Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SANAA243
2007-02-12 10:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

SAADA: PARLIAMENT VOTES FOR WAR, BUT OVER WHAT?

Tags:  PREL MOPS PINR PINS PHUM YM 
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PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHYN #0243/01 0431041
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121041Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6367
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0192
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0174
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0068
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 000243 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS PINR PINS PHUM YM
SUBJECT: SAADA: PARLIAMENT VOTES FOR WAR, BUT OVER WHAT?

REF: A. SANAA 226

B. SANAA 221

C. SANAA 211

D. SANAA 177

E. SANAA 139

F. SANAA 116

G. SANAA 85

Classified By: DCM NABEEL KHOURY, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 000243

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS PINR PINS PHUM YM
SUBJECT: SAADA: PARLIAMENT VOTES FOR WAR, BUT OVER WHAT?

REF: A. SANAA 226

B. SANAA 221

C. SANAA 211

D. SANAA 177

E. SANAA 139

F. SANAA 116

G. SANAA 85

Classified By: DCM NABEEL KHOURY, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a closed session on February 10,
Parliament voted to authorize President Saleh to use military
force against al-Houthi insurrectionists in Saada.
Opposition party leaders have kept a low-profile in public,
but indicated privately that their parties voted
overwhelmingly against the measure. Echoing comments made by
a range of Embassy contacts, these leaders believe that the
roots of the conflict are a complicated mix of political and
tribal manipulation, influenced by religious ideology. The
Government and the al-Houthis share the blame for the
conflict and must now compromise in order to resolve it.
Particularly, the Government must show consistency in how it
deals with Saada compared to other governorates in the
administration of mosques and schools, as well as the
disposition of security forces. The al-Houthis must overcome
past grievances, accept that the republican system cannot be
replaced by a sectarian regime, and work within the system to
achieve change. The al-Houthis' precise political aims and
political organization remain unclear even to these seasoned
oppositionists. END SUMMARY

--------------
PARLIAMENT VOTES FOR WAR
--------------


2. (C) Parliament met in closed session on February 10 and
received a briefing from National Security Bureau Director
Ali al-Ansi. Opposition and independent media outlets
complained that their reporters werenot allowed to cover the
session, but pro-governent newspapers claimed that the
Parliament "urge the Government to end the al-Houthi
sedition" and take legal action against members of a
mediatio committee that had originally enjoyed the
Goverment's support. (NOTE: The mediation committee i
headed by the Saada governor, who was appointedas a
political concession to the al-Houthis after the last round

of major fighting ended in early 006. According to
opposition contacts, the Govenor is now perceived as being
too close to the a-Houthis and is being branded a "traitor"
by som, particularly in the sensationalist press associated
with the regime. END NOTE)

--------------
OPPOSITION QUIET BUT FRUSTRATED --------------


3. (C) In a prvate meeting with DCM and PolChief, Yemeni
Sociaist Party (YSP) Secretary General Dr. Yassin Said Noman
and Islah Secretary General Abdulwahab al-Ani said that
their parties had voted overwhelmingy against the
authorization to use force. Askedwhy the two main
opposition parties have been quet thus far on the third
round of fighting in Saada, al-Ansi replied that the
opposition had takena strong public stance against the use
of violene when the Government launched its first major
ofensive against the al-Houthis in 2004. Al-Ansi hd
participated actively in mediation efforts at tat time, and
felt that the Government threw up s many obstacles to those
efforts that the mediaton committee became frustrated.
Al-Ansi said that there is a feeling among the opposition
that the Government is determined to take military action,
and there is little the parties can do to block it, but the
opposition press has been vocal in its criticisms of the
Government.

--------------
WHAT IS THIS WAR ABOUT, ANYWAY?
--------------


4. (C) Al-Ansi and Noman advised that military force alone
would not solve the problem and that both sides would need to

SANAA 00000243 002 OF 003


accept part of the blame for the continued conflict and
return to the negotiating table to find a solution. Echoing
comments made by other post contacts (reftels),they opined
that the conflict should not be seen as primarily a
Sunni-Shia clash. While the al-Houthis' brand of Shi'ism
plays a role in their thinking, there are tribal and
historical elements to the conflict that are at least as
important.


5. (C) According to these party leaders, the al-Houthis feel
wronged by the Saleh regime because it was Saleh himself who
"played the religion card first." Saleh financed and
facilitated the al-Houthis' religious studies in Iran, where
they established ties to the religious community in Qom, and
then gave them control over mosques and schools when they
returned to Yemen in order to counter growing Salafi
influence in Saada in particular. As the al-Houthis began to
grow into a more popular political force, particularly with
armed elements, Saleh gradually moved to replace al-Houthi
preachers and administrators with Salafi or Shafi' preachers
in Saada mosques and schools. The al-Houthis felt betrayed
and increasingly hemmed in, both ideologically and
politically.


6. (C) To the extent that the al-Houthis have a political
program -- which is not at all clear at this point -- it is
to return Yemen to imamic rule, according to Noman and
al-Ansi. The al-Houthis see no benefit from the republican
system, but view it simply as having replaced religious
authoritarianism with a secular one. Given the choice
between "dictatorships," according to Noman, the al-Houthis
would rather it be a religious one.

--------------
SO HOW DO WE FIX IT?
--------------


7. (C) Prodded into focusing on what is actually on the
negotiating table and how it should be dealt with, our
interlocutors suggested the Government must make the
republican system work consistently for all of the people,
including the al-Houthis. This means development assistance
for Saada, but also a commitment to keeping the Government
out of local mosques. The Government should determine what
constitutes a "red line" in terms of mosque preachers' speech
if they are inciting followers to action, but in general, the
Government should allow mosques to stay under local control
and for preachers to exercise the right of political
expression.


8. (C) The Government must also not treat Saada differently
from other governorates when it comes to the disposition of
security forces. If areas under tribal control are respected
in al-Jawf and Marib, for example, then they should also be
respected in Saada. The Government cannot insist on
controlling every mountain-top in Saada when it does not
insist on the same conditions elsewhere. Likewise, the
Government must respect tribal traditions when dealing with
the al-Houthis -- who are above all else tribesmen -- and not
deal with them solely on a military basis.


9. (C) The al-Houthis, for their part, must compromise by
accepting the republican system and working within it. They
must also accept that schools are not religious institutions,
but are places in which children should learn about
republicanism, their rights under the constitution, and good
civics in general.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) Noman and al-Ansi are two of the most respected
members of the opposition, and their analysis of the
situation is the best we have heard from any of our contacts
thus far. Noman, a secular southerner and al-Ansi, a Shafi'
Islamist northerner, are beholden neither to the Government's
nor to the al-Houthis' views on this issue, so it is not
surprising that they believe that both sides need to admit
their mistakes and compromise if the conflict is to be
resolved without further bloodshed.

SANAA 00000243 003 OF 003




11. (C) While this cool-headed analysis is the most likely
path to peace and stability in Saada, there currently are no
signs that either the Government or the al-Houthis are
willing to follow it. This confrontation has become a very
emotional and personal issue for Saleh and Abdul Malik
al-Houthi and his followers, a fact that indicates to us that
another major military confrontation will probably take place
before both sides are willing to sit down to serious
negotiations again. Like most issues in Yemen, this conflict
is rooted in a complex mix of personal, tribal, military and
political considerations -- all of which are influenced by
the religious beliefs of the al-Houthis and Government
supporters, but are not exclusively governed by them.
KRAJESKI