BADAWI INTERVIEWS CONCLUDE -- TIME TO CONSIDER

S E C R E T SANAA 002151

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV YM
SUBJECT: BADAWI INTERVIEWS CONCLUDE -- TIME TO CONSIDER
NEXT STEPS

REF: A. SANAA 1989

B. SANAA 1991

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) On November 26, a team of FBI investigators will
conduct their final interview with convicted USS Cole bombing
conspirator Jamal al-Badawi. With the end of these regular
interviews, we now face the issue of how to ensure that
Badawi remains in jail in Sana'a while inter-agencey
discussions continue regarding USG requirements to resolve
this matter. Until now, the FBI interviews have acted as de
facto verification visits. While the ROYG, up to and
including President Saleh, has promised us continued access
to Badawi, the details of the access have not been spelled
out (reftels).


2. (C) On November 26, the Ambassador met for approximately
40 minutes with Minister of Interior Rashad Mohamed al-Alimi.
After thanking him for giving the FBI investigators access
to Badawi, the Ambassador reiterated continuing USG interest
in taking custody of the terrorist, notwithstanding Yemen's
constitutional restrictions on extradition. The Ambassador
then noted that, while discussions on ways to resolved the
Badawi case continue, it is in the interests of both nations
to examine ways to ensure that Badawi remains incarcerated.
To that end, the Ambassador presented the Minister the
following possibilities:

a) Use of an Electronic Monitoring Device
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(C) The USG could offer to the ROYG the use of an electronic
monitoring device like those used in the United States to
keep prisoners under house arrest. These devices consist of
a radio transmitter in a bracelet that attaches to a
prisoner's ankle. This transmitter sends a regular message
to a receiver that can be calibrated to determine if the
individual wearing the bracelet is in a certain area. (Note:
RSO indicates these devices can be accurate to within a few
feet. End Note.) The bracelet is designed so that any
attempt to remove it will be detectable. This would allow
reliable monitoring of Badawi's location. This would likely
still require visits to the prison to ensure the device had
not been tampered with. The device should be installed and
monitored by U.S. officials.

b) On-Demand Visits
--------------

(C) A specified number of visits each month with an agreed
upon minimum required notice time (perhaps one hour) would
allow us to effectively ensure Badawi's presence in the
prison with an acceptable level of intrusion into the Yemeni
prison system and an acceptable commitment of USG time and
effort. (Comment. The most important issue with visits is
not that they be unlimited in number, rather that they be as
close to unannounced as possible. An unlimited number of
visits is useless if the ROYG has 48 hours to produce the
prisoner. This would be sufficient time to find him and
bring him to Sana'a for the visit. On the other hand, visits
that would not allow the ROYG time to prepare would be
effective even if they were limited in number. End Comment.)

The Minister said that he would pass the ideas on to senior
security officials.


3. (C) Post will continue to press the ROYG for a suitable
monitoring mechanism, and welcomes alternatives methods that
may not have occurred to us.
SECHE