IO PDAS WARLICK'S ROME MEETINGS ON UNSC ISSUES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ROME 000209

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2017
TAGS: PREL UNSC PHUM XF ZL XW IT
SUBJECT: IO PDAS WARLICK'S ROME MEETINGS ON UNSC ISSUES

REF: STATE 11796

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Classified By: Political Minister Counselor David D. Pearce for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
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1. (C/NF) In January 29 consultations in Rome, visiting IO
PDAS James Warlick discussed a broad range of upcoming UNSC
issues including the Balkans, Middle East, and the Horn of
Africa with Italy, a new non-permanent member. On Kosovo,
Warlick and the Italians agreed on the way forward, and the
GOI thought Russia would ultimately abstain on a Kosovo
resolution. Warlick warned of the need to resist Russian
pressure for delays and possible tradeoffs at the expense of
Georgia's interests. On the Middle East, Warlick thanked the
Italians for their leadership in Lebanon but warned against a
UN committee's planned conference in Rome, noting it could
turn into an Israel-bashing exercise that would harm, not
help, efforts to promote peace. He urged the Italians to
fully implement Iran sanctions, noting financial pressure
could be key to getting Tehran back to the negotiating table.
The Italians said that Iran sanctions would be painful for
Italy, but they would be implemented. Meanwhile, it was also
important to consider how to address Iran over the longer
term. On Somalia, the Italians agreed that support for the
TFG, peacekeeping and reconstruction were necessary and said
they would work to avoid conditioning EU assistance to the
TFG. Warlick also discussed Rome's upcoming committee
responsibilities at the UNSC, and the Italians said they
would work for results as head of the DPRK and Sudan
sanctions committees. They noted that, like the U.S., they
were disappointed by the Human Rights Council, but Italy
would become a candidate for the HRC and continue to press
for positive change. End summary.


Kosovo: Avoiding Russian Tit for Tat
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2. (C) Warlick told Director General for Europe Laura
Mirachian that the United States expected to consult on UN
Special Representative Maarti Ahtisaari's recommendations and
take up a UNSC resolution in March, working with the Quint.
Warlick warned that the Russians would try to conflate the
Kosovo resolution with a pending resolution on UNOMIG in
Georgia. The U.S. preferred, therefore, that a Kosovo
resolution come first. He urged that the Quint remain
unified and firm in avoiding trading Georgia's interests for
Kosovo's. A new Kosovo resolution would lift the current
1244 resolution, endorse Ahtisaari's recommendations, and
pave the way for a Kosovar declaration of independence with a
strong international presence. Warlick expected that U.S.
and EU recognition would come shortly after that. Belgrade
should be convinced that Serb concerns about minorities,
religious sites and decentralization were being met. In the
end, if the Quint stood together in the UNSC, Qatar, China
and others would follow suit. Russia would likely go along
reluctantly. If they accept the Ahtisaari plan, it would be
much easier to get them to go along with a resolution.
However, if the Russians sensed any weakness or split within
the Quint, they would be much tougher on Kosovo and Georgia.
Additionally, the US believed that the process should go
forward whether or not a government was formed in Belgrade.
No decision about moving forward unilaterally if the UNSC
failed had been made by the US, though.


3. (C) Mirachian stated that D'Alema had already outlined
Italy's view of the process. The announcement of the
Ahtisaari plan would be followed by a UNSCR (although the
exact phrasing of independence had not been agreed),followed
by a declaration from the Kosovar authorities. NATO had
already agreed on PfP for Serbia and the EU should push for
restarting SAA - with a conditional clause in the event of
noncompliance with ICTY. Mirachian agreed that Russia would
take a tough negotiating position but thought that in the end
it would probably agree to abstain if the scope of the
resolution were limited. She believed that Russia would

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accept the delinking of Kosovo from Serbia but that it saw
independence as a separate issue to be addressed in the
future. Russia would not approve any resolution opposed by
Belgrade, so Italy and the rest of the Quint should work to
get Serbia on board. She believed that Russia would
eventually agree to move the international administration
from the UN to the EU. In the end, a resolution that had the
support of the U.S., EU and Russia would provide the most
stability. The EU was united in its belief that Kosovo would
not be a tradeoff for Georgia and that the path for the
Balkans was through EU integration. (Mirachian confirmed
Italy's desire to join the Friends of Georgia group in NY.)
She worried, however, that enlargement fatigue and absorption
capacity could be an obstacle. The EU needed to make a
decision on recognition but believed that an SAA agreement,
on which there was already consensus, could serve as a de
facto recognition or pave the way for recognition. She
added, however, that neither the EU nor Italy had decided
concretely on how to proceed on recognition. In the
meantime, the Kosovar authorities needed to be very careful
on any public declarations immediately after the UNSCR.


4. (C) On administration, Mirachian said that the UN with its
4,000 personnel had been ineffective and worried that an EUSR
office with 1,000-1,500 would not be as effective as
necessary. Additionally, 500 million Euros, the yearly cost
of the administration estimated by the GOI could prove a
heavy burden on the EU. Nevertheless, the GOI was committed
to ensuring that a Kosovar administration was being pushed on
standards and would work to making the judicial pillar
successful to avoid any possible spillover effects of
political or criminal instability - something the GOI
believes is already happening. Mirachian added that the new
administration should be extended to ensure U.S.
participation.


Cautioning Against UN Committee's Planned Mideast Conference
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5. (C) Warlick thanked Middle East Department officials for
Italy's its leadership on Lebanon. Incoming Gen. Graziano
would need to play a political role in addition to his
military duties. Vice Director General for the Middle East
and Mediterranean Luca Del Balzo noted that there was a
window of opportunity on Lebanon and the Middle East Peace
Process, but worried about the internal situation in Lebanon.
Warlick and Del Balzo agreed the Paris Conference was
successful both financially and in showing the international
community's support for the Siniora government. Forward
movement on the tribunal in the UNSC was important and Italy
was working with the Arab League on the issue. Warlick told
Del Balzo and BMENA Coordinator Sergio Scarantino that the
U.S. was prepared to work for progress on the Middle East
through the Quartet and at the UN. While the U.S. and Israel
were often isolated amid the posturing at UNGA, any actions
in the UNSC need to be focused on pragmatic results.
Unfortunately, the Qataris so far had been using the UNSC
forum mainly to score political points. The U.S. would look
to Italy to help prevent Qatar from playing an unhelpful role.


6. (C) Per reftel, Warlick then urged that the GOI reconsider
its support for a conference planned in Rome March 22-23 by
the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of
the Palestinian People (CEIRPP). He said that, while we
appreciated Italy's good intentions, this meeting would be
particularly unhelpful at a time when there are promising
efforts to renew discussions on the Middle East, including
the February 2 Quartet meeting in Washington and a later
planned trilateral meeting with Secretary Rice, PM Olmert and
PA President Abbas. The U.S. had long opposed the Committee
on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian
People (CEIRPP) and tried to eliminate its funding. Long
experience with this committee suggested the conference would
become a forum for one-sided criticism of Israel and hinder,
not help, efforts to improve the international environment
and move the parties towards negotiations. Once the
conference was launched it would be out of GOI hands. But
Italy would be identified with it, and this was significant,

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given Italy's high profile as a UNSC member.


7. (C) Scarantino replied that, in that case, the U.S. should
help Italy get good Israeli representation at the meeting.
He was well aware of our views, based on reports from the
Italian Embassy in Washington. But there was a continuing
need for dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians and the
idea for the Rome CEIRPP conference had begun with a request
from Palestinian Permanent Observer Mansur -- whom Scarantino
considered more moderate than his predecessor. The GOI
understood the risks, and wished to avoid anti-Israel
polemics, but it thought this could be done. Scarantino
cited the Bethlehem 2000 conference, also organized by the
CEIRPP and GOI, as a precedent. He felt the Bethlehem
conference had been successful, with a consensus approach and
a constructive final document. So Italy was not as convinced
as the United States that the Rome meeting would be a
failure. The March 22-23 meeting would take place after the
Quartet meeting and perhaps could be a celebration if the
Quartet session went well. If not, well, Abu Mazen and
Olmert would likely want to move forward in any case. And it
was important to help Abu Mazen show some political gains.
Scarantino repeated that the GOI sought language on a meeting
text that was free of recriminations and was not polemical,
but rather contained parameters for peace, including roadmap
language.


8. (C) Pol M/C then reinforced Warlick's message by telling
Scarantino that we wished to be very clear: The Washington
view was that nothing good could come of an event in Rome
sponsored by the CEIRPP. This was not the way to help Abu
Mazen. The record suggested that the meeting would likely be
focused on Israel-bashing and propaganda point-scoring. We
understood well that the Middle East was a top priority issue
for the GOI; indeed, it was for the USG as well. And we
appreciated Italy's leadership and help, especially in
Lebanon. But this event would do nothing to advance the
cause of peace, quite the contrary. The conference would
thus be seen with displeasure in Washington. Scarantino said
we had been abundantly clear on USG views, but Italy had a
different view.


Iraq and Iran: Need to Maintain Cooperation
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9. (C) Warlick expressed appreciation for Italy's continued
engagement in Iraq and highlighted the importance of a robust
UN presence and engagement. He asked Italy to consider
contributing to the middle ring security Distinct Entity
Trust to allow a greater UN presence on the ground. Del
Balzo agreed the role of the UN was essential but said (after
checking with Italian Iraq envoy De Martino) that Italy had
no resources for this; nevertheless, he would pass on the USG
request. On Iran and Resolution 1737, Warlick asked for
Italy's thoughts on the way to proceed after the
UNSCR-mandated 60 days expire. Del Balzo noted that a UNSCR
could be very costly to Italy, but that it must be
implemented. The international community should wait for the
60 days and then see where to go, he said. Italy would
consider another resolution, perhaps with additional
sanctions, Del Balzo added, but it was important to look at
what we wanted to do in the longer term. Warlick said we
were willing to talk, but only after Iran stops enrichment
comes into compliance with the NPT and UNSCR. We would keep
coming back to Iran in the sanctions committee and beyond.
PolMinCouns noted that financial pressure was key and Italy
could play an important role. Warlick and Del Balzo agreed
that UNSC consensus was important; a coalition of the willing
would not have the same impact, but it could not be excluded.


Somalia: Give the TFG Space for Progress
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10. (C) Warlick told Deputy Director General for Political
Affairs Giacomo Sanfelice that the international community
has to make some decisions on Somalia. The U.S. sees three
phases. The first is the resolution on the IGASOM force.

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The U.S. is working to ensure two battalions from Uganda can
deploy. The U.S. knows that this is an essential immediate
step, but it is not sufficient to provide longer-term
stability for the Transitional Federal Government. The U.S.
will assist with logistical support. The second phase is the
deployment of an African Union force at the TFG's request.
This should be done quickly. The UK is drafting a
resolution, which could be ready within the week, on an AU
deployment and will include an exemption to the arms embargo.
The U.S. will propose language to deploy a joint UN/AU
technical assessment mission to provide recommendations on
peacekeeping and reconstruction options. Based on the
precedent of the IGASOM resolution, the U.S. does not expect
opposition to the resolution. The third phase is the
deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in Somalia. The U.S.
hopes to see the TFG gain ground and reach out to moderate
ICU members and civil society. The U.S. plans to contribute
financially to the AU force and was glad the EU could
contribute 15 million Euros but was concerned that EU
assistance was conditioned on TFG actions. Warlick asked the
Italians to work within the EU to remove conditionality.


11. (C) San Felice stated that Italy was prepared to
contribute resources. D'Alema had called on the EU to
provide rapid assistance and had even volunteered to host a
donors' conference (an offer subsequently repeated by PM
Prodi at the Addis Ababa AU meeting). Italy was concerned
that Somalia could become a terrorist haven and the
humanitarian situation could deteriorate. Nevertheless,
Italy would like to see the deployment of international
forces accompanied by an enhancement of the international
dialogue process. The TFG has to show willingness to engage
with all elements of society. Italy will be looking for
positive signals at the AU Summit in Addis Ababa.


North Korea and Sudan: Making Sanctions Work
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12. (C) Warlick said that Italy's chairmanship of the DPRK
and Sudan sanctions committees was important. The DPRK panel
had been chaired by Slovakia, which had come in for criticism
by Russia. In reality, Russia and China wanted to stall
activity. The US had demarched Russia on its unhelpful
tactics to prevent Slovakia from continuing as chair. So
Italy should be prepared, show resolve, and send a message on
sanctions. The DPRK resolution committee was already having
an impact on Six Party Talks. San Felice said they were in
touch with the Slovaks and recognize the difficulties.
Nevertheless, Italy is committed to achieving results. The
fact that the committee decisions are based on consensus
could be a problem, however. On Sudan, Warlick said the US
wants to deploy elements of the UN heavy package to test
President Bashir's sincerity. In Chad, the U.S. is prepared
to support a peacekeeping mission. President Bush asked Ban
Ki-Moon to take a personal role in Sudan. San Felice pledged
support on Sudan.


Other Remaining UN Issues: Ethiopia, HRC, Reform
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13. (C) On Ethiopia-Eritrea, San Felice said the UNMEE
mandate renewal needs to determine the size of the force.
Italy wants the force to remain at its current size.
Warlick said the US was prepared to argue for a ceiling that
would allow forces to be drawn down with the ability to
return if necessary without additional UNSC action. The U.S.
wanted to see the force go from 2,300 to 1.700.


14. (C) Warlick stated that the Secretary has not decided
whether the U.S. would run for the Human Rights Council. The
U.S. was discouraged by the performance of the HRC because it
hadn't shown that it could address country-specific issues.
Three out of four special sessions have been on Israel. The
US hasn't completely given up on the HRC and if it doesn't
run, it would likely stay engaged as an observer. The U.S.
would like to see a special session on Burma. The U.S. is
frustrated that the most egregious human rights violators

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cannot be held accountable by the UN. San Felice said Italy
was also discouraged by the HRC's work, but Italy would
continue to try to make it work and would advance its
candidacy. On reform issues more generally, he agreed that
there was a need to break the G77 and NAM paradigm, but Italy
was encouraged by the Peacebuilding Commission and countries
needed to continue to push on reform.


Comment
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15. (C) The Italians clearly appreciated this consultation
and the opportunity to hear U.S. views across the board on
the many issues they will be grappling with as a new
non-permanent UNSC member. Several key senior MFA officials
indicated interest in follow-up meetings in Washington, a
prospect Warlick welcomed. This is a government that has a
thin governing majority, and a small, but influential far
left component in its ruling coalition. Moreover, the
foreign minister is inclined to deus-ex-machina political
interventions on selected issues. To manage this, it is
extremely useful to have periodic senior-level exchanges like
this one, not only to convey U.S. views and drill deeply with
Italian subject experts, but also to ensure effective
coordination on Kosovo, Russia, Iran, the Middle East,
Africa, Afghanistan, North Korea, and UN reform as Italy
settles into its UNSC seat for the next two years.


16. (C) PDAS Warlick has cleared this cable.
SPOGLI