Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SANSALVADOR2206
2007-11-01 16:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy San Salvador
Cable title:  

POPULIST SAN MIGUEL MAYOR LOOKS TO LARGER

Tags:  ES PGOV PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSN #2206/01 3051644
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011644Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8459
C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 002206 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2017
TAGS: ES PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: POPULIST SAN MIGUEL MAYOR LOOKS TO LARGER
POLITICAL STAGE

REF: SAN SALVADOR 1525

Classified By: DCM Michael A. Butler for reason 1.4(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 002206

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2017
TAGS: ES PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: POPULIST SAN MIGUEL MAYOR LOOKS TO LARGER
POLITICAL STAGE

REF: SAN SALVADOR 1525

Classified By: DCM Michael A. Butler for reason 1.4(d)


1. (U) Summary: Will Salgado, the populist mayor of the
city of San Miguel, plays a dominant role in the regional
politics of eastern El Salvador. A political maverick known
for his brash public persona, frequent party changes, and
allegations of involvement in extrajudicial vigilante groups,
Salgado believes that his candidacy could have a significant
impact on the outcome of the 2009 Presidential elections.
End summary.

--------------
San Miguel's Favorite Son
--------------


2. (U) On October 12, Political Counselor and Deputy traveled
to the city of San Miguel to meet with populist mayor Will
Salgado. San Miguel (population 282,367),the second largest
city in El Salvador, is the capital of the Department of San
Miguel and the economic hub of the eastern portion of the
country. It is also notorious as a major source of migrants
to the U.S., many of them illegal. As with virtually every
other Salvadoran municipality of any size, San Miguel has
serious problems with gangs and violent crime, as well as
street-level drug sales and drug addiction.


3. (SBU) Will Salgado is a throwback to the days of old
school populist politicians. A prominent local businessman
and former Army Sergeant who fought in the Salvadoran civil
war during the 1980's, Salgado was first elected mayor of San
Miguel as a member of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) in

2000. He then moved to the National Republican Alliance
Party (ARENA) in 2003. In 2005, Salgado opted to depart
ARENA in favor of the National Conciliation Party (PCN).
This also proved to be a short-lived evolution, as Salgado
returned to the PDC in 2007. Despite various political
permutations, Salgado has remained moored to the far right of
the Salvadoran political spectrum, as well as vehemently
critical of the "communists" in the opposition Farabundo
Marti Liberation Front (FMLN).


4. (SBU) In addition to his frequent shifts in party
affiliation, Salgado is also famous for an oversized public
persona. Salgado cultivates a regular guy image which
resonates with San Miguel voters, but often makes him the

subject of scorn and ridicule in the national media. Salgado
frequently uses colloquial language and profanity in public
settings, and makes numerous references to his humble origins
and self-propelled rise to business prominence. His plebeian
tactics also backfire on occasion, however, as he discovered
last year after his use of colorful slang to describe a San
Miguel beauty contest participant (referring to her as
literally "uglier than a spider") caused a stink that did not
die down until Salgado personally apologized. This and other
verbal indiscretions notwithstanding, Salgado's positive
local polling numbers are amongst the strongest of any
Salvadoran politician. These numbers are likely enhanced by
Salgado's sponsorship of a local soccer team and municipal
festivities, as well as the frequent television and radio
appearances that he uses to enhance his reputation for
getting things done for San Miguel's voters. (Note: Salgado
owns a local San Miguel television station, as well as a
regional chain of furniture stores which offer credit to
less-qualified customers. End note).


5. (C) There is also allegedly a darker side to Salgado's
populist appeal. Long rumored to be involved with vigilante
groups engaged in extrajudicial executions of street gang
members and other criminals, in 2005 Salgado was arrested and
prosecuted on homicide and conspiracy charges. The case
against Salgado, part of a larger prosecution brought against
a vigilante group known as "La Sombra Negra" ("the Dark
Shadow"),was dismissed on appeal in 2006. There have also
been vague but persistent allegations that Salgado is
involved in smuggling of merchandise related to his furniture
business, as well as even fuzzier accusations of a connection
to human trafficking. None of these allegations have to date
been substantiated, and, perhaps most importantly from
Salgado's perspective, they have had little impact on his
popularity with San Miguel voters.

--------------
The Mayor Will See You Now
--------------


6. (C) During a one hour office call and subsequent private
lunch, Salgado engaged poloffs in a wide-ranging
conversation. After noting that he has declared his
"pre-candidacy" for the PDC's 2009 Presidential ticket,
Salgado launched into an analysis of the political dynamics
underpinning the upcoming elections. Arguing that ARENA has

"reached the end of a cycle," Salgado opined that voter
discontent, disgust with corruption within ARENA ranks, and
"desperation for change" have swung electoral momentum in the
FMLN's favor. Although ARENA is "stubbornly trying to impose
a fifth straight Presidential candidate" on the Salvadoran
electorate, Salgado told poloffs that with journalist turned
politician Mauricio Funes out front, the FMLN has "a good
chance of winning." Noting that a local San Miguel poll gave
Funes "a 98 percent chance" of winning the upcoming
elections, Salgado warned that an FMLN government would
impose draconian economic policies leading to "the
destruction" of independent businessmen such as himself.


7. (C) Turning to his own Presidential candidacy, Salgado
stated that if he aggressively campaigned, he could draw
enough votes away from ARENA to "ensure" an FMLN victory.
After a notable pause, Salgado then declared that he is "not
obsessed with being a Presidential candidate," and will only
push his Presidential campaign "if it will help ensure
stability in El Salvador." When asked if he would consider
running for President on the ticket of a coalition of smaller
parties including the PDC, the PCN, and others, Salgado
dismissively stated "there is no third option in the
Salvadoran political spectrum," and concluded that "there is
no use in being President if you don't control the National
Assembly."


8. (C) In response to a query as to why he has changed party
affiliation so many times, Salgado launched into an extensive
discussion of corruption. Alleging that corruption is
rampant at the municipal level across the entire country,
Salgado told poloffs that his departure from the PDC and PCN
both stemmed from his refusal to engage in corruption.
Getting more specific, Salgado stated that during his stint
with the PCN, he rebuffed repeated demands that he award
municipal contracts to companies owned by cronies of the
political party leadership, including former PCN legislative
assembly deputy Roberto Silva, who is awaiting extradition
from the U.S. on charges of money laundering and official
corruption. Salgado also matter-of-factly stated that
current PDC faction leader Rodolfo Parker regularly pressures
him to reward municipal contracts and do other financial
favors for political allies. Drawing a distinction between
himself and his political colleagues, Salgado stated that as
a businessman he "pays more taxes than all of them combined,"
and that as a politician he has "never accepted one cent"
that he didn't earn.


9. (C) Salgado was equally frank when turning to crime and
public security. He explained that street gang extortion of
San Miguel businesses is a major problem, and noted that gang
members charge local businesses an average of USD 3,000 per
month protection money, an amount that forces many local
businesses already facing uncertain economic circumstances to
go under. When asked what policies or law enforcement
approaches could best counter the street gangs, Salgado
paused and said that he would share "half of the truth" with
us. He then stated that while "other measures" against gang
members are the most effective approach, he would not discuss
those. He declined to be more specific when pressed as to
the meaning of "other measures," and instead noted that in
the wake of the recent arrest of several San Miguel-based PNC
officers allegedly involved in the extrajudicial killing of
gang members (reftel),the gangs have become even more
assertive in extorting local businesses. (Note: Poloffs took
Salgado's reference to "other measures" to mean the
extrajudicial killing of gang members. End note.)


10. (C) Salgado stated that drug addiction was at the heart
of El Salvador's gang problem, and that gang members must be
"separated" from Salvadoran society, put into some sort of
institutions where they can be "detoxified," and given job
training. He went on to observe that drug addiction among
gang members is more severe in San Miguel than in San
Salvador, and that illegal drugs are more readily available
in San Miguel owing to the close proximity to the borders
with Honduras and Nicaragua. This in turn lead to Salgado
alleging that San Miguel's drug problems are exacerbated by
corruption within the National Civilian Police (PNC),who, as
"everyone in San Miguel knows," are bribed by gang members,
drug traffickers, and organized crime. Salgado then
concluded his ruminations with the observation that the U.S.
practice of deporting Salvadoran nationals with criminal
backgrounds is also a major factor behind San Miguel's
sky-high crime rates.

--------------
Comment
--------------


11. (C) In person, Salgado comes across as somewhat more
thoughtful and nuanced than the oversized public persona
depicted in the media. His analysis of the potential impact

of voter discontent with ARENA tracks reasonably closely with
what we have heard from other interlocutors and seen
suggested in polling data. Salgado's comments on the
prevalence of corruption within the ranks of the PDC and PCN,
and its spillover into municipal government, also strike us
as very plausible.


12. (C) That said, anything Salgado says needs to be taken
along with a grain of salt. Salgado's contention that his
aggressively campaigning for President in 2009 would draw
away enough votes from ARENA to ensure an FMLN victory is
both self-serving and overblown. While Salgado is certainly
the most popular politician in San Miguel, his appeal is
likely to remain a local, or, at best, a regional phenomena.
Even should he mount a serious campaign, his impact on the
2009 Presidential election would probably not be as
significant as he suggests. (Note: PDC leadership has made
clear to us that Salgado will not/not run for President
representing that party in 2009. End note). Salgado's views
on police corruption in San Miguel seem idiosyncratic, and
are most likely the result of lingering animus over his 2005
arrest at the hands of the PNC.


13. (C) Although Salgado's apparent tacit support for the
extrajudicial execution of street gang members is troubling
in and of itself, it more importantly reflects a far more
serious dynamic lurking on the fringes of Salvadoran society.
With violent crime rates consistently high, and street gangs
ever more brazenly extorting small and medium-sized
businesses, the Salvadoran public is losing confidence in the
ability of the PNC, the judiciary, the main political
parties, and even the state itself to deliver on promises of
improved public security. Should this trend continue, the
"other means" alluded to by Salgado may come to strike many
Salvadorans as a viable tactic for prevailing in the nation's
ongoing struggle with violent street gangs. End comment.
Glazer