Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SANAA2138
2007-11-20 15:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

AL-QIRBI PUSHES FOR HIGH-LEVEL US PARTICIPATION IN

Tags:  PGOV PREL YM 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0009
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHYN #2138/01 3241501
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201501Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8450
C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 002138 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL YM
SUBJECT: AL-QIRBI PUSHES FOR HIGH-LEVEL US PARTICIPATION IN
FORUM FOR THE FUTURE

REF: SANAA 1191

SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 002138

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL YM
SUBJECT: AL-QIRBI PUSHES FOR HIGH-LEVEL US PARTICIPATION IN
FORUM FOR THE FUTURE

REF: SANAA 1191

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (U) In their November 20 meeting, the Ambassador
reiterated his understanding to Foreign Minister al-Qirbi
that the Secretary of State would not attend the Forum for
the Future, while al-Qirbi continued to push for high-level
U.S. participation. Al-Qirbi was optimistic but
non-committal about Arab involvement in the Annapolis
Conference.

THE FORUM FOR THE FUTURE
--------------


2. (U) The first topic of discussion in the Ambassador's 25
minute, November 20 meeting with Foreign Minster al-Qirbi was
the Forum for the Future. Al-Qirbi began by asking if the
Ambassador had any new information. The Ambassador noted that
he presumed the Minister knew by now that Assistant Secretary
Welch had told Yemeni Ambassador to the United States
al-Hajjri yesterday that the Secretary's attendance at the
Forum was not viable in the absence of a satisfactory
resolution to the Badawi case. Al-Qirbi indicated that the
ROYG considered the Forum too important to abandon and
intended to continue with it. He noted that he intended to
place a call to his German counterpart that afternoon to
discuss it.


3. (C) While appearing to accept that the Secretary would not
attend, al-Qirbi continued to make the case for high level
U.S. participation. He pointed out some people might see
sub-ministerial U.S. participation as a sign that the U.S. is
not serious about the Forum's goals and has lost interest.
The Ambassador said that there should be no doubt about
continued U.S. commitment to the Forum's goals and, in fact,
it was concern that the Secretary' participation in the
meeting would distract from serious discussion of those goals
given the Badawi issue, that prompted her decision to stay
away.

THE ANNAPOLIS CONFERENCE
--------------


4. (C) On the topic of the Annapolis conference, the
Ambassador emphasized the importance of broad Arab
participation to its success. He urged al-Qirbi himself to
attend. The Foreign Minister replied that neither he nor his
regional counterparts had received invitations. (Note: Post
will forward the invitation immediately upon receipt. End

Note.) Al-Qirbi went on to say that a group of Arab
Foreign Ministers will meet in Cairo on November 22; he
expected that a decision on participation would come out of
that meeting. Overall, al-Qirbi appeared optimistic about
the conference. He said he believed that all Arab countries
would participate as long as the agenda includes issues seen
to be critical to a comprehensive settlement, including the
Golan Heights and Shebba Farms. He indicated that the
presence of Syria and Lebanon among the invitees was
important as well.

CT COOPERATION IN THE POST BADAWI WORLD
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador noted the importance to the bilateral
relationship of not allowing the Badawi case to become its
defining issue. He noted frustration with Political Security
Organization (PSO) Chief General Ghalib Mutahir Qamish, who
appears to lack the will to move forward on building a clear
strategic partnership with U.S. counterpart agencies. He
noted that this subject would likely be raised with Qamish
when he visits the United States next week. (Note. Qamish
and Deputy PSO director Ammar Saleh will travel to the U.S.
to meet with Senior U.S. Security Officials including the NSC
and the Director of the FBI on a trip sponsored by post's
POLMIL office. End Note.) The Ambassador reiterated to
al-Qirbi that Post had not yet received the detailed
information on President Saleh's surrender program, which
Saleh had promised within four days on October 29 (reftel).
Al-Qirbi noted that he had looked into the issue and that
Deputy PSO Director General Ali Mansour, who was tasked with
providing the information, continues to be preoccupied
dealing with unrest in Southern Yemen. He said he would
speak to Mansour about it again.


6. (C) Al-Qirbi took the opportunity of the meeting to
express some of his personal views on the bilateral
relationship. He said that it is important that we not allow
our CT cooperation to become bogged down in issues of what he
called "tactics," a clear reference to the handling of the
Badawi case. He went on to say that people often don't

understand the social and tribal issues that come into play
in Yemen and said if our two countries disagree on tactics,
we should sit down and discuss them. Al-Qirbi then moved to
the issue of the relationship between the diplomatic and
security services. "In the past," he said, "the diplomatic
services have been able to act as a bridge between the
security services." He said that the ROYG now feels that the
State Department has taken the side of the security services
and is ignoring political issues. The Ambassador noted that
the Badawi case had both security and political implications
for the United States.

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) Although he appears to accept that Secretary Rice will
not be attending the Forum for the Future, al-Qirbi was
clearly looking for confirmation that the U.S. still intends
to send a senior-level delegation. The ROYG has invested a
lot of political capital in the Forum and will likely try to
proceed with it as a Ministerial-level event. His comments
on Arab participation in the Annapolis conference are
encouraging. His responses to the Ambassador's CT
cooperation concerns, however, were disappointing, as was his
return to the "cultural context" rhetoric on the Badawi
issue.
SECHE