Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SAOPAULO58
2007-01-24 09:32:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Consulate Sao Paulo
Cable title:  

HELPING SAO PAULO AUTHORITIES RESPOND TO SECURITY THREATS

Tags:  PGOV SNAR ASEC PREL BR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6652
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHSO #0058/01 0240932
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 240932Z JAN 07
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6309
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7388
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2904
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2602
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 2257
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 3191
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1966
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 3322
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7727
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAWJC/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/TSA HQ WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SAO PAULO 000058 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/BSC, INL
STATE ALSO FOR DS/IP/WHA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/DSS/OSAC
NSC FOR FEARS
DOJ FOR BRUCE SWARTZ
TREASURY FOR OASIA, DAS LEE AND JHOEK
DHS HQ FOR PLCY/OIA - KEVIN O'REILLY
BUENOS AIRES FOR TSA/JOCHOA
USAID FOR LAC/AA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV SNAR ASEC PREL BR
SUBJECT: HELPING SAO PAULO AUTHORITIES RESPOND TO SECURITY THREATS
TO PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

REF: (A) SAO PAULO 36; (B) SAO PAULO 6

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

-------
SUMMARY
-------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SAO PAULO 000058

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/BSC, INL
STATE ALSO FOR DS/IP/WHA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/DSS/OSAC
NSC FOR FEARS
DOJ FOR BRUCE SWARTZ
TREASURY FOR OASIA, DAS LEE AND JHOEK
DHS HQ FOR PLCY/OIA - KEVIN O'REILLY
BUENOS AIRES FOR TSA/JOCHOA
USAID FOR LAC/AA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV SNAR ASEC PREL BR
SUBJECT: HELPING SAO PAULO AUTHORITIES RESPOND TO SECURITY THREATS
TO PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

REF: (A) SAO PAULO 36; (B) SAO PAULO 6

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) Consul General met January 17 with Sao Paulo State
Secretary of Metropolitan Transportation Jose Luiz Portella and his

SIPDIS
team to follow up on Governor Serra's request (ref A) for security
assistance in the subway and train systems. Portella described the
challenges these systems face and outlined existing operating
procedures. In response, DHS/ICE Attache asked a number of questions
and offered to bring in an expert to provide an assessment. TSA
representative in Buenos Aires is scheduled to visit Sao Paulo
January 24 as a first step in providing targeted technical
assistance to state security officials. End Summary.


2. (SBU) Consul General (CG),accompanied by DHS/ICE Country
Attache, RSO, and poloff, met January 17 with Secretary of
Metropolitan Transportation (STM) Jose Luiz Portella and numerous
officials. Portella was accompanied by Deputy Secretary of Public
Security Lauro Malheiros Neto; Military Police Sub-commander Colonel
Jose Roberto Martins Marques; STM Security Coordinator Colonel Marco
Antonio Moyses; Conrado Grava de Souza, Director of Operations for
the Sao Paulo Metropolitan Company (Metro); Jose Luiz Bastos, Chief
of the Security Department of Metro; Atilio Nerilo, Director of
Operations and Maintenance for the Sao Paulo Company of Metropolitan
Trains (CPTM); Colonel Leopoldo Augusto Correa Filho, Director of
Security for the CPTM; and others. "Metro" refers to the subway
system in Sao Paulo and environs, and CPTM is the more extensive
commuter rail system.


3. (SBU) Secretary Portella, who, like most state government
officials, is in his third week on the job, described the safety and
security challenges his office faces. On the afternoon of January
12, there was a major cave-in on the construction site of a new

subway line in the city; as of January 17, the bodies of two victims
had been found, with at least five people still missing, and the
unstable ground and fears of further landslides were impeding
recovery efforts. Four more bodies have been recovered since then,
and rescue operations continue, plagued by rainfall and mud. (Note:
The "yellow line" Metro project was inaugurated amid great fanfare
in December 2005 as Sao Paulo's first public-private partnership
(PPP) project. End Note.)


4. (SBU) More to the point, there have been a number of recent
security incidents in the public transportation system as reported
reftels. On December 23, a device exploded near the Ana Rosa metro
station in south-central Sao Paulo; nobody was injured. Early in
the morning of December 25, a bomb exploded on a CPTM train at the
downtown Itapevi station, killing one person. A second device was
found on that train and was deactivated and taken to a Military
Police explosive storage facility. However, it was apparently not
effectively deactivated, because on January 2, a police sergeant was
killed when it exploded while he was tinkering with it (ref B). In
addition, there have been several bomb scares that turned out to be
false alarms. For these reasons, Governor Serra had asked the
Ambassador for any available U.S. expertise and assistance, and the
Secretariat for Metropolitan Transportation (STM) had submitted a

SIPDIS
list of operational questions for subway authorities in New York and
Washington, DC. DHS and other USG authorities are currently working
on responses to those questions.


5. (SBU) The Attache described the department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) composition and his agency's and authority. He

SAO PAULO 00000058 002 OF 003


further explained that in DHS, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) is the subject matter expert in the area of
security on airplanes, trains, and other modes of transportation and
that TSA has a Regional Attache in Buenos Aires. The Attache
believes Sao Paulo transportation security officials would benefit
from a visit to major cities in the U.S. to see how the job is done
there, or, alternatively, DHS/TSA can arrange for the visit of an
expert from the U.S.


6. (SBU) Portella and his team responded to a series of questions
prepared by the ICE and DHS Attaches. The system encompasses more
than 3,000 kilometers of rail. Metro has 54 stations and CPTM has

88. The only real difference between the two systems is that CPTM
is almost entirely above ground. Metro carries 3 million passengers
per day, versus 1.6 million for CPTM. Metro's red line carries
75,000 passengers per hour in each direction during morning and late
afternoon peak periods. Trains are inspected thoroughly before
beginning a day's service, and controls were strengthened after the
December 23 Metro station bomb incident. Authorities of both Metro
and CPTM are finding an increasing number of unusual or suspicious
packages, each one requiring an inspection and a determination.
Many of them turn out not to be a threat, but "even an empty box can
cause problems." Even if it's just an empty laptop case, or a bag
of bananas or dirty laundry, Metro and CPTM have to take precautions
until they determine it is not lethal, which can be extremely
disruptive. Sometimes it's merely vandalism by youth gangs or by
individuals or groups interested, for their own parochial reasons,
in harming the rail system.


7. (SBU) Metro has about 1,000 security personnel, and CPTM has
1,200. In addition to these, there are contractors and police
officers. Metro has 650 video cameras and CPTM 866, but many of
these cannot record. Ultimately the companies would like to have
24-hour camera coverage of all stations. In the event of a security
threat or incident, the appropriate company's security personnel
respond, along with military police, civil police, and the Fire
Department. The military police have training in bomb detection and
in explosive ordnance disposal. Officials of other agencies have
varying degrees of security training. Portella's answer to the CG's
question whether there was an inter-agency task force for dealing
with security issues was unclear, but it appears that they do not.
More than anything, officials would like an expert to review and
diagnose the threats they face and the procedures they have in place
to address them. Training appropriate to their local situation
could follow. They would also like updated guides and manuals from
USG security and law enforcement agencies.


8. (SBU) The device found December 23 in the Ana Rosa Metro station
was a pipe bomb. The bomb used in the December 25 CPTM train
incident was an incendiary device. The device that exploded January
2 at a Military Police Battalion (ref B),killing a police sergeant,
appeared to be made of sandy, greasy matter. Authorities believe
the organized crime gang First Capital Command (PCC) may be
responsible for the recent spate of attacks and have arrested one
PCC member, who was reportedly responsible for the murder of a judge
in 2002.


9. (SBU) Bringing the meeting to a close, CG summed up the state of
play. DHS and RSO are seeking answers to the questions submitted by
Secretary Portella's staff on January 10. DHS/ICE Attache promised

SIPDIS
to arrange a visit by the Regional TSA Attache in Buenos Aires, who
can obtain the guides and manuals requested by Portella's staff.
(Note: This visit has been scheduled to take place January 23-26.
End Note.) The Secretariat should identify key employees to send
for training in the U.S. Portella designated Military Police
Colonel Jose Roberto Martins and Metro Security Director Conrado
Grava de Souza as POCs for follow-up with USG.

SAO PAULO 00000058 003 OF 003




10. (SBU) Comment: The meeting was cordial and productive. It
helped define problems and identify practical measures to address
them. Per ref A, Governor Serra has indicated that money is not the
problem, and that what the state government needs is equipment,
training, and expertise. Assisting Sao Paulo state deal with its
security challenges could be a cost-effective way of generating good
will. End Comment.


11. (U) This cable was cleared by DHS/ICE Attache in Brasilia.


MCMULLEN