SAADA: CALLS FOR DIALOGUE ABOUND, BUT FIGHTING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001022

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS PINR PINS PHUM YM
SUBJECT: SAADA: CALLS FOR DIALOGUE ABOUND, BUT FIGHTING
CONTINUES


SANAA 00001022 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: DCM NABEEL KHOURY, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: President Saleh used his May 22 Unity Day
speech to announce a unilateral ceasefire for the day and
once again call upon rebels in Saada to lay down their
weapons in exchange for a dialogue. Meanwhile, Saleh
dispatched the Minister of Religious Affairs and other
clerics to Saada to engage the al-Houthis. Informed sources
say that, despite official denials, Qatari officials are
mediating between the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and
certain Saada leaders. Despite these efforts, fighting
reportedly continues unabated, and some government insiders
are concerned that no significant attempts are being made to
reduce popular support for the rebels. NGOs estimate that
there are as many as 35,000 internally displaced people in
Saada who are receiving little support. Public reaction to
Embassy's expressed hopes for a peaceful resolution to the
conflict has been positive, and we will continue to stress
the point both in public and in private. END SUMMARY


2. (U) During a nationally televised speech marking the 17th
anniversary of unification between the former north and south
Yemens on May 22, President Saleh repeated his call to
followers of Abdulmalik al-Houthi to lay down their weapons
and enter a dialogue with the government. Saleh guaranteed a
"fair trial for them as a result of war crimes committed
against the homeland." He also announced that in recognition
of Unity Day, the government would observe a one-day
suspension of military activities.


3. (U) Several days earlier, press reporting indicated that
Saleh had sent Minister of Religious Affairs Judge Hamoud
al-Hitar to Saada to "deliver a message" to the al-Houthis
through the intermediary of tribal sheikhs. The message,
according to press reports, hewed to what Saleh has been
demanding since the outbreak of the latest round of violence
in January: turn in your heavy and medium weapons, stop the
violence, and engage in the political process through legal
parties and publications. Official press reporting
emphasized that Hitar's mission was not to negotiate with the
rebels, but to communicate these conditions on Saleh's
behalf. (NOTE: Hitar has agreed to meet with Ambassador
during the week of June 2-6 to discuss his trip to Saada.)


4. (C) Following the May 12 visit to Sanaa of Qatari Emir
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, media sources speculated
that the visit was linked to attempts at mediation between
the ROYG and certain Saada tribal sheikhs, some of whom
reportedly are Qatari-Yemeni dual nationals. ROYG officials
issued a denial, but an informed ROYG source told DCM and
Ambassador that "there is something to the stories."


5. (C) A ruling party reformer who enjoys frequent access to
President Saleh told Embassy officers in April that he had
received Saleh's blessing to begin indirect, discreet talks
with the al-Houthis and their supporters. A centerpiece of
his plan was to reconstitute the recently dissolved al-Haq
party, which had as members men from several prominent Zaydi
families from Saada. The party, he said, could be used as an
outlet to "peel away" al-Houthi supporters who are looking
for a way to voice their opposition to the government, but
who could be convinced to do it in a legal way. The
official, who is also a tribal sheikh from another part of
Yemen, asserted that "we are not just fighting the al-Houthis
anymore -- we have lost the trust of the sheikhs" in Saada,
and dialogue through the al-Haq party and other mechanisms
could be a way of winning them back. Hitar and other
religious leaders have "no credibility," he opined, because
they are tied closely to the government and are not mandated
to negotiate, but merely to repeat Saleh's demands.


6. (C) Unfortunately, according to this source, his
entreaties with the President to allow the party's
re-constitution have gone unanswered. "The problem is," he
explained, "I talk to the President about dialogue and
co-opting the al-Houthis' supporters, and then 15 guys follow
me telling the President that we should just shoot them all.
The problem is, we cannot win this war militarily and the
President needs to understand this." The government,
according to this ruling party member, is divided between two

SANAA 00001022 002.4 OF 002


camps -- those who call for "crushing" the al-Houthis, and
those who know that using only military means will not solve
the problems in Saada over the long term. This source termed
the appointment of a former Deputy Ministry of Interior on
April 19 as a victory for the "let's crush them" camp.


7. (C) The Health Department Director for Saada told poloff
that fighting has displaced more than 20,000 people, most of
whom have gathered at government centers in and around Saada
City. (NOTE: ICRC estimates that the number is closer to
35,000. END NOTE) The government has not been able to
provide for their needs, but has also not made an official
request of donors to provide humanitarian relief. The Health
Director said that media reports of the military blocking
deliveries of basic commodities and fuel to certain areas
supportive of the al-Houthis was true, but "only as a
security measure" and only "on a temporary basis" while they
conduct operations in a particular area.


8. (C) A group of international and local NGOs have sent one
convoy to the province since March, but estimates that the
displaced people will need USD 1.3 million more in food and
non-food items over the coming six months if the situation
does not improve. Among major donors, only the UN has shown
a willingness to send assistance without a specific
government request, provided that the ROYG extends as much
protection as possible to aid convoys.


9. (C) In private sessions with government and political
party leaders, Embassy officers have emphasized that the USG
hopes that both sides will engage in the dialogue that
President Saleh is calling for, and will work toward a
peaceful resolution to the conflict. Ambassador and DCM have
stressed that, while the government has a duty to impose its
authority everywhere in Yemen, it should also exhaust all
peaceful means for ending the conflict. Yemeni political
observers, both within the government and the opposition,
have generally reacted positively to the Embassy's advice in
this regard.


10. (C) COMMENT: Post still does not believe that the Saada
conflict poses an immediate threat to the Saleh regime. The
longer it persists without a clear victory for the
government, however, the more difficult it will become for
the regime to put down unrest in other parts of the country,
given all of the human and financial resources it has
committed to Saada. Saleh has remained in power for over 28
years thanks in large part to his ability to cut deals with
certain groups while undercutting others, all combined with
military and political pressure. We believe that he will
also eventually find the right formula for winning the day in
Saada. How long that takes depends on when Saleh fully
realizes that those advising him from the "crush them" camp
not only cannot deliver an unconditional victory, but very
likely have a financial and political stake in seeing the war
prolonged. END COMMENT


11. (C) Septels will explore the role of military and tribal
leaders in the Saada conflict.


12. (U) Minimize considered.
KRAJESKI