Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ROME667
2007-04-02 15:02:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

ITALY'S EXPORT CREDIT POLICY VIS-A-VIS IRAN STAYS

Tags:  EFIN ECON KTTP PARM KN PREL UNSC OECD EXIM 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1939
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHRN
DE RUEHRO #0667/01 0921502
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 021502Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7579
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSS/OECD POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1745
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1362
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2233
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 2291
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 8520
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 2440
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000667 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN; IO; NEA; EEB; EUR/WE, KATHLEEN ALLEGRONE,
ANDREW YOUNG, AND KEVIN OPSTRUP; ISN/CPI, ANTHONY RUGGIERO
AND JENNIFER CHALMERS; ISN/RA, RICHARD NEPHEW; IO/T HEATHER
VON BEHREN
TREASURY FOR U/S STUART LEVEY, RACHEL LOEFFLER, COLLEEN
EDDY, AND BEN DAVIS
EMBASSY PARIS FOR ECON AND OECD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2017
TAGS: EFIN ECON KTTP PARM KN PREL UNSC OECD EXIM
IR, GM, FR, UK, IT
SUBJECT: ITALY'S EXPORT CREDIT POLICY VIS-A-VIS IRAN STAYS
THE SAME; MOF SUGGESTS TARGETING IRAN'S CENTRAL BANK

REF: A. DEPT OF TREASURY/EDDY EMAIL 3/30/2007

B. STATE 40909

C. STATE 40440

D. STATE 37801

E. ROME 628

F. ROME 198

G. PARIS 544

ROME 00000667 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Economic Minister Counselor Tom Delare for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000667

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN; IO; NEA; EEB; EUR/WE, KATHLEEN ALLEGRONE,
ANDREW YOUNG, AND KEVIN OPSTRUP; ISN/CPI, ANTHONY RUGGIERO
AND JENNIFER CHALMERS; ISN/RA, RICHARD NEPHEW; IO/T HEATHER
VON BEHREN
TREASURY FOR U/S STUART LEVEY, RACHEL LOEFFLER, COLLEEN
EDDY, AND BEN DAVIS
EMBASSY PARIS FOR ECON AND OECD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2017
TAGS: EFIN ECON KTTP PARM KN PREL UNSC OECD EXIM
IR, GM, FR, UK, IT
SUBJECT: ITALY'S EXPORT CREDIT POLICY VIS-A-VIS IRAN STAYS
THE SAME; MOF SUGGESTS TARGETING IRAN'S CENTRAL BANK

REF: A. DEPT OF TREASURY/EDDY EMAIL 3/30/2007

B. STATE 40909

C. STATE 40440

D. STATE 37801

E. ROME 628

F. ROME 198

G. PARIS 544

ROME 00000667 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Economic Minister Counselor Tom Delare for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------


1. (S/NF) EcMin discussed UNSCR 1747, Bank Sepah Rome,
Italy's export credit agency SACE exposure to Iran, and U.S.
designation of Iran's Defense Industries Organization March
30 with the Ministry of Finance (MOF). The MOF confirmed the
March 27 Bank of Italy (BOI) report of BOI actions taken
against Bank Sepah, noted that SACE has not changed its
export credit policy toward Iran, reported that SACE has not
issued new export credit insurance for Iran, and suggested
the UN and U.S. next target Iran's Central Bank. The MOF
claimed that SACE has reduced its exposure to Iran the past
year by ten percent. (SACE has not reduced its 4.6 billion
euro exposure to Iran in absolute terms, since 2005, but only
as a percentage of its increasing global exposure.) The MOF
would not commit to SACE changing its policy on Iran. End
summary and comment.


2. (S) EcMin met March 30 with MOF Director General for
International Affairs (and SACE President) Ignazio Angeloni

and Filippo Giansante, advisor to Angeloni, to discuss UNSCR
1747 and the U.S. designation of the Iran Defense Industries
Organization (refs C and D). Angeloni confirmed what BOI
officials had reported March 27 concerning BOI actions taken
against Bank Sepah Rome (ref E),but referred us back to BOI
to discuss whether the GOI had frozen Bank Sepah Rome's fixed
assets, including the branch building. EcMin also passed ref
B points on Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO).
Angeloni stated that he was not aware if DIO was active in
Italy or with Italian firms, but offered to investigate and
get back to EcMin.

EXPORT CREDITS TO IRAN
--------------


3. (S) Angeloni asked for clarification on the USG
interpretation of UNSCR 1747 language dissuading states and
international financial institutions from issuing new loans,
grants, and assistance to Iran. He remarked that the U.S.
view would influence how Italy and the EU approach the issue.
EcMin emphasized that the U.S. takes an expansive and
comprehensive view of UNSCR 1747's language, particularly
with regard to business with Iranian state-owned enterprises.


4. (S) Angeloni responded that SACE is not conducting "any
new business" with Iran, given the heightened level of risk.
However, he added, this is not due to any SACE policy change,
but is "a matter of practicality." Angeloni emphasized that
SACE is "not controlled" by the GOI, but is a joint stock
company independent from GOI policy and, ultimately,
answerable to its shareholders.


5. (S) EcMin pressed Angeloni to have SACE follow the lead
of the French ECA, COFACE, and issue a public statement to
tighten export credit policy to Iran and create a screening
mechanism to review all new business with Iran (ref G).
Angeloni replied that SACE had been more restrictive than
France and Germany in its stance toward Iran the past year.
Italy saw no need to take measures similar to COFACE, when
SACE had reduced its exposure to Iran by ten percent in 2006,

ROME 00000667 002.2 OF 002


and anticipated a further reduction in Iran exposure in 2007.
(Comment: SACE has not reduced its exposure to Iran in
absolute terms. Rather, the SACE argument is disingenuous,
as SACE's Iran exposure appears to have remained steady at
around 4.6 billion euros since 2005, while SACE has increased
its total global portfolio from approximately 23 to 28
billion euros since 2005. In percentage terms, Iran takes up
less of the portfolio, but, as far as we can determine, there
is no change in real terms. End comment.)


6. (S/NF) EcMin passed Angeloni declassified intelligence
that Bank Sepah might now be moving funds through Bank
Markazi (ref A). Angeloni thanked us and encouraged the U.S.
to share additional information of this nature with Italy.
He added that if the UN and U.S. decided to target Iran's
Central Bank, it would be a "big hit" against Iran's entire
financial system.

COMMENT
--------------


7. (S/NF) As in previous meetings, Angeloni would not agree
that SACE should change its policy on Iran and significantly
reduce its exposure to Iran, despite continued UN pressure.
Angeloni's remark that SACE is a joint stock company that
makes business decisions independently of GOI policy is
Angeloni's way of reassuring us that SACE understands the
serious risk of doing business with Iran and is acting
accordingly. However, Angeloni's statement cannot be taken
at face value, since Angeloni himself, a high-ranking MOF
official, also serves as SACE's President. Italy believes
this fig-leaf permits SACE sufficient cover both to manage
U.S. and UN pressure and to permit SACE to continue doing
business with Iran. We cannot forget that SACE officials
believe that Iran has traditionally been a "good customer"
(ref F). End comment.
SPOGLI