SAADA: FIGHTING INTENSIFIES WITH TROOP SURGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000285

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2017
TAGS: MOPS PINR PREL YM
SUBJECT: SAADA: FIGHTING INTENSIFIES WITH TROOP SURGE

REF: A. SANAA 263

B. SANAA 243

C. SANAA 226

D. SANAA 221

E. SANAA 211

SANAA 00000285 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (
D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Fighting in Saada intensified over the
past week as ROYG troop deployments in Saada doubled to
nearly 15,000. Estimates of troops killed in ambushes and
direct attacks on military installations are between 50 and
100, with at least 200 injured. Casualties among the
al-Houthis are difficult to confirm, but currently appear
much lower. Al-Houthis reportedly brought the fight to Sanaa
by dumping the bodies of several security officers in
locations around the city in a scare tactic against the
security and military services. Despite these actions and
the escalation of fighting in Saada, post does not see the
potential for a wider conflict that would threaten the regime
at this time. END SUMMARY


2. (C) Since fighting broke out again in earnest on January
27, the ROYG has nearly doubled its troop presence in Saada
to between 12,000 and 15,000 regular troops, mostly from the
1st Armored Division, according to DAO's government sources,
and has begun using fighter jets for bombing missions. The
Government has sought public support for these deployments
and ensuing military action through a nationwide media
campaign using strong rhetoric against the al-Houthis,
calling them for example, "ignorant forces of darkness who
adopted deviant terrorist and racist ideas." The President
also secured Parliament's authorization for a military
campaign, held public, televised meetings of the Supreme
Defense Council, and issued three public ultimata demanding
that the al-Houthis lay down their arms -- all of which were
ignored.


3. (C) The al-Houthis, for their part, have engaged in
guerrilla-style fighting through ambushes and attacks on
military personnel and facilities in Saada, resulting in the
deaths of between 50 and 100 troops, according to ROYG
officials and media outlets. President Saleh estimated the
number of injured troops at 250. The Government has been
silent on the number of al-Houthi casualties, and the
inability of Yemeni civilians, including journalists, to
travel to Saada has made it difficult to ascertain confirmed
numbers, but most observers believe that the al-Houthis'
losses are much lower than the Government's. (NOTE: Media
reports that telephone communications to and from Saada have
been cut are false. END NOTE)


4. (C) While the al-Houthis have not been able to match the
Government's media campaign, the insurrectionists have
reportedly begun psychological operations targeted against
the ROYG's security and military services. Over the past 10
days, the al-Houthis reportedly dumped the dead bodies of
several police officers from Saada in locations around Sanaa.
Unlike during previous military campaigns against the
al-Houthis in 2004 and 2005, however, post has not received
reports of grenade attacks or assassination plots against
ROYG officials in Sanaa.


5. (C) Contacts have reported separately that certain Saada
tribesmen are backing the al-Houthis, not for ideological
links to the group, but rather out of anger toward the ROYG
for not receiving the kind of budget outlays they were privy
to in previous years. DAO also reports that individual young
tribesmen from al-Jawf province have reinforced the al-Houthi
fighters, although not with the explicit blessing of their
tribal leaders.


6. (C) COMMENT: This third phase of violence between the
al-Houthis and ROYG forces has thus far followed the same
pattern as in 2004 and 2005. What began as small clashes at
the end of January has escalated as the Government deploys
more troops and attempts to garner political support among
key constituencies and the public at large. As in previous
campaigns, post expects to see an increase in losses on both
sides and potential al-Houthi operations against specific

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targets in Sanaa.


7. (C) COMMENT CONT'D: The Government has emphasized both
publicly and privately that this time it wants to break the
al-Houthis' back. It is not clear to post at this point that
the Government can wipe out every member of what appears to
be a highly dispersed and decentralized group that feels it
has little to lose and believes it is fighting for a just
cause. At the same time, we do not see any signs that the
al-Houthis are capable of destabilizing the regime. Tribal
support for the insurrectionists bears watching, but we do
not yet have the sense that the tribes in Saada intend to do
anything more than enjoy seeing Saleh's nose bloodied. END
COMMENT
KRAJESKI