BOSNIA: EUFOR MOVING AHEAD WITH DRAWDOWN PLANS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 000109

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),D (SMITH),P (BAME),EUR/SCE (HOH,
SAINZ, FOOKS),AND EUR/RPM (BROTZEN),NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC
FOR WIGHTMAN, OSD FOR MARK JONES, USNATO FOR SHAFFER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: EUFOR MOVING AHEAD WITH DRAWDOWN PLANS


Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(EUFOR Operation Althea) continues planning to approximately
halve its forces in Bosnia this spring. A decision to
drawdown was taken "in principle" in December, and is
expected to be confirmed in Brussels by the PSC on February
27 or 28, once the fall-out from the Kosovo final status
process in Bosnia is better known. Acording to the EUFOR
POLAD, while this "definitiv decision" has yet to been
taken, individual EUFR participant countries have already
issued ordes to withdraw their forces, making a drawdown
somthing of a fait accompli. The drawdown would leav no
significant international military presence in Republika
Srpska for the first time in 15 years. EUFOR planners
believe that Kosovo fallout in the RS will be political
rather than military in nature. While they may be right, the
absence of any military presence could well impact the
calculations of those who may seek to stir up potential
trouble in the RS over Kosovo. End summary.


SUBSTANTIAL DRAWDOWN THROUGHOUT THE SPRING
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2. (C) The EU decided "in principle" in December to
approximately halve the 6000 strong EUFOR in Bosnia in the
coming months. A confirmation of this decision is expected
to be made by the EU's Political Steering Committee (PSC) in
Brussels on February 27th or 28th. The current drawdown plan
calls for the re-deployment of the approximately 2500
remaining EUFOR troops to Camp Butmir, adjacent to the
Sarajevo International Airport. EUFOR would close the
headquarters of its Multinational Taskforces in Tuzla,
Mostar, and Banja Luka. The approximately 45 Liaison
Operation Team houses scattered throughout the country would
remain open. The EUFOR drawdown and re-deployment would
leave no significant international troop presence in the
Republika Srpska for the first time in almost 15 years.


THE KOSOVO FACTOR
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3. (C) The late February confirmation of the drawdown plan
was established so the EU could better gauge the fall-out of
the Kosovo final status process in Bosnia. According to the
EUFOR POLAD, all drawdown planning has been predicated on the
assumption that the Kosovo decision will have no significant
security implications in Bosnia. While conceding that there
has been some "turmoil" recently in Bosnia, the POLAD told us
that EUFOR planners consider this to be more political rather
than military in nature. He pointed to the fact that there
was no violent reaction to this summer's bombing of former
Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic's tomb and the October
rocket attack on a mosque in Mostar as an indication that the
security sphere in Bosnia has largely stabilized. The POLAD
further informed us that EUFOR military commanders believe
that even with a drawdown, EUFOR could deal with any
long-term contingencies in Bosnia without the need for
substantial augmentation.


"DEFINITIVE PLANNING"
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4. (C) While a "definitive decision" on the drawdown will not
be taken until late February, the POLAD relayed to us that
the EUFOR constituent countries' "definitive planning" has
more or less made that decision a fait accompli. The POLAD
noted that some governments had already issued re-deployment
orders to the their forces, and that the planning for the
execution of the drawdown was complete. As such, forces were
prepared to begin the drawdown and re-deployment
"immediately" after the February PSC decision.


COMMENT: ASSUMPTIONS, PLANNING SOLID?
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5. (C) EUFOR POLAD expressed some skepticism to us that
EUFOR's Kosovo assumptions would be borne out and concern
that perhaps planning had overtaken the decision-making
process. His concerns do seem somewhat legitimate-- EUFOR in
effect decided to time its drawdown to better reflect the
fallout of Kosovo, yet has already completed its planning
based on an assumption that there will be no or limited
security destabilization in Bosnia. While the assumptions
underlying this rather optimistic prognosis may prove
accurate, EUFOR's hands in the short-term may be tied to deal
with any unforeseen contingency. It is also interesting that
EUFOR's assumptions are at odds with what we are hearing from
many Europeans when they claim OHR should remain open
because, among other things, the uncertainties about Kosovo
spillovers are too great to risk a June 2007 closure.
MCELHANEY