AMBASSADOR PRESSES FOREIGN MINISTRY ON BADAWI CASE

S E C R E T SANAA 002096

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KISL YM
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PRESSES FOREIGN MINISTRY ON BADAWI CASE

REF: STATE 155898

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
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1. (S) Per reftel, the Ambassador met on November 14 with the
Deputy Foreign Minister to discuss the Badawi case. The
Ambassador thanked him for the steps the ROYG has taken to
ensure access for FBI investigators and reiterated strong USG
interest in having Badawi in US custody. He said the USG
would look favorably on Badawi's continued incarceration in
Sana'a with USG access. Al-Dhabbi said the ROYG would work
to resolve the situation and agreed to convey the message to
President Saleh. The Ambassador privately suggested
exploring how Badawi could be turned over and what incentives
might make it politically feasible. Noting that he had not
received instructions from Washington, the Ambassador said
these incentives might include the rescheduling of the
signing of Yemen's Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)
Threshold Country Plan or working for the return of Yemenis
currently held at Guantanamo. Al-Dhabbi said he would pass
the message directly to Saleh. End Summary.

Official Meeting
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2. (C) On November 14, the Ambassador met with Prime Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohy Al-Dhabbi for approximately
45 minutes at Al-Dhabbi's office to discuss the case of Jamal
al-Badawi. The Ambassador conveyed to Al-Dhabbi the USG's
appreciation for transferring Badawi to Sana'a and providing
access to him for FBI investigators. The Ambassador noted
that Badawi's cooperation has been good and the FBI team was
satisfied with PSO cooperation. He particularly noted
assurances the team had received that Badawi was returned to
a prison cell each evening after interrogation.


3. (C) The Ambassador reiterated to Al-Dhabbi the USG's
desire to have Badawi handed over to U.S. custody. While
that issue is wrestled with, the Ambassador indicated to
Al-Dhabbi that the USG would look favorably on a decision to
keep Badawi in prison in Sana'a and grant U.S. officials
on-demand access to him. He then added that Badawi's case,
if left unresolved, could become a major impediment to the
bilateral relationship.


4. (C) The Deputy Foreign Minister asked if such
incarceration in Sana'a with the stated conditions would
satisfy the USG. The Ambassador responded that such
incarceration was a requirement. Al-Dhabbi said that the
ROYG would do its best to protect the bilateral relationship
but urged that the USG not stake the entire relationship on
one issue. He conceded that in negotiating with Badawi the
ROYG had not sufficiently considered American feelings but
emphasized that at no time did the ROYG intend to hurt the
victims of the USS Cole bombing or their families. He
assured the Ambassador the ROYG is doing the "maximum that it
can" and promised to convey the Ambassador's message the same
day. The Ambassador expressed his appreciation the ROYG's
commitment to keep Badawi in prison.


Private Conversation
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5. (S) The Ambassador asked at this point if he might speak
privately with al-Dhabbi. Once the notetakers had departed,
the Ambassador explained that he wanted to convey our wish to
explore quietly with the ROYG ways to effect the transfer of
Badawi to US custody, recognizing the difficulty this course
of action poses for President Saleh.


6. (S) The Ambassador told al-Dhabbi that we do not wish to
focus exclusively on the negative consequences of the Badawi
case going unresolved, although there should be no doubt that
failure to reach a satisfactory outcome would almost
certainly lead to such measures. We are also prepared, the
Ambassador said, to consider steps that will enable President
Saleh to point to material gains for Yemen as a result of
Badawi,s surrender to US custody. Taking care to note that
he had yet to receive instructions from Washington, the
Ambassador suggested that these measures might include, in
the first instance, a rescheduling of the MCC Threshold
Program signing. He said he also believed the USG would be
prepared to work towards the return of Yemeni nationals
currently held at Guantanamo. These two steps, he said,
should enable President Saleh to claim that Yemen had been
more than adequately compensated for its decision to turn
over Badawi to American custody. The Ambassador also said
that other gestures might also be considered in order to
enable both Yemen and the United States to assert that our
respective requirements had been satisfied and, in the
process, put this matter behind us.


7. (S) Al-Dhabbi said he would inform the President
personally of the United States, interest in exploring
incentives that might be offered to resolve the Badawi
affair, recognizing that this subject should remain as close
hold as possible. He expressed certainty that President
Saleh,s first reaction would be an adamant rejection of any
negotiation, but that on reflection, the President would
begin to see the benefits and his position might evolve.
This, al-Dhabbi said, is a process that will require both
time and careful management. He promised to keep the
Ambassador informed.

Comment
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8. (S) Although Al-Dhabbi did not formally commit to any
concrete ROYG action, his tone indicated that he felt that,
at a minimum, the USG can count on Badawi's continued
incarceration with access that will allow us to confirm his
status. With respect to possible incentives for Badawi's
return, Al-Dhabbi's willingness to convey to Saleh an idea
that he thinks will face "adamant rejection" is, in and of
itself, a positive sign. In Yemen, very few officials are
willing to carry messages to the President that they feel
will upset him.
SECHE