Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SANTODOMINGO355
2007-02-20 14:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Santo Domingo
Cable title:  

U/S EDELMAN ON COUNTER-NARCOTICS COOPERATION AND

Tags:  MASS MOPS PREL KCRM SNAR HA VE DR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0031
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDG #0355/01 0511430
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201430Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7443
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE PRIORITY 4476
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCOWCV/CUSTOMS CARIBBEAN ATTACHE MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEFHLC/HQS DHS WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTO DOMINGO 000355 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR WHA, WHA/CAR SEARBY, INL/LP RHAWKINS
DEA FOR MBRAUN
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PLEASE PASS OSDP, SOUTHCOM-JIATF SOUTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2017
TAGS: MASS MOPS PREL KCRM SNAR HA VE DR
SUBJECT: U/S EDELMAN ON COUNTER-NARCOTICS COOPERATION AND
OPERATION RUM PUNCH (MAR 1 - MAY 31)

REF: A. A) LARGENT-KING (OSD) EMAIL 2/5/07

B. B) SANTO DOMINGO 320

Classified By: Political Officer Michael Garuckis for reasons 1.4(b) an
d (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTO DOMINGO 000355

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR WHA, WHA/CAR SEARBY, INL/LP RHAWKINS
DEA FOR MBRAUN
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PLEASE PASS OSDP, SOUTHCOM-JIATF SOUTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2017
TAGS: MASS MOPS PREL KCRM SNAR HA VE DR
SUBJECT: U/S EDELMAN ON COUNTER-NARCOTICS COOPERATION AND
OPERATION RUM PUNCH (MAR 1 - MAY 31)

REF: A. A) LARGENT-KING (OSD) EMAIL 2/5/07

B. B) SANTO DOMINGO 320

Classified By: Political Officer Michael Garuckis for reasons 1.4(b) an
d (d)


1. (C) Summary. On February 2, Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy Eric Edelman, DEA Chief of Operations Michael Braun,
Commander of U.S. Southern Command's Joint Interagency Task
Force South (JIATF-South) Rear Admiral Jeffrey Hathaway,
Ambassador Hans Hertell and other U.S. civilian and military
officials met with senior Dominican officials in advance of
Operation Rum Punch, a U.S.-led multinational effort to
disrupt the narcotics air bridge between South America
(primarily Venezuela) and Hispanola during the period March 1
- May 31. Dominican officials, while agreeing on the
necessity for anti-narcotics cooperation, stressed that poor
funding and inadequate material resources limit their ability
to contribute. Dominican officials further suggested that
Venezuela would provide little assistance in disrupting the
air bridge. In response to a direct request for material
assistance from National Directorate for Drug Control (DNCD)
Director Major General Rafael Ramirez Ferreira, Edelman
stated that the USG would look into the possible transfer of
excess defense articles to the Dominican government. Edelman
and Braun followed on with press interviews highlighting the
need for inter-governmental cooperation and the dangers posed
by a growing domestic drug trade in the Dominican Republic.
(See REF A) End Summary.

--------------
Background: Operation Rum Punch
--------------

-- Drug Flows into Hispanola


2. (SBU) Based on data provided by both U.S.-based
over-the-horizon military radars (OTH) and aerial intercepts,
the DEA estimates that approximately 61 metric tons of

narcotics enter Hispanola by air annually, with nearly every
kilogram arriving on a flight originating in Venezuela.
These Venezuela-based narcotics flights depart for Hispanola
an average of 11 times per month, with the Dominican Republic
the ultimate destination roughly two-thirds of the time. In
terms of delivery methods, roughly 90 percent of flights
off-loading narcotics to
Haiti do so by landing in Haitian territory, while two-thirds
of flights delivering narcotics to the Dominican Republic do
so by air drop (often offshore). The vast majority of these
narcotics are eventually transshipped to the United States.


3. (SBU) Although the traffickers' aerial operations appear
fragile -- JIATF-South estimates that no more than 12 pilots
are involved -- counter-measures have proven difficult.
Venezuelan denials of responsibility, combined with the lack
of a strong police police presence in northern Venezuela and
the inability of Dominican and Haitian officials to arrest
local ground crews and foreign pilots, have frustrated
attempts to roll-up the criminal organizations using the air
bridge.

-- The Local "End Game"


4. (SBU) Operation Rum Punch is designed to break, at least
temporarily, the intelligence logjam by giving local
Dominican and Haitian police authorities the material and
expertise necessary to execute an "end game" (i.e., to
effectuate arrests).


5. (SBU) Operation Rum Punch is a three-month (March 1 - May
31) multi-agency operation using Department of Defense OTH,
Navy Orion observation aircraft, U.S. Coast Guard platforms,
DEA Citation and Cessna aircraft, two DEA rotary-wing
airframes, and two DHS Customs and Border Protection
Blackhawk helicopters. In the Dominican Republic, Tactical
Response Teams comprised of officers from the DNCD and the
DEA will be staged, either with DEA helicopters at San Isidro
Airbase, Dominican Republic, or with CBP helicopters in
Puerto Rico. Mixed DEA - DNCD ground teams will also be
positioned near areas historically used as destinations for

narcotics flights. The operational planning includes mixed
DEA-Haitian ground teams in Haiti but does not include the
use of helicopters.


6. (SBU) After a countdown involving a series of staged
warnings based on OTH data and aerial data/intercepts, TRTs
and ground teams will respond to predicted drop zones or
landing fields. Arrests and subsequent prosecutions will be
undertaken by local authorities.


7. (SBU) A successful end game will do much to restrict
overall narcotics flow to Hispanola and, ultimately, the
United States, as success will force shipments to the sea
(where law enforcement experts assert that interdiction of
narcotics is easier).

--------------
U/S Edelman at the DNCD
--------------


8. (SBU) On February 2, Edelman, accompanied by Braun and
Hathaway, traveled to the Dominican Republic to express
support for Rum Punch and to stress the importance of
continued cooperation in regional counter-narcotics
initiatives. Together with Hertell and other Embassy, DOD,
and DEA officials, the three met with the DNCD's Ramirez
Ferreira in his office.


9. (C) Ramirez Ferreira began the meeting by noting the
difficulties in transforming the Directorate from a
"inflexible military structure" into something more suitable
for anti-narcotics work before suggesting that the greatest
problem faced in the fight against narcotics is corruption --
both in the Dominican Republic and abroad. Ramirez Ferreira
also noted that poor funding, the relatively small size of
the Directorate, and a dearth of equipment (i.e., "go-fast
boats," aircraft, and radars) exacerbate problems caused by
structural change and corruption in the Dominican Republic.
The combination of these factors renders the Caribbean "open"
to both ships and aircraft. In discussing the "Caribbean,"
Ramirez Ferreira described the serious problem of illegal
narcotics inflows across the Haitian land border. (Note:
Embassy-based DEA officials assert that narcotics inflows
from Haiti are minimal.)


10. (C) Edelman, in turn, suggested that Dominican officials
"see the threat in exactly the right way" in regard to the
dangers posed by corruption to recently formed democratic
institutions. He then pledged that, although U.S. military
commitments stretch our force structure, "we have not
forgotten our commitment to this common struggle." In
identifying the source point of the narcotics entering the
region, Edelman emphasized Venezuela's role. Easily
observable in Ramirez Ferreira's anteroom was a DNCD video
projection of suspect aircraft tracks from November 2006
showing 20 non-scheduled flights departing Venezuela for
Hispanola and Colombia.


11. (C) Edelman and Ramirez Ferreira also discussed the
impact drugs can have on populations in light of Dominican
concerns that a growing portion of the narcotics passing
through the country stay to meet increased local demand.


12. (C) Difficulties in cooperation outside the
U.S.-Dominican relationship were also discussed, with Ramirez
Ferreira emphasizing problems coordinating with his Haitian
counterparts ("a country in chaos") and Edelman mentioning
Venezuela's tacit acceptance of drug-trafficking operations
in the north (a "virtual free zone" or "safe haven").
Continuing the discussion on cooperation, Ramirez Ferreira
mentioned an upcoming "Drugs Conference" scheduled for March
15 and hosted by he Dominican Republic. According to Ramirez
Ferreira, the Conference will be attended by the presidents
of Colombia and Haiti, as well as the prime minister of
Jamaica. A "high-level" representative of the U.S.
Government will also be invited. (See REF B for invitation
list)


13. (C) A discussion of "next steps" following the conclusion
of Rum Punch resulted in a DNCD request for U.S. military

surplus, specifically boats, aircraft and radars. Edelman
committed to examining the "possibility" of providing
helicopters as "excess defense articles" but cationed that
training, maintenance, and parts for he helicopters would
not be included. Ramirez Ferreira said that if provided, the
DNCD could cover these associated costs.


14. (SBU) At meeting's end, Hathaway invited Ramirez Ferreira
to visit JIATF-South to view operations and strengthen
coordination and Braun pledged continued DEA support for
counter-narcotics efforts. Braun also secured from Ramirez
Ferreira an agreement to allow cross-border operations during
Rum Punch so that Dominican-based DEA helicopters could
conduct interdictions in Haiti.

--------------
Lunch with Dominican Officials
--------------


15. (SBU) Similar discussions were held over a following
lunch hosted by Hertell, with Attorney General Radhames
Jimenez Pena, Armed Forces Secretary LTG Ramon Aquino Garcia,
and DNCD Director MG Ramirez Ferreira in attendance.
Discussions centered around the visit's focus topic,
Operation Rum Punch and the Dominican-U.S. cooperation in the
counter-drug war.


16. (C) In reference to the importance of cooperation among
government agencies, specifically the DNCD and Dominican
Secretary of Defense (SEFA),and intra-agency cooperation,

SIPDIS
Edelman encouraged both Aquino and Ramirez Ferreira to learn
more about joint warfighting at the U.S. Joint Forces Command
(USJFCOM) if such a visit could be arranged. Edelman asked
Hathaway if he could explore that possibility. USJFCOM at
Norfolk, Virginia, instructs U.S. and allied officers in
combined, inter-agency and joint operations and planning.
Edelman encouraged Ramirez Ferreira's to visit USJFCOM with
the understanding that he would first complete the offered
meeting at JIATF-South in Key West. Aquino and Ramirez
Ferreira said that the DNCD and the armed forces work well
together. (Note: This cooperation is not apparent to Embassy
country-team members who view their daily operations and
policies. Embassy thinks competition for scant resources and
disunity in command keep each entity at arms' length and
uncooperative.)


17. (C) Both Ramirez Ferreira and Aquino discounted Haitian
cooperation in the drug war. According to the generals, the
Dominican government cannot depend on the Haitian government
to enforce its border, saying "the Haitian nation has had no
sense of unity since 1803." Aquino mentioned the two biggest
problems with his armed forces as being lack of equipment and
Haiti. His primary desires are more small arms ammunition, an
air-search radar system, and interdiction aircraft. Without
these requirements, he said he is unable to adequately
protect the Dominican Republic from drug traffickers, human
smugglers and other threats. Edelman agreed that the will to
work together is critical but that tools are also necessary.


18. (C) Aquino also commented that the Venezuelan government
adds instability to the region and that President Hugo
Chavez' rhetoric causes Dominican government officials to
question his true objectives. According to Aquino, the
Dominican government is concerned about Venezuelan official
attitudes because they are cultural friends and Caribbean
neighbors with a history of partnership. Ramirez Ferreira
added that his Venezuelan counterpart will not be helpful in
identifying the source of drug trafficking flights from
Venezuela. The new Venezuelan appointee is a former
intelligence officer and Chavez henchman. Ramirez Ferreira
reminded Edelman that Venezuela staunchly denies that
narcotics flights destined for Hispanola originate in
Venezuela. Ramirez Ferreira opined -- and Edelman agreed --
that the government of Venezuela purposefully creates
problems in prosecution of the drug war, as it desires to
flood the United States with drugs in order to degrade U.S.
strength and deny the United States regional influence.

--------------
Press Interviews

--------------


19. (U) Following the lunch, Edelman and Braun conducted
interviews with reporters from two major Dominican
newspapers, El Dia and Hoy. Both papers gave the interviews
favorable front-page coverage.

--------------
Comment
--------------


20. (C) The visit by Under Secretary Edelman came at an
important time, with Rum Punch about to begin and the
increase in suspect flights from Venezuela raising concerns.
It demonstrated Department of Defense attention to the
Caribbean and the counter-narcotics fight at a time when many
regional leaders accuse the United States of neglecting both
in favor of Iraq, Afghanistan and terrorism.


21. (U) Drafted by Michael Garuckis. This cable has been
cleared with the Office of Ambassador Edelman.


22. (U) This report and extensive other material can be
consulted on our SIPRNET site,
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/santodomingo/
HERTELL