Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SANAA2044
2007-11-04 09:23:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

SALEH ADVISOR TELLS AMBASSADOR THE PRESIDENT NOW

Tags:  PTER PREL KMCA EAID EFIN ECON YM 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7275
RR RUEHLMC
DE RUEHYN #2044 3080923
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 040923Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8336
INFO RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
S E C R E T SANAA 002044 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2017
TAGS: PTER PREL KMCA EAID EFIN ECON YM
SUBJECT: SALEH ADVISOR TELLS AMBASSADOR THE PRESIDENT NOW
UNDERSTANDS THE MAGNITUDE OF HIS ERROR

REF: SANAA 1991

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------
S E C R E T SANAA 002044

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2017
TAGS: PTER PREL KMCA EAID EFIN ECON YM
SUBJECT: SALEH ADVISOR TELLS AMBASSADOR THE PRESIDENT NOW
UNDERSTANDS THE MAGNITUDE OF HIS ERROR

REF: SANAA 1991

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (S) The Ambassador met November 3 with senior Presidential
advisor AbdulKarim al-Eryani to discuss the case of Jamal
al-Badawi and the recent meeting between the Ambassador and
President Saleh. Eryani emphasized that the meeting was
important insofar as it clarified for Saleh the magnitude of
his error in releasing al-Badawi. Eryani also told the
Ambassador that he considers Saleh's surrender program for
extremists only about 50% effective but noted Saleh continues
to believe in it. Eryani further added that President
Saleh's deep disappointment at the delay of the MCC signing
makes it a valuable bargaining chip. END SUMMARY


2. (S) In a one hour November 3 meeting, the Ambassador spoke
with senior Presidential advisor AbdulKarim al-Eryani to
discuss the case of Jamal al-Badawi and the Ambassador's
October 29 meeting with President Saleh. Al-Eryani, who had
attended the meeting (reftel),noted that it was very useful
as a means to explain personally to President Saleh the depth
of US feeling on the issue of Jamal al-Badawi. Eryani said
that it was essential that Saleh heard directly from the
Ambassador on this matter or he simply wouldn't have
understood. (Note: This is evidence of the almost-complete
absence of close advisors to Saleh who understand the US well
enough to anticipate how his decisions will be greeted in
Washington. End note.) Eryani added that Saleh now realizes
what a bad mistake he made and that his behavior in the
meeting revealed his natural reaction when he finds himself
in a weak position, which is to attack.


3. (S) Al-Eryani said that his own opinion of the ROYG
"surrender" program is that it is at best 50 percent
effective. He said, however, it is the President's program,
and he believes in it. Saleh's problem now is how to wiggle
out of a commitment he undoubtedly made to Badawi and his
supporters (Note: Eryani suggested that they are influential
and could make life uncomfortable for Saleh, but declined to
identify them. End Note.) The deal would probably have
entailed an agreement that, if al-Badawi surrendered and
agreed to help apprehend others, he would avoid going back to
prison. Now, Saleh will have to reneg on that deal, and the
best political cover he has available to him is the very
negative American reaction.


4. (S) Eryani suggested that Saleh will need to hear from the
US again regarding the decision on the two options he
presented during the October 29 meeting: allow Badawi to
remain under house arrest and help the ROYG locate and
apprehend other extremists, or return him to jail for the
duration of his sentence and forget about any such gains.
(Note: The Ambassador made abundantly clear on October 29 the
US position that Badawi must remain in jail. End Note.)
Eryani suggested that this message be conveyed in a week or
so; in the meantime, Eryani expressed confidence that Badawi
will remain in jail. (Note: Since the FBI team is in place
and ready to begin their interviews with Badawi this much
seems certain, at least for the short term. End Note.)


5. (S) Eryani also suggested that the President's deep
disappointment at the postponement of the MCC signing, and
his strong desire to see it reinstated, makes the Threshold
Program an effective bargaining chip, if used effectively.
The Ambassador said that Yemen and the MCC are receiving such
heavy scrutiny at the moment that it is unlikely the
Threshold Program signing will be rescheduled anytime soon,
although, he added, Yemen and the US need to work towards
that goal. Eryani said it would be important for the
President to hear this message directly, in order to
encourage him to take the steps necessary to restore
confidence lost as a result of this incident.

COMMENT
--------------

6. (S) Al-Eryani, who must be 70 by now, still impresses with
his energy, insight and quick wit. He understands the
President's thinking and is also one of the few advisors who
are likely to have a hand in shaping that thinking.
Regrettably, al-Eryani travels a great deal and, as a result,
is often absent when Saleh - and we - could use his counsel
SECHE