ITALY SUGGESTS IDEA OF LEBANON CONTACT GROUP WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000393

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2017
TAGS: PGOV XF UN LE IT
SUBJECT: ITALY SUGGESTS IDEA OF LEBANON CONTACT GROUP WITH
BROADER MANDATE

ROME 00000393 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Acting DCM David D. Pearce for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) During February 22 and 23 meetings with senior
Italian MFA officials, NEA DAS Robert Danin discussed the
idea of an informal contact group on Lebanon to discuss
implementation of UNSCR 1701's arms embargo. Danin
suggested the informal group's members could include
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, U.K., and the U.S. and meet
in national capitals. The Italians suggested that they
could participate in such a group if it broadened its
mandate to cover the entire range of political issues
related to the situation in Lebanon. MFA DG for Middle
East, Cesare Ragaglini said the "core" of Lebanon's
problems (including UNSCR 1701 implementation,
arms-smuggling, and the Tribunal) can best be dealt with
and understood within the context of Lebanon's current
political crisis, resolution of which is a sine qua non for
increasing the GOL's ability to effectively implement UNSCR

1701. End Summary.

Strengthening the Arms Embargo
--------------


2. (C) NEA DAS Robert Danin proposed setting up an
informal contact group to discuss the UNSCR 1701's arms
embargo provisions during February 23 meetings with high
level Italian MFA officials (discussions on developments on
MEPP and Lebanon in general will be reported septel).
Danin met with DG for Mediterranean and Middle East Affairs
Cesare Ragaglini, DCM for the Italian Embassy in Washington
Stefano Stefanini, DAS equivalent for MEPP and BMENA Sergio
Scarantino, Near East Affairs Office Director Luciano
Pezzotti and Lebanon Desk officer Giorgia de Parolis.


3. (C) Danin told his interlocutors Lebanon remains a top
priority for the U.S. and that we would like to do
everything possible to help move the situation forward.
Danin emphasized that the strength of UNSCR 1701 is that
the onus for arms embargo enforcement is put on Lebanon's
neighbors and suggested an informal forum to explore ways
to fully implement the resolution. He therefore proposed
setting up an informal contact group on Lebanon to exchange
information and share views on UNSCR 1701 implementation.
He suggested the group meet in national capitals and that
the membership could include France, Germany, Italy, Spain,
U.K., and the U.S. The agenda of such an informal meeting
could include: increased intelligence sharing; border
monitoring; expanding UNIFIL's mandate; and increasing
mechanisms for enforcing the arms embargo. Danin told the
Italians that he had already discussed the idea with his
French and German counterparts, who had expressed interest
in the idea of the contact-group, but that both had
suggested the group meet at the United Nations in New
York. Danin, on the other hand, advocated meeting in
national capitals with subject matter experts in order to
ensure a more in-depth exchange of ideas and to avoid
attracting too much attention as it is difficult to keep
meetings or groups in NY 'discreet'.

Italians Suggest Broader Mandate
--------------


4. (C) Italian DG for Mediterranean and Middle Eastern
Affairs, Cesare Ragaglini, expressed interest in the
contact-group proposal but suggested raising it to the A/S
level and broadening the group's mandate to discuss the
overall political situation in Lebanon. Ragaglini said the
"core" of Lebanon's problems (including UNSCR 1701
implementation, arms-smuggling, the Tribunal, government
formation, and elections) can best be dealt with and
understood within the context of Lebanon's current
political crisis. The DCM from the Italian Embassy in
Washington, Stefano Stefanini, also supported this
approach, saying it reminded him of similar efforts in the
1980s with respect to South Africa in which like-minded
countries got together in order to coordinate a consistent
message to the South African government - a tactic which
could also be useful vis-`-vis Lebanon. He added that the
contact group could also be useful to avoid a decoupling of
views by countries with troops on the ground (Italy,
France, Germany, Spain) from those with interests in the
region but not represented on the ground in UNIFIL (U.S.,
U.K.) Stefanini noted that broadening the scope of the

ROME 00000393 002.2 OF 002


group to include the political situation could serve as a
further justification for not meeting in NY under a UN
framework, but rather in national capitals.


5. (C) Stefanini suggested defining/limiting the scope
somewhat by focusing discussions on the topic of 'How to
move the political process in Lebanon Forward', thereby
giving the discussions a framework broad enough to justify
not holding the discussions in NY at the UN (alleviating
French/German concerns of by-passing the UN) yet still
focused enough to keep the group on track. Ragaglini
suggested initial meetings be restricted to the countries
proposed by Danin but expressed openness to broadening the
membership at a future date if members agreed.


6. (C) Ragaglini argued that to focus discussions in the
proposed contact group only on the arms embargo would be a
mistake. While the arms embargo is certainly an important
part of UNSCR 1701, it is unrealistic to expect full
implementation until Lebanon sees some resolution to the
current political crisis. Ragaglini urged caution in
over-highlighting just one aspect of a complex puzzle that
included not only weapons transfers but also overflights
and the overall deterioration of the political situation in
Lebanon. Ragaglini underscored that he in no way meant to
downplay the risks posed by continued arms smuggling,
especially since Italian troops on the ground in UNIFIL are
directly at risk. However, in his analysis the crucial
goal must remain Lebanon's stability.

Danin: Focus on the Concrete and Achievable
--------------


7. (C) Danin cautioned that by broadening the agenda too
much, the informal group could lose sight of concrete
achievable goals, such discussing ways to enforce the arms
embargo (sanctions committee/border monitoring/air UNIFIL)
and run the risk of being seen by countries outside the
group as attempting to come together to secretly plot the
future of Lebanon. He argued that more effective
implementation of the arms embargo as envisaged under UNSCR
1701 could help stabilize the Siniora government and give
him more room to resolve the government crisis. Danin
shared U.S. intelligence reports (made releasable to Italy
by the intelligence community) regarding continued arms
smuggling across the Syrian border and told the Italians a
DIA team would be visiting the week of February 26 to share
additional intelligence with their Italian counterparts.


8. (C) Ragaglini thanked Danin for sharing U.S.
intelligence and said he would welcome opening a diplomatic
channel to share and evaluate such intelligence. He said
he was traveling to Lebanon February 27 - March 2 and would
be meeting with a broad spectrum of interlocutors. He said
in addition to trying to ascertain information on the
status of the Israeli hostages, he planned to look into why
the LAF is cooperating less and less with UNIFIL.
Ragaglini said the Italian UNIFIL commander had indicated
two reasons for the LAF's lack of cooperation: logistical
problems such as a lack of fuel and spare parts for
vehicles coupled with repercussions from the tense
political situation in Beirut.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) The Italians are clearly intrigued by the idea of
an informal contact group on Lebanon, as evidenced by their
request that Danin come to Rome for discussions on the
topic. However, in contrast to their German and French
colleagues, who wish to limit a Lebanon contact group to
discussion of technical issues within the UN, the Italians
are convinced that the only way that the group can be
effective is to tackle the entire broad range of Lebanon's
core political issues, not just one part of it. End
Comment.


10. (U) NEA DAS Danin has cleared this cable.

SPOGLI