PRODI GETS APPROVAL TO SEEK A CONFIDENCE VOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000385

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO PARM IT
SUBJECT: PRODI GETS APPROVAL TO SEEK A CONFIDENCE VOTE

REF: (A) ROME 375 (B) ROME 362 (C) ROME 356

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Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR DAVID D. PEARCE, REASONS 1.
4 (b),(d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C/NF) President Napolitano offered PM Prodi February 24
a second chance to prove his majority in a parliamentary
confidence vote that will take place by the end of the week.
Prodi appears to have collected four additional votes in the
Senate and should squeak through. Thanks to FM D'Alema's
decision to force a showdown with the far-left, the Prodi
coalition emerges as more centrist. Although the basic
electoral math still leaves Prodi with a razor-thin Senate
majority, the far-left has been chastised and significantly
weakened. We expect that the mid-late March vote on funding
for the Italian Afghan (ISAF) and other foreign military
missions will be approved, and the government is holding to
its decision to support the 173rd Airborne's consolidation at
Dal Molin Airfield, Vicenza. Major action on domestic issues
appears problematic, given the fragility of the coalition and
the priority given to electoral reform for near term action
by the President. End summary.


"No Alternative" to Prodi Government
--------------


2. (C/NF) On February 24, following several days of
intensive consultations with party leaders, President
Napolitano convoked caretaker PM Prodi, rejected his
resignation, and gave him another opportunity to prove he
still has a majority in Parliament. A very cautious
Napolitano said that there was "no alternative" to the Prodi
government right now. However, in citing the need for the
major parties to make changes to the electoral law, he
clearly kept in reserve the option of a
technical/institutional government to enact such a law if the
Prodi government cannot keep its majority together. A
cartoon in the leading newspaper daily Corriere della Sera
pictured Napolitano carefully stacking a house of cards that
represented the Prodi coalition.


3. (C/NF) Prodi is scheduled to address both houses of
Parliament on February 28; we expect a confidence vote in the
Senate on March 1 and in the Chamber of Deputies on March 2.
The government will have no problems in the Chamber. After a
weekend of consultations and horse-trading, it appears Prodi
picked up another four votes in the Senate and may win by
162-160. Key vote switches in favor of the government are
expected to include Senator-for-Life Andreotti (satisfied by
the government's change of heart on same-sex union
legislation),Marco Follini (who emerges with new power as a
swing vote),and the two Communist dissidents (who will
support the government at least on a confidence vote).


Necessary Trauma
--------------


4. (C/NF) The Prodi government emerges from this episode as
more centrist, due in large part to maneuvering by FM
D'Alema, who leads the largest party (DS) in the coalition.
D'Alema, after months of frustration with the far-left,
finally forced a showdown designed to get the radicals under
control. First, President Napolitano (also DS) publicly
indicated that the government should be "self-sufficient"
(i.e., not need opposition support) in conducting its foreign
policy. Then, by publicly stating before the February 21
foreign policy vote that the government would "go home" if it
lost, D'Alema forced Prodi to tender his resignation when the
government could not hold its majority.


5. (C/NF) After successfully pushing the government to the
left on the Afghanistan mission, including Italy's ISAF
contributions, the consolidation of the 173rd Airborne
Brigade at Dal Molin, and same-sex union legislation, the
radicals have now been publicly chastised and are

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significantly weaker. Despite the trauma necessary to
re-align the coalition, however, the basic electoral math in
the Senate has not changed. The Prodi government is still an
ideologically diverse nine-member coalition government with a
razor-thin majority.


Domestic Implications
--------------


6. (C/NF) In regrouping to broaden its centrist appeal,
Prodi demanded and received support from all nine coalition
parties on a 12-point program (Ref A). The domestic angle
included a more pro-family agenda that drops support for
pending legislation to recognize same-sex unions. It also
included an economic agenda to reform pensions, cut
government spending, and increase funding for the South and
infrastructure projects. Following Napolitano's comments on
the electoral law, the major parties on both the left and the
right will likely begin a behind the scenes dialogue on
electoral reform of some kind. And, unfortunately, that
exercise is likely to push most domestic reform, aside from
non-controversial and marginal issues, off the table for the
time being.


Foreign Policy/Defense Implications
--------------


7. (C/NF) The first and strongest item of Prodi's 12-point
program is an affirmation that all coalition parties will
support the government's foreign and defense policy and its
"international commitments," with a specific reference to the
Italian mission in Afghanistan. Legislation to extend
funding for Italy's foreign missions is now moving through
parliamentary committees. We expect the funding bill to be
approved in late March, with the support of the center-right
opposition and without major problems. It will not, however,
lift existing caveats on Italian ISAF operations. There was
no pending legislation that affected Dal Molin, but the
government is holding to its decision to support the 173rd
Airborne's consolidation at Vicenza. We assume Prodi means
the international commitments language in point one of his
program applies also to support forthe Dal Molin decision.
D'Alema told the Parliament it would have been a "hostile
act" to the U.S. not to have supported this decision. Just
before the vote, the government signed agreements to continue
cooperation on the Joint Strike Fighter and on ballistic
missile defense.
SPOGLI