Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SANAA226
2007-02-07 11:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

ZAYDI SHI'IS, THE AL HOUTHIS, AND SUNNIS: WHAT IT

Tags:  MOPS PINR PREL YM 
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FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
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INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0007
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0065
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000226 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017
TAGS: MOPS PINR PREL YM
SUBJECT: ZAYDI SHI'IS, THE AL HOUTHIS, AND SUNNIS: WHAT IT
MEANS FOR THE SAADA CONFLICT

SANAA 00000226 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: DCM NABEEL KHOURY, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000226

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017
TAGS: MOPS PINR PREL YM
SUBJECT: ZAYDI SHI'IS, THE AL HOUTHIS, AND SUNNIS: WHAT IT
MEANS FOR THE SAADA CONFLICT

SANAA 00000226 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: DCM NABEEL KHOURY, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The third outbreak of major clashes between
al-Houthi insurgents and the Yemeni regime has once again
brought international attention to Yemen's Zaydi (Shia)
population. Misunderstanding about Yemeni Zaydi practices
and beliefs have led some in the regional and international
communities to view the Saada conflict as Sunni versus Shia.
The line between Sunni and Shia in Yemen, however, is highly
blurred; the two groups often pray in the same mosques and
worship much in the same manner, while identity is derived
chiefly from tribal rather than religious affiliation.
Confusion exists among Yemenis themselves on what it actually
means to be Zaydi, and the relationship Zaydi teachings have
with the political theology of Badr al-Din al-Houthi. The
conflict between the ROYG and the al-Houthis is political and
tribal, rather than religious in nature, yet the fighting in
Saada has stirred up questions about the Sunni-Shia divide in
Yemen, and whether or not it exists at all. END SUMMARY

--------------
Yemen's Zaydi Shia
--------------


2. (U) Approximately 75 percent of Yemenis are Sunni Muslims
of the Shafi'i school. The remaining 25 percent are Shia of
the Zaydi sect. Among Shia, Zaydis are considered the
closest to Sunni theology. Zaydis believe neither in the
infallibility of the Imams, nor in their divine guidance.


3. (U) Zaydis come from the "fiver" school of Shi'ism, based
on the belief that there were only five legitimate Imams
following the death of the Prophet Mohammed. The
overwhelming number of Yemeni Zaydis reside in the northern
governorates, which are also heavily tribal. The regime's
ruling elite, including President Saleh, Speaker of
Parliament Abdullah al-Ahmar, and General Ali Mohsen
al-Ahmar, are of Zaydi origin.


4. (U) Until the Yemen Revolution defeated the Imamate in
1962, Zaydi Imams ruled most of northern Yemen through a Shia
dynasty that was founded in 897. Members of the ruling
family, referred to as Sayeds, claimed to be Hashemites --

direct descendants of the Prophet Mohammed. As Islamic
regimes came and went, a key political belief arose that is
still current among Zaydis today: Zaydis have the right and
the duty to overthrow their ruler when he has become corrupt.

-------------- --
Shia and Sunni in Yemen: What's the Difference?
-------------- --


5. (C) Yemen's Zaydis and Shafi'is often pray in the same
mosques and practice many of the same customs. Yemen's
Zaydis do not celebrate Ashura, one of the holiest of Shia
occasions, with the traditional solemn procession and
self-flagellation witnessed in other countries. In years
past, Sanaa celebrated Ashura with a fireworks display, but
public observance of the holiday has been more muted in
recent years. On matters of Islamic law, Zaydis are closer
to Sunni Shafi'i beliefs than to other Shia interpretations.


6. (SBU) Unlike other nations with significant Shia
minorities, Yemen has no history of a distinct Shia community
with its own religious, social, or political agenda. Zaydi
Sheikh al-Ahmar heads the Islamic-based reform party Islah,
and powerful Commander of the Northwestern Region, General
Ali Mohsen, is known for his Salafi beliefs and connections.
Both are Zaydi, yet hold leadership positions in Sunni
political and religious movements.

-------------- ---
Shabab al-Moumin: What Sort of Shia are They?
-------------- ---


7. (SBU) The "Shabab" follow the teachings of slain rebel
leader Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, who is from a prominent
Zaydi and Hashemite family. Al-Houthi's teachings can be
described as "homemade" twelver Shi'ism, the mainstream set
found in Iran and throughout the Middle East. Al-Houthi

SANAA 00000226 002.2 OF 002


studied at the Badr Religious Center, founded with Saleh's
tacit endorsement, by Yemeni theologian al-Hatwari in 1997.
Al-Hatwari taught the twelver version of Shi'ism, elements of
which al-Houthi took back to followers in Saada - with an
emphasis on lineage. Al-Houthi preached that only
descendants of a Hashemite family from the Sayed class (such
as himself) could be a legitimate ruler of Yemen. When this
belief was made public, it naturally drew the attention of
the regime.

--------------
Comment
--------------


8. (C) COMMENT: The al-Houthi rebels' ultimate political
goal is unclear. Statements and writings of both Hussein
Badr al-Din al-Houthi, killed at the end of the first phase
of the conflict in 2005, as well as those of his father
Hussein, suggest that they favor the revival of the Imamate
theocracy with an anti-American vision. Their rhetoric is
highly antagonistic against Israel and the United States.
The ROYG claims that al-Houthi followers envision a regime
modeled after the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is still
unclear, however, as the al-Houthi's statements and military
operations have focused mainly on control of Saada in
alliance with key tribes.


9. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: According to reliable contact,
fighting broke out on January 27, for example, due to a
classic tribal dispute with the ROYG: the placement of
military checkpoints in key tribal areas. This further
illustrates that the al-Houthis are acting with the well-worn
mold of Yemen's tribes, who have for centuries challenged the
way the country's central authority governs them. END COMMENT
KRAJESKI