SAADA: WAR IS OVER, BUT CAN ROYG NOW WIN THE PEACE?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001133

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS MARR QA YM
SUBJECT: SAADA: WAR IS OVER, BUT CAN ROYG NOW WIN THE PEACE?

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Classified By: DCM NABEEL KHOURY, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Post contacts have confirmed media
reporting of a peace deal brokered by the Government of Qatar
to bring an end to almost five months of intensive fighting
in the northern governorate of Saada. The deal reportedly
provides safe haven for the al-Houthi rebel leadership in
Doha in exchange for their staying quiet and for their
backers accepting the republican regime. The Government, for
its part, reportedly will release a number of al-Houthi
supporters from prison, has agreed not to prosecute certain
rebel leaders, and will rebuild war-damaged areas. A
high-level, bipartisan parliamentary committee has been sent
to Saada to oversee the implementation of the ceasfire
agreement. The Republic of Yemen Government's (ROYG) primary
challenge now will be to prevent acts of revenge by military,
sectarian and tribal elements, while convincing the people of
Saada that its promises of economic development are genuine.
END SUMMARY


2. (U) Beginning on June 14, local and international media
outlets reported that a peace deal between the ROYG and the
al-Houthi insurgents, who had engaged in fierce clashes since
the end of January, had been reached through Qatari
mediation. Press reporting during the month of May
speculated that the Qataris were involved in peace talks and
that this was the reason behind visits to Sanaa by the Qatari
Emir and his Prime Minister, as well as trips to Doha by
presidential advisor Dr. Abdulkarim al-Iryani.


3. (C) Neither government has publicly confirmed Qatar's
role as mediator, but post contacts have described in detail
Qatar's involvement in reaching a settlement. Dr. Iryani
told the Ambassador on June 14 that he had recently returned
from Doha, where the al-Houthi leadership, represented by
renegade Parliament Member Yahya al-Houthi, had agreed to a
ceasefire and to hand in their medium and heavy weapons. The
ROYG, he said, agreed to allow rebel leader Abdulmalik
al-Houthi, his family, and other associates to travel to
Qatar. Iryani intimated that the ROYG had also agreed not to
prosecute al-Houthi fighters if they abide by the terms of
the agreement, but that President Saleh, who must accommodate
military leaders whose troops have suffered heavy casualties,
had been reluctant to agree to this point.


4. (C) Ruling party member and tribal sheikh, Mohammed Abu
Luhoum, told poloffs on June 18 that President Saleh relied
on his strong personal relationship with the Qatari Emir to
help conclude the deal with Qatar's help, noting that Dr.
Iryani and the Qatari Prime Minister were key in working out
the details with the rebels. Abu Luhoum also confirmed that
Qatar had pledged a certain amount of development assistance
for Saada to help sweeten the deal for both sides -- aid that
will come on top of its pledges at the November 2006 donors'
conference in London. He added that a high-level, 10-member
parliamentary delegation including members of both the
opposition and the ruling party and headed by Shoura Council
Vice Chairman Muhsen al-'Ulufi, had left for Saada to oversee
the implementation of the ceasefire agreement.


5. (C) Abu Luhoum assessed that that al-Houthis had
"achieved a victory of sorts," because the ROYG had been
unable to defeat them militarily, and they had gained a
number of supporters during the conflict. He said he gave
the military and Ministry of Interior "a D-minus or worse"
for their performance in Saada, and said that this is a
shining example as to why the longer term solution for Saada
must be a comprehensive economic development package, along
with political decentralization.


6. (C) Military leaders like Northwestern Area Commander Ali
Muhsen al-Ahmar, he said, "must be put on the side now," and
prevented from exacting revenge on the population, as
happened during the first two Houthi uprisings. Salafists
must also not be allowed to take over mosques and further
enflame the population. "Three years ago, our biggest
mistake was doing nothing on the ideological side," he said.

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This time, a message of peace and development must become the
focus in Saada, and he urged poloffs to make that point with
the ROYG leadership. Otherwise, he concluded, "within a year
we will see the consequences of Saada," noting that other
governorates were already showing signs of major discontent
over the ROYG's economic policies, particularly in Dala' and
al-Jawf provinces.


7. (C) COMMENT: This peace deal, if it is respected by both
sides (and reports are still mixed on that),presents an
opportunity for the ROYG to change its approach to Saada.
For more than a decade, the governorate has been the fiefdom
of military leaders who capitalize on its proximity to Saudi
Arabia and its productive farmland to become rich through
smuggling and selling weapons. The ROYG, and particularly
Ali Muhsen, has relied on Salafi preachers to counter Zaydi
leaders in balancing one type of religious extremism with
another.


8. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Long term solutions for Saada
necessarily include social, political and economic
development, filtered through a decentralization plan that
has so far remained a paper exercise. In conjunction with
other donors, we will continue to press this message with
Saleh and others as the ROYG begins to put together its plan
for "winning the peace" in Saada if the guns have indeed
fallen silent.
KRAJESKI