BOSNIA: SILAJDZIC SIGNALS WILLINGNESS TO MAKE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 001042

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS),P FOR BAME
NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KAWC KJUS BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: SILAJDZIC SIGNALS WILLINGNESS TO MAKE
HEADWAY ON POLICE, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN WASHINGTON


Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
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1. (C) President Haris Silajdzic says that he views his trip
to Washington the week of May 21 as a good opportunity to
reach basic agreements on police and constitutional reform.
Silajdzic said that the concurrent visit of Republika Srpska
(RS) Prime Minister Milorad Dodik to Washington would allow
senior State Department officials to facilitate agreements on
long-standing points of contention, and meetings in the
Department would "raise the stakes" for failure to
compromise. On police reform, Silajdzic says that he would
accept the Police Reform Directorate's Report, and agree to
hold off pushing for an accord on the name of the police
forces. On constitutional reform, Silajdzic said he "would
go halfway" and accept a deal that abolished entity voting at
the state-level, except for issues involving the transfer of
competencies and shared competencies. He also said he wanted
the "dissolution clause" of the U.S.-brokered package of
amendments modified. Ambassador pledged to reach out to
Dodik in the near-term to determine if Silajdzic's proposals
could form the base for an agreement in Washington. End
Summary.

WASHINGTON VISIT: FORCE A DEAL
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2. (C) Silajdzic told the Ambassador in a meeting on May 14
that his upcoming visit to Washington, which coincides with
Dodik's visit, would probably be the best time to reach an
agreement on police and constitutional reform. Silajdzic
told the Ambassador that meeting with high-level State
Department officials would "raise the stakes" for failure to
agree to the reforms, adding that he could no longer afford
to look like he wanted "to destroy everything." Silajdzic
conceded that ideally he would like to dismantle the entire
Bosnian state and entity apparatus and lay the foundations
for a new, more centralized and just state, but considering
the broader political realities, he realized that was no
longer an option. He said that he was prepared to work these
issues as long as it takes to hammer out an agreement, and
suggested that high-level Washington officials be involved if
an agreement is reached.

POLICE REFORM: ACCEPT THE REPORT, HOLD OFF ON THE NAME
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3. (C) Silajdzic said that, if Dodik agreed, substantial
progress on police reform could be realized and the EU
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) could be signed
following the Washington visit. Silajdzic agreed to sign off
on the Police Directorate Report and accept the timeline that
it contains, in exchange for Dodik agreeing to delay reaching
an agreement on the name of the police forces. Silajdzic
said that the only issue was "timing," and delaying the
decision on the name could allow all parties to reach an
acceptable long-term solution to the reform. Silajdzic told
the Ambassador that he thought this agreement was "doable,"
but the Ambassador would have to strongly lobby Dodik.

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS: REDUCE ENTITY VOTING
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4. (C) Silajdzic also told the Ambassador that he was willing
to deal on constitutional reform, and, that in a professed
effort at transparency, he would share his "bottom line."
Silajdzic said that he was willing to agree on the U.S.
brokered package of amendments if two of his long-standing
grievances with the package were addressed. Silajdzic said
that any reform would have to expressly remove the ability of
any minority bloc of deputies, meaning from the RS, to
dissolve parliament and the government (i.e. the so-called
"dissolution clause"). Second, Silajdzic said he could accept
a deal that maintained entity voting only on the transfer of
competencies from the entities to the state and on matters
involving shared competencies. Silajdzic said he would not
make an issue of some of his other previous objections,
including the powers of the President and Prime Minister.
Silajdzic told the Ambassador that by making "concessions,"
he was moving "more than halfway," and Dodik should be
expected to reciprocate. Echoing some of his familiar lines,

Silajdzic reminded the Ambassador that organs of the RS had
been found "guilty of genocide" and that Dodik should be
willing to offer political compromise as a remedy for these
crimes.

HOW TO MANAGE THE EUROPEANS
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5. (C) Silajdzic professed that it might be easier to secure
Dodik's support for his proposals than to deal with the
political fallout among European partners to any agreement
brokered in Washington. Silajdzic noted that police reform
in particular had long been the purview of the EU, and that
the USG should try to avoid the appearance of working around
its authority. Silajdzic at first suggested inviting High
Representative Schwarz- Schilling to the meetings in
Washington, but quickly backed away from the idea when he
realized that it may be counter-productive. In closing, an
optimistic Silajdzic suggested that both he and Dodik could
fly to Brussels after reaching agreement on the reforms in
Washington and be on hand for the signing of the SAA. In
that way, the Europeans could be made "to feel part of the
process."

COMMENT
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6. (C) To gauge whether there is some mileage in making a
major push on the reforms prior to Silajdzic and Dodik being
in Washington next week, we will talk with Dodik May 14 as
well. It could well be that the two could come to a meeting
of the minds on the issues over the next several days, but it
is too early to say whether the deadlock can be broken
anytime soon.
MCELHANEY