Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SANTIAGO983
2007-06-18 14:45:00
SECRET
Embassy Santiago
Cable title:  

A SOUTHERN CONE PERSPECTIVE ON COUNTERING CHAVEZ

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM KCRM AR BO BR PARM UY VE CI 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1664
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 2994
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 3691
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 0361
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1429
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUN 5253
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 3682
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SANTIAGO 000983 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KCRM AR BO BR PARM UY VE CI
SUBJECT: A SOUTHERN CONE PERSPECTIVE ON COUNTERING CHAVEZ
AND REASSERTING U.S. LEADERSHIP

REF: ASUNCION 396

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CRAIG KELLY; Reasons 1.4(b),(d)


-------
Summary
-------

S E C R E T SANTIAGO 000983

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KCRM AR BO BR PARM UY VE CI
SUBJECT: A SOUTHERN CONE PERSPECTIVE ON COUNTERING CHAVEZ
AND REASSERTING U.S. LEADERSHIP

REF: ASUNCION 396

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CRAIG KELLY; Reasons 1.4(b),(d)


--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Hugo Chavez,s effort to expand his influence into the
Southern Cone was the subject of ref A. This, part two in a
series of joint cables from Southern Cone embassies, looks at
ways the U.S. can counter Chavez and reassert U.S. leadership
in the region. From posts' perspectives, there are six main
areas of action for the USG as it seeks to limit Chavez's
influence:

--Know the enemy: We have to better understand how Chavez
thinks and what he intends;
--Directly engage: We must reassert our presence in the
region, and engage broadly, especially with the "non-elites";
--Change the political landscape: We should offer a vision of
hope and back it up with adequately-funded programs;
--Enhance military relationships: We should continue to
strengthen ties to those military leaders in the region who
share our concern over Chavez;
--Play to our strength: We must emphasize that democracy,
and a free trade approach that includes corporate social
responsibility, provides lasting solutions;
--Get the message out: Public diplomacy is key; this is a
battle of ideas and visions. Septel provides detailed
suggestions.


2. (C) We should neither underestimate Chavez nor lose sight
of his vulnerabilities. Many of the region's leaders and
opnion makers appreciate the importance of relations with the
U.S. and generally want to see us more deeply engaged. They
reject the notion that Chavez best represents the region's
interests. We must convince not only government leaders but
civil society - the person on the street - that we are
committed to a progressive and democractic vision for the
Americas and to helping our neighbors meet their challenges.
If we can, we will make quick inroads into marginalizing

Chavez' influence, bolster democracy and reassert our own
leadership in the region. End Summary.

--------------
Know Thy Enemy
--------------


3. (S/NF) Notwithstanding his tirades and antics, it would
be a mistake to dismiss Hugo Chavez as just a clown or old
school caudillo. He has a vision, however distorted, and he
is taking calculated measures to advance it. To effectively
counter the threat he represents, we need to know better his
objectives and how he intends to pursue them. This requires
better intelligence in all of our countries. Embassy
Asuncion,s getting hold of Chavez's MSP equivalent, for
example, and then sharing it with policy makers and
implementers in Washington and the region helps inform and
coordinate our response.


4. (S/NF) When we have concrete intelligence on an issue
about which our friends in the region share our concern --
e.g., Venezuela's relationship with Iran -- we should share
it to the extent we can. And when Chavez's programs feed
local elite appetites for corruption or otherwise fail to
deliver on their promises, we need to make it known.

--------------
Directly Engage
--------------


5. (SBU) We must challenge the mistaken notion that the U.S.
is absent and aloof from the region. President Bush's visit
to five countries in the region in March, and his follow-on
meeting with President Lula at Camp David, made a hugely
positive impression. A/S Shannon's April visit to Chile and
Paraguay was similarly applauded by local leaders and the
press. We need to build on this good will with a regular
stream of senior-level visits, including by Cabinet members,
speaking to our positive agenda for the region and producing
concrete programs and agreements that respond to its

problems.


6. (SBU) To obtain the greatest return on these visits, we
encourage Washington to explore multiple-country itineraries.
When we make these visits, it is important we be seen not
just with government officials and elites, but also with
those who have been marginalized or are on the fringes of
society. We need visits not only to those countries where
leaders praise us, but even more
importantly where governments have distanced themselves from
us. In these places, showing the flag and explaining
directly to populations our view of democracy and progress
can change views about the U.S. that may have become
distorted or out of date.

--------------
Change the Political Landscape
--------------


7. (C) Chavez' agenda is about expanding his influence and
power, using the "Bolivarian Revolution" as his vehicle.
This rubs a lot of the region's governmental and
non-governmental leaders and opinion makers the wrong way --
particularly those who don't want to be associated with his
methods or regard Chavez as a growing threat to their own
leadership. We have to play to that resentment by
strengthening our ties with these leaders, praising their
governance, and fostering broad public respect for the
progressive models they are seeking to build within their
societies. Fortunately, local "case studies" of countries
that are leftist-led but are democratic and fiscally
responsible offer glistening counterpoints to Chavez's
retrograde project.

-- Because of its sheer size and economic weight, Brazil has
outsized influence over the rest of the continent. In this
regard, it can be a powerful counterpoint to Chavez's
project. We should help present Brazil's course -- i.e.,
pursuit of fiscal responsibility and strong democratic
institutions, openness to the global the community, and
mature engagement with both its neighbors and the U.S. --
as a progressive and hopeful model for the region.

-- Chile offers another excellent alternative to Chavez. FM
Foxley seeks to integrate Chile more fully into the global
economy. Chile has not only stated but demonstrated -- e.g.
Bachelet's letter to House leader Nancy Pelosi expressing
Chilean support for congressional ratification of FTAs with
Peru, Colombia, and Panama -- its willingness to help bring
along other Latin American countries into the global economy.
We should look to find other ways to give Chile the lead on
important initiatives, but without making them look like they
are our puppets or surrogates.

-- Argentina is more complex, but still presents distinct
characteristics that should inform our approach to countering
Chavez's influence there. Argentina has a large middle class
and a vibrant civil society open to our ideas and vision of a
market-based democracy and wary of Chavez's "revolutions."
Venezuela does not appear to have provided Argentina any
significant subsidies or outright grants, but Chavez has been
able to exploit Buenos Aires, lack of access to investment
capital and international financing. Domestic and foreign
investors are not providing adequate long-term investment
capital to quickly develop needed infrastructure. And still
unresolved post-crisis defaults on official Paris Club and
private bondholder debt are restricting Argentina's access to
the volume of new sovereign credits in global capital markets
it would need to fund infrastructure development on its own.
The obvious counter to the influence that Chavez' financial
support has bought him in Argentina is to help the GoA regain
direct access to international financial markets and to work
with the GoA to develop the kind of investment climate that
will attract the volume of domestic and foreign investment
needed to build new foundational infrastructure at
competitive costs. This needs to be complemented by engaging
actively with civil society and key non-economic actors in
the government on areas of shared concern (anti-crime,
anti-terror, peacekeeping, etc.).

-- Our growing economic relationship with the pragmatic
leftist government in Uruguay puts the lie to the claim that
greater trade and investment with the U.S. is tantamount to

betrayal of local populations. This is critical because poor
countries, like Uruguay, are vulnerable not so much to
Chavez,s ideology but to his petrobolivars. We need to draw
attention to and build on these success stories borne out of
engagement with the U.S., as alternatives to Chavez' vision
of a region cut off from the U.S. Even Paraguay's leftist
priest-turned presidential candidate Fernando Lugo has stated
he is closer to Bachelet or Lula than to Chavez.


8. (C) Of course, we also need to make sure that the truth
about Chavez -- his hollow vision, his empty promises, his
dangerous international relationships starting with Iran) --
gets out, always exercising careful judgment about where and
how we take on Chavez directly/publicly. While it remains
preferable that we take the high road focusing attention on
our "vision of hope of hope and prosperity for the region,"
there will continue to be times we need to speak out on the
concerns his authoritarian bent raises. However, we
shouldn't be alone nor necessarily always in the lead.
Rather the NGO
community and local civil society groups, the region's
leaders and international organizations, the UN and OAS in
particular, must assume a greater role in addressing this
problem and put Chavez on the defensive -- not by
exaggerating the threat but speaking to the facts. The recent
closing of RCTV is one such area where international
organizations and local media and civil rights groups could
have been more vocal.


9. ( C) With regard to Mercosur, we should not be timid in
stating that Venezuela's membership will torpedo U.S.
interest in even considering direct negotiations with the
trading bloc, and in questioning when and how Mercosur plans
to apply its democracy clause strictures to Chavez's regime.
Without voicing hostility to Mercosur per se, we can continue
to pursue FTA's with interested countries, and encourage
alterative arrangements, such as Chile,s "Arco del Pacifico"
initiative.

--------------
Play to our Mil-Mil Advantage
--------------


10. (C) Southern Cone militaries remain key institutions in
their respective countries and important allies for the U.S.
These militaries are generally organized and technically
competent. Their desire to maintain interoperability, access
to U.S. technology and training are something we can turn to
our advantage. As they seek to modernize, professionalize,
and transform, they seek closer relations with the US to
assist in those processes. Over the past several years we
have seen a steady decrease in funds for critical programs
such as International Military Education and Training (IMET)
and traditional Commander Activities (TCA) and the
elimination of other important programs such as Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) and Excess Defense Articles (EDA)
due to sanctions under ASPA. To effectively maintain our
mil-to-mil relations and guide pol-mil events in the region
in support of our interests, we must reverse the slide. Now
is precisely the time we need to be increasing our pol-mil
engagement
and programs vice decreasing and limiting them. We also need
to revisit some long-held and frankly rigid positions on SOFA
agreements and insistence on certain privileges and
immunities with a view to gaining flexibility to negotiate
new defense cooperation agreements with regional militaries.


11. (C) An increasingly unifying theme that completely
excludes Chavez, and isolates Venezuela among the militaries
and security forces of the region, is participation in
international and regional peacekeeping operations. The
Southern Cone is doing very well in this area, with all
countries active contributors to PKO missions worldwide.
Argentina and Chile have even formed a combined peacekeeping
brigade, which is expected to be available for deployment
sometime in 2008. Uruguay is the highest per-capita
contributor of PKO troops. We should make more GPOI funds
available to Southern Cone countries to increase and
strengthen their peacekeeping capabilities and cooperation.
Additionally, we should explore using the mechanism that the
region's contributors to MINUSTAH (Haiti) have established to
discuss ways of increasing peacekeeping cooperation on a
broader scale.


--------------
Stress Our Winning Formula
--------------


12. (C) Chavez has made significant inroads, particularly
with local populations, by providing programs for the
underprivileged and by casting the U.S. as elitist and only
interested in promoting free trade to the benefit of big
business. The slogans are facile: Neoliberalism makes the
rich richer and the poor poorer; the Bolivarian Revolution
guarantees our region's sovereignty and dignity. But they
ring true with some local populations and make others feel
better about their own lack of progress.


13. (C) Transforming our image does not mean we walk away
from our commitment to free trade and the promise it delivers
to impoverished populations. However, it does mean we should
do a better job of promoting free trade by pointing to local
and global success stories, making it easier to forge FTAs,
and by expanding access to U.S. markets, and by promoting
investment. Concluding the Doha Round is critical to
revitalizing more local trade negotiations and bolstering our
own credibility. In the meantime, we should support programs
that promote regional exports, particularly favoring small
and medium-size enterprises, and emphasize good corporate
citizenship.


14. (C) We must also emphasize social responsibility among
corporations and investors, and as a USG priority. President
Bush's March 5 speech about social justice struck a chord
throughout the region. We should be seen standing with local
populations, delivering programs that speak directly to their
economic and social needs, particularly in the areas of
health and education. This is vital not only in the poorer
countries, but equally in places like Chile and Argentina,
where our very small community and youth action programs are
welcomed and receive excellent media attention.


15. (C) Projects which foster greater transparency and
democracy are important; they empower local citizens,
strengthen democratic institutions, and contribute to a
foundation for growth. When it comes to programs, there is no
getting around the fact that we must back up policies with
more resources to counteract Chavez,s easy walking around
money, which is making a huge impact in countries like
Uruguay. Chavez isn't waging his campaign simply on
rhetoric. He is investing millions in his campaign for the
hearts and minds. We can use greater discretion and use our
funds in a more strategic, targeted manner, but we aren't
going to transform the perception that we are not committed
seriously to this region by waging our own campaign on the
cheap.

--------------
Getting the Message Out
--------------


16. (U) Public diplomacy will be absolutely vital to our
success. We cannot win in the marketplace of ideas unless we
have active and effective outreach, especially to the young
and those active in addressing social ills and education
needs. Embassy Santiago septel addresses many PD areas in
which we could be more active. People-to-people contact at
the grassroots level with local leaders, NGOs, youth groups,
community activists, and cooperatives is key.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


17. (C) As Chavez seeks to take on the mantle of this
generation,s Castro, he starts with built-in advantages, not
the least of which is a whole lot of money. Add to that the
bluster of his anti-imperial, anti-U.S. rhetoric, and a
certain squirrelly charisma, both of which continue to find a
sympathetic audience in much of Latin America, and he
presents a formidable foe. But he certainly can be taken.
Washington policy-makers have already hit on one sure-fire
tactic: Don,t fire back at every provocation, especially
when it,s clear that Chavez,s mouth has opened before his
brain has engaged. His recent dust-ups with both the
Brazilian and Chilean senates over the RCTV closure are

examples where Chavez,s ranting lost him points with
ostensible friends without our having to lift a finger.


18. (C) But we cannot hope for Chavez,s blunders alone to
derail him in the Southern Cone. Hence the package of
measures we propose: A more muscular USG presence in the
region that builds on high-level visits, underscores the
strengths of viable, successful alternatives (i.e., Brazil
and Chile) to Chavez,s brand of socialism, targets enhanced
resources to regions and populations beyond the elites, and
which uses public diplomacy to make our message loud and
clear - democracy, freer trade and investment, work and that
along with that come active and effective programs to address
social ills and the needs of the region's youthful
population. Enough said. End comment.

KELLY