Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ROME2261
2007-10-29 16:27:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

AFTER JALILI/LARIJANI VISIT, ITALIANS SEE NO

Tags:  PREL KNNP IR AF YI IAEA MNUC PARM 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2078
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHRO #2261/01 3021627
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 291627Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9320
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0330
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0386
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 9064
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 2733
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 2877
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0816
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 002261 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

ISN/CPI ANTHONY RUGGIERO, T, TREASURY, EUR, NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2017
TAGS: PREL KNNP IR AF YI IAEA MNUC PARM
SUBJECT: AFTER JALILI/LARIJANI VISIT, ITALIANS SEE NO
SOFTENING OF IRANIAN POSITION

REF: A. ROME 2247

B. ROME DAILY REPORTS 10/24-25/07

ROME 00002261 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 002261

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

ISN/CPI ANTHONY RUGGIERO, T, TREASURY, EUR, NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2017
TAGS: PREL KNNP IR AF YI IAEA MNUC PARM
SUBJECT: AFTER JALILI/LARIJANI VISIT, ITALIANS SEE NO
SOFTENING OF IRANIAN POSITION

REF: A. ROME 2247

B. ROME DAILY REPORTS 10/24-25/07

ROME 00002261 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C//NF) Summary: The GOI sees no softening of the Iranian
position on nuclear enrichment after the October 23 visit of
the Iranian nuclear negotiating team. Nevertheless, Italy
sees Iran's agreement to ontinue talks with Solana as a sign
of progress. The Ambassador told PM Prodi's Diplomatic
Adviser Stefano Sannino that Italy was increasingly seen as
the weak link on Iran and urged support for stronger
sanctions. Sannino was skeptical about the effectiveness of
sanctions on Iran and countered that Italy has not extended
export credits to Iran for over a year and does not plan to
do so. Later that day, the Ambassador called FM D'Alema to
inform him that the USG had designated additional entities
and individuals for targeted sanctions (Ref A). In a
follow-up discussion, Italian Officials told Poloff that in
separate meetings with the Iranian delegation on October 24,
PM Prodi and FM D'Alema pressed for a full suspension of
enrichment activities, which the Iranians resisted. Prodi
told them that the earlier Italian offer, tendered in June
2007 (that Italy would support restarting negotiations if
Iran would noticeably slow down its enrichment) was no longer
on the table. Prodi and D'Alema told the Iranians they had
"missed the boat" and now the only option on the table was
complete suspension of enrichment in order to restart
negotiations. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
Sannino: Italy Skeptical on Sanctions, Hopeful on IAEA Track
-------------- --------------


2. (C//NF) The Ambassador met with PM Prodi's Diplomatic
Adviser Stefano Sannino on October 25. He explained to
Sannino that Italy is increasingly seen as the weak link on

Iran, always at the weakest end on discussions of further
sanctions. The Italians needed to start supporting a
stronger sanctions regime. Sannino disputed the need to add
sanctions, saying they should be really tough or they are not
worth doing. He recalled being in Serbia under the sanctions
regime and the adverse impact they had on gasoline,
electricity, and food supplies. Sannino said that the talks
between EU HR Solana and former lead Iranian negotiator Ari
Larijani and Deputy FM Saeed Jalili on October 23 had moved
things forward a bit towards progress at the IAEA. He
commented that Larijani had done all the talking; Jalili had
not said a single word. Sannino confirmed what the SACE (the
GOI Export Credit Agency) head told the Ambassador a few days
ago - no export credits were extended to Iran this year and
none are planned to be extended. Later that day, the
Ambassador called FM D'Alema to inform him of the USG
decision to add new entities and
individuals to the sanctions list (Ref A).

-------------- --------------
Prodi: Iran Has Missed the Boat, Italian Offer no Longer on
Table
-------------- --------------


3. (C//NF) The MFA Iran Desk Officer Lorenzo Kluzer told
Poloff that PM Prodi had been firm with the Iranian
delegation during their October 24 meeting. Prodi told them
that the Italian offer (that Italy would support restarting
negotiations if Iran would noticeably slow-down its
enrichment),tendered in June 2007, was no longer on the
table. Prodi and D'Alema told the Iranians they had "missed
the boat" and now the only option on the table was complete
suspension of enrichment in order to restart negotiations.
Prodi suggested that if Iran wanted to save face it could
condition its agreement to cease enrichment on an immediate
start to negotiations on the nuclear issue, or limit the
suspension to three months and then reevaluate. However,
Prodi emphatically insisted on full suspension of enrichment.
The Iranians continued to reiterate that stopping enrichment
was not an option, though they showed willingness to slow
down. Commenting on a press article quoting D'Alema as
offering "a negotiating framework to the Iranian delegation,"
Kluzer insisted that Prodi and D'Alema's offer was entirely
in line with the EU position, and not an "Italian proposal."


ROME 00002261 002.2 OF 002



4. (S//NF) In a follow-up discussion, PM Prodi's Middle East
Adviser Marco Carnelos told Poloff that the Larijani/Jalili
meetings had yielded progress on the IAEA front. He said
that during the meetings with Solana on October 23, and
subsequently on October 24 with Prodi and D'Alema, Larijani
(whom Carnelos characterized as "the man in charge" because
Jalili was silent the entire time) told Prodi and D'Alema
that even though Iran had not yet ratified the additional
protocol, it was implementing it fully and going further in
some instances. Prodi and D'Alema had reminded Larijani that
if Iran has a deal with the IAEA it must be implemented fully
and on-time, and that IAEA cooperation alone is not enough:
it must be accompanied by full suspension. Larijani
responded with a "no". He said Iran had already tried the
suspension track in 2003 "but it didn't get us anywhere" and
"we won't repeat this." Larijani then said they could agree
to the international community's somehow limiting the number
of "additional" centrifuges. D'Alema and Prodi responded
that this was unacceptable.


5. (S//NF) Carnelos said that the fact that they agreed to
meet with Solana again in a month was a positive step. He
said the GOI was in no position to judge Larijani's claims
concerning IAEA cooperation but that El Baradei would be and
his upcoming report should shed light on the matter. In
response to the additional U.S. designations, Carnelos said
the Iranians might see this as a "provocation" and be
inclined to respond by increasing tensions. Either way, he
was not convinced sanctions would have a positive effect.

--------------
Iranian Interference in Iraq
--------------


6. (S//NF) Carnelos said he had talked to "one of them"
(presumably Larijani) about Iraq, urging Iran to stop
meddling in Iraqi affairs and stop supporting militias who
were killing U.S. soldiers. His Iranian interlocutor
responded by asking why the U.S. does not designate the
actual Shia militias in Iraq as "terrorists" instead of the
Iranian government authorities suspected of supporting these
groups, implying that these groups were actually not
supported by Iran.
SPOGLI