SAADA HISTORY: HUSSEIN AL-HOUTHI - PARLIAMENTARIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 000907

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2017
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: SAADA HISTORY: HUSSEIN AL-HOUTHI - PARLIAMENTARIAN
TURNED INSURGENT

REF: A. 04 SANAA 001936

B. 04 SANAA 001962

C. 04 SANAA 002225

D. 04 SANAA 002006

E. 04 SANAA 002421

F. SANAA 000226

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Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Since 2004, the ROYG has fought three wars in
the Saada governorate with the al-Houthis, with each round
more intense and prolonged than the last. History is key to
understanding why this conflict began and continues to
reemerge. The roots of the conflict lie with the late Hussein
Badr al-Din al-Houthi, the former member of Parliament and
inspiration of the first rebellion in 2004. His evolution
and radicalization mirror the conflict itself, which
continues to gain strength as those supporting the al-Houthis
grow in number. His beliefs began through his experiences as
a student in Sudan, grew into an ideology as a teacher, and
developed into a movement as a rebel leader. Post has
collected views from contacts who had direct communication
with Hussein al-Houthi, and presents them here as a way of
understanding the roots of the current conflict. END SUMMARY

Parliamentarian
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2. (C) From 1993-1997, Hussein al-Houthi was a member of
Parliament, as a representative of the al-Haq party.
According to post contacts, President Saleh promised
al-Houthi his support in 1997 if he distanced himself from
his party and aligned with the ruling GPC party. Al-Houthi
thus split from al-Haq, only to be met with empty promises
aimed at keeping him under government control in Sanaa, and
away from Saada. The President's office subsequently
campaigned against al-Houthi, causing him to lose his seat
during the 1997 parliamentary elections to another GPC member.

Student
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3. (C) Shortly thereafter, the relatively young al-Houthi
received a government scholarship to complete his masters and
doctoral studies in Sudan. In 2001, after obtaining his
graduate degree, but before completing his doctoral
dissertation in Islamic studies, family health issues caused
him to return to Saada. During his stay, his scholarship was
taken away by the government and he could not return to
Khartoum to complete his studies. While in his home village
of Marran, a powerful sheikh jailed 14 villagers due to a
dispute over a water well. Hussein al-Houthi saw this as a
grave injustice, and felt it was his duty to stand-up for his
weak and poor compatriots. (NOTE: The al-Houthis are not
tribal, but live under the protection of tribal sheikhs as
descendants of the Prophet Mohammed. END NOTE)

Teacher
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4. (C) Soon thereafter, Hussein al-Houthi joined the
Believing Youth, or "Shabab al-Mo'min" in Arabic. He began
to host cultural forums for youths, assembling large numbers
of followers attracted to his charismatic speaking style. He
stressed the importance of loyalty to the group and obedience
to the leader. He slowly began breaking away from the
Shabab, criticizing them for only being an educational
association, and not rising to the next necessary step of
becoming a movement. He thus took his disciples and decided
to transform his thoughts into an ideology, to bring about a
movement. He believed that all of the independent Zaydi
scholars in Saada needed to be united under one umbrella.
The invasion of Iraq in 2003 gave him the fuel he was
searching for to boast popular interest in his ideas.
Al-Houthi and his followers, who still have not established a
formal name or leadership structure, began to be known as
"harakat al-shi'ar,' or the movement of the slogan. (NOTE:
See ref F for an explanation of Zaydi Islam and the
particular brand practiced by the al-Houthis. END NOTE)

The Movement of the Slogan
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5. (C) Capitalizing upon popular fervor against the invasion
of Iraq, al-Houthi followers began taking up the slogan,
"Death to America, Death to Israel." The slogan also stood
as an indirect criticism of the ROYG, which the movement
painted as a corrupt stooge of the United States and Israel.


6. (C) Al-Houthi's following continued to expand in
2002-2003. Some were sent to Sanaa to chant the movement's
slogan in the Grand Mosque of the capital. The ROYG took a
firm stance against these chanters, arresting approximately
800 individuals throughout numerous Friday prayer ceremonies,
further fueling anti-government sentiments.

Saada
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7. (C) Al-Houthi took advantage of every opportunity to
politically attack President Saleh with the slogan, whether
in Sanaa or Saada. An event which sparked greater tension
between the two men occurred when the President passed
through Saada on his way to Hajj pilgrimage in Mecca.
Al-Houthi sent protesters to chant the movement's
anti-American slogan outside the Saada mosque where Saleh had
stopped to pray. After prayers, the President attempted to
give a speech, but was impeded by three men loudly chanting
the slogan.

Letter
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8. (C) In response, Saleh sent a letter to Hussein al-Houthi
summoning him to Sanaa, to which al-Houthi agreed.
Meanwhile, in June (2004) Saleh visited Washington, DC and
upon his return, sent another letter to al-Houthi summoning
him again to Sanaa. Al-Houthi agreed once more, but was
intercepted on his way by government troops, who were sent to
address an unrelated tribal conflict. Three of these troops
were killed reportedly, while trying to break-up a drug
smuggling confrontation in the province. Saleh believed that
al-Houthi was behind the death of the three soldiers.

Fighting Erupts
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9. (C) Following this incident, al-Houthi and his followers
took to the mountains of Marran in Saada. The ROYG asked for
Hussein al-Houthi to surrender, but he refused, setting off
the first armed confrontations with the ROYG in 2004.
Hussein was killed on September 10, 2004, after approximately
10 weeks of fighting (ref A).

Continuous Fighting
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10. (C) The death of Hussein al-Houthi in 2004 marked for the
ROYG the end of the conflict in Saada. Uprisings in 2005 and
2007, however, led by Hussein's father Badr al-Din and his
brother Abdul-Malik, respectively, demonstrated that the
rupture between the al-Houthi movement and the ROYG only grew
deeper. Reliable DAO contacts indicate that fighters in
support of al-Houthi now number more than 4,000. On April
14, President Saleh told Ambassador that more than 3,000
government troops had so far been killed or injured in the
fight. Since that date, casualties on both sides have only
increased, with more intense fighting displacing thousands
within Saada. According to a range of contacts, this latest
conflict, which broke out in January, has spread to include
tribes that were not previously involved, but who feel
wronged by Saleh, and are taking advantage of the al-Houthis'
uprising to put pressure on Saleh. (NOTE: Tribal and Salafi
involvement will be reported septel. END NOTE)

COMMENT
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11. (C) COMMENT: Despite Hussein al-Houthi's anti-American
slogans, observers who are in contact with the al-Houthis
believe that Hussein was, and now Abdul-Malik is and
continues to be devoted to maintaining a republican regime.
Their aim, according to these contacts, is not to return the
rule of the imam, as the ROYG claims, but rather to have
peace, security, and prosperity in Saada and all of Yemen.
These observers claim that the al-Houthis utilized an

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anti-Western slogan to unite their community against
injustice, which they believe is exemplified by the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the American "occupation" of
Iraq. Despite this, however, their primary focus is on their
own country, and specifically to the province of Saada, which
is notoriously neglected by the ROYG and is deeply
impoverished.


12. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The evolution of the al-Houthi
phenomenon suggests that this is a classic political and
personal struggle between a regional leader who feels wronged
and betrayed, and a strong ruler who feels inappropriately
challenged. The struggle has expanded with each round of
fighting to include those who feel they have little left to
lose, and are ready to use religion to further their
political goals. Analyzing the conflict from this angle
provides at least a degree of hope that what began as a
political dispute between two formidable adversaries can also
be resolved by political means. The longer the conflict
endures, however, and the more actors beyond the al-Houthi
family become involved, the more difficult it becomes to
reach such a settlement. END COMMENT


13. (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR KHARTOUM

KRAJESKI