ITALY: SUDAN SANCTIONS COULD HARDEN KHARTOUM, NEED

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000627

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

FOR IO/PSC GRACE KANG, FOR AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2017
TAGS: PREL CD CT UNSC KPKO IT
SUBJECT: ITALY: SUDAN SANCTIONS COULD HARDEN KHARTOUM, NEED
POLITICAL STRATEGY

REF: STATE 33367

Classified By: Acting Political Minister-Counselor Jonathan R. Cohen fo
r reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. While Italy considered Sudanese President
Bashir's March 6 letter to SYG Ban unsatisfactory, the GOI
thought it was too early to call it a rejection of the
agreement on the Darfur UN Heavy Support Package (HSP).
Italy did not believe that sanctions were the best solution
as they would likely harden Khartoum's position. However,
Italy might be willing to consider sanctions if they were
presented as part of a broader political strategy. It was
important to give UN Special Envoy for Sudan Eliasson and the
political track a chance to work in response to Bashir's
letter before turning to sanctions. Italy saw the Tripartite
Commission as a key forum for discussion and problem-solving
on the UN/AU hybrid force. End Summary.


2. (C) Poloff delivered reftel points March 26 to Fabrizio
Pignatelli and Domenico Polona, MFA Horn of Africa Office
Director and Deputy, respectively; and separately to Leonardo
Bencini, UN Office Director. Poloff highlighted U.S. concerns
regarding Sudanese President Bashir's March 6 letter to SYG
Ban, and asked Italy to publicly speak out against Bashir's
efforts to impose conditions on UN support for Darfur.
Pignatelli responded that Italy thought it was too early to
consider the letter a rejection of the HSP. He noted that
UNSCR 1706 had not been accepted by the Sudanese Government,
and that the November 16 Addis Ababa Agreement was very
general. Given that the agreement did not go into detail on
the deployment (and that the AU had agreed on the need for
UN/AU/GNU dialogue during UNGA),Khartoum could expect to
have input as the process moved forward. Poloff stressed
that the HSP was a package, and could not be subject to
line-item veto, as the letter seemed to propose.


3. (C) The Tripartite Commission provided a framework for
discussing and resolving problems relating to the Darfur
hybrid force, Pignatelli said. He also noted that UN and AU
response to the letter has thus far been cautious. Italy saw
Bashir's emphasis on the importance of the political track as
a positive element that could help guide the way forward.
When Eliasson went to Asmara, he cautioned that too much
pressure in this phase was not the solution, according to
Pignatelli. Italy thought sanctions might not be the best
solution.


4. (C) If sanctions targeted the GNU directly, Pignatelli
worried it would bring an end to all collaboration from
Khartoum. Pignatelli also raised several other concerns
about sanctions, including the potential effect on the Darfur
conference in Juba, how proposed elements like the monitoring
of offensive flights would be implemented, and what
unilateral sanctions the U.S. was considering. Pignatelli
also wondered what the role of the Libya-Chad-Eritrea-Sudan
initiative would be within the political track. Italy
believed these questions should be addressed before
considering sanctions.


5. (C) Pignatelli argued that it was important to support
Eliasson and AU Special Envoy for Darfur Salim, as well as to
monitor Sudanese First Vice President Kiir's initiative, thus
giving the political track an opportunity to work.
Sanctions, he said, could serve to harden the most
uncooperative elements of the GNU and place Bashir in a
difficult position. While Italy took a very pragmatic
approach to Darfur and might be able to accept a hardening of
the sanctions regime, the GOI needed to see how this fit into
a broader political strategy.


6. (C) Ethiopian Foreign Minister Mesfin will visit Rome on
March 29 for discussions, including on Sudan, Somalia, the
Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute, and Italy-Ethiopia bilateral
issues, according to Pignatelli.
SPOGLI