
and see him as a partner on most issues. Ibrovic and Komsic
believe he is angling to fill the RS leadership vacuum "after
Dodik inevitably overreaches." (Comment: Silajdzic's staff
have also claimed that Radmanovic's long-term political aim
was to challenge Dodik. End Comment.) Ibrovic said that in
his and his boss's assessment, Radmanovic was a "Communist,
not a Serb." To illustrate this point, Ibrovic said that
Radmanovic used the traditional Serb military greeting "God
help you, heroes" during the ceremony for the Bosnian army's
RS regiment, but afterwards personally apologized to Komsic.
According to Ibrovic, Radmanovic said Dodik had "forced" him
to use the greeting, but that he personally found it
distasteful. Radmanovic's uncomfortable relationship with
Serb nationalism would make it difficult for him to usurp
Dodik's political position, Ibrovic asserted.

Comment

SARAJEVO 00001177 003 OF 003


--------------


8. (C) Ibrovic believes he has created a "brilliant"
political strategy for positioning Komsic as Bosnia's savior
once the current storm of ethQc politics runs its course.
Ibrovic is a mercurial character given to theatrical, angry
outbursts and widely rumored to be an alcoholic, so we take
some of his claims with a grain of salt. Nonetheless,
Radmanovic's and Silajdzic's staff confirm that Ibrovic is
the only advisor to whom Komsic really listens. In this
context, Ibrovic's perceptions may matter more than political
reality, and it certainly is true that Komsic used the
Presidency's Iraq trip for some political showboating. In
any case, Komsic's performance to date has not fulfilled the
high hopes we and many others had for him in the wake of the
October 2006 general elections. It is difficult to imagine
Komsic, in his current incarnation, as an effective chairman
of the Presidency, which is likely to further complicate
efforts to accomplish our objectives in Bosnia over the next
8 months.
MCELHANEY