ITALY: YOUR MEETING WITH FM D'ALEMA SEPTEMBER 27

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 002046

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC IT
SUBJECT: ITALY: YOUR MEETING WITH FM D'ALEMA SEPTEMBER 27

REF: ROME 1949

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Classified By: Classified by Ronald P. Spogli, Ambassador, for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C/NF) Summary. While the issues on Italy's international
agenda in the near future will for the most part track with
ours, the GOI's tactics and desired outcomes may not.
D'Alema will want to discuss Iran, Kosovo, Lebanon, Syria,
the Middle East Peace Process, Afghanistan and Sudan. You
may also want to brief him on your upcoming trip to Moscow.
D'Alema told me September 12 that he could support a new
UNSCR on Iran with additional sanctions but thinks it should
be accompanied by an unconditional offer to negotiate with
Tehran. On Kosovo, D'Alema understands the need for a quick
status solution even without a UNSC resolution. On Sudan,
Italy plans to make a significant contribution to an
international effort. On all major UNSC issues, the Italians
will seek to balance EU policy consensus with their desire to
maintain good relations with Russia. Also, the GOI is
inclined to seek dialogue for its own sake, including with
states and leaders that are internationally isolated, and has
done so recently with Iran, Syria and Sudan. That said,
D'Alema has been supportive of our position on most major
issues, including with these states. PM Prodi has been less
so.


2. (C/NF) You are meeting D'Alema as the Italian government
hits a low point in domestic popularity. D'Alema has managed
to deflect attacks on foreign policy from far left members of
the Prodi coalition who would prefer to see Italy take a
lower international profile. However, public support for
Italy's international engagement is high. The GOI remains
reliant on far left parties to stay in power, and, this
weekend's kidnapping and rescue of 2 Italian ISAF soldiers
notwithstanding, military casualties or kidnappings could
threaten Italy's troop deployments in Afghanistan and
Lebanon, and its PRT in Iraq. Because D'Alema makes key
decisions on his own, at times against the recommendations of
his staff and frequently without consulting other members of
the governing coalition or senior ministry officials, there
is no substitute for personally engaging him in frequent
consultation. Your meeting provides our best opportunity to
do so on our key agenda items for the fall. In particular,
you should urge D'Alema to push PM Prodi to desist from
meeting with senior Iranians and Syrians and from making
conciliatory statements about Hamas. End summary.

Italy and Dialogue with Pariahs
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3. (C/NF) D'Alema fears Italy's position is eroding both
within the EU and within the Euro-Atlantic community. The
election of Sarkozy in France and Merkel's efforts to rebuild
Germany's relationship with the US have sharpened Italy's
concern of being relegated to second tier status among
European powers. Prodi and D'Alema's penchant for dialogue
and hosting conferences may in part be an effort to halt that
perceived slide in importance. Whatever the reason (one of
Prodi's staff told us that the PM just likes to talk to
people, sometimes too much with the wrong people) this
tendency, in particular on the part of Prodi, risks the
impression of Italy splitting from the international
community on tacitly agreed positions regarding limits to
contact with Hamas, Syria, Iran, and even the Taliban. The
Italians believe they do not lose anything by these contacts.
I have told them that they lose international credibility and
undermine our common objectives by doing so. You could
usefully reinforce this message with D'Alema.


Iran: Open to Further Sanctions, Want Offer of Negotiations
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4. (C/NF) The GOI seeks a role on Iran commensurate with
Italy's strategic and commercial interests there. Although
D'Alema is open to a third round of sanctions, he conditioned
his support by calling for a "no-strings" offer of
negotiations to accompany a new UNSCR. The PM's Diplomatic
Advisor's Sept. 18-21 trip to Tehran and PM Prodi's meeting
with Deputy FM Jalili undermined international efforts to
make clear to Tehran how serious the situation is.
Meanwhile, the GOI has not sought to actively pressure Iran
via its economic and commercial ties. The central bank has
not closed the Bank Sepah Rome branch, but put it under
central bank receivership. In FATF discussions last week in
Rome, the GOI proposed that it liaise with the Iranians to

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bring them to understand the need to respond to FATF
inquiries. U.S. Treasury reps worried that "coaching" an
Iranian response could end up being counterproductive. Italy,
Iran's second largest EU trading partner, is unlikely to go
beyond the letter of UNSC resolutions or the EU common
position. We need to encourage the GOI to increase financial
pressure and maintain the common approach to isolating Tehran
on the nuclear issue. You should thank D'Alema for his
public statements at the end of last week supporting "even
more severe sanctions," and urge him to press PM Prodi to
cease high level contact/visits with the Iranians.

UNIFIL/Lebanon: Keeping up the Pressure on Syria
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5. (C/NF) Italy commands UNIFIL II and contributes over 2500
troops (the single largest troop contributor). PM Prodi and
Lebanese PM Siniora have a good relationship and speak often.
The GOI also maintains contact with Syria and Iran on
Lebanon. Siniora and Syrian VP Shara were both in Rome in
September and saw Prodi. The GOI is concerned about the
stability of the Siniora government and wants to strengthen
him, but they are reluctant to confront Syria or Iran on the
issue of weapons smuggling and support to Hizballah fearing
for the safety of their troops. The fragile GOI is anxious
to avoid Italian casualties that could harm public support
for their troop deployment. The GOI supports the EU Border
mission proposal and agreed (at our prompting) to host a
meeting (U.S., UK, France, Spain, Italy, German, EU) on the
margins of UNGA to discuss it.

MEPP: GOI wants to be "Player, not just Payer"
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6. (C/NF) The Italians believe they can make an important
contribution to the Middle East Peace Process and want to be
involved. D'Alema appreciates renewed U.S. engagement and
has made a conscious effort to maintain good ties with a
skeptical Israeli government. While clear on the need to
satisfy the three Quartet conditions, he remains intrigued
with the idea of "dialogue" with Hamas. (The GOI's line is
that Hamas is a reality that must be acknowledged, and that
the goal should be to avoid a permanent split among the
Palestinians.) D'Alema will push for Syrian inclusion in the
November MEPP conference. He should be reminded that there
should be neither dialogue nor negotiation with Hamas until
Quartet requirements are met, and that the goal now is to
support PA President Abbas.

Kosovo
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7. (C/NF) D'Alema was PM during the 1999 NATO bombing of
Yugoslavia and has a staff of highly knowledgeable advisors.
We may need to prevent Italy from backsliding on the December
10 deadline. Italy's preference absent a negotiated
solution between the two parties is independence through a
UNSC resolution. In the absence of a resolution, reluctance
to irritate Russia, a major supplier of energy to Italy, will
make D'Alema hesitant to take a leadership role in the EU.
D'Alema will likely accept a unilateral declaration of
independence by Kosovo, but only after the majority of EU and
Contact Group countries have declared an intention to
recognize Kosovo.

Sudan
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8. (C/NF) Italy is constructively engaged on Sudan but
continues to send mixed messages, for example, by hosting
President Bashir recently in Rome, and remains opposed to
sanctions. Italy has offered to host a meeting in Rome on
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement under the
auspices of the IGAD Partners, Forum. The GOI has declared
Africa to be one its priorities at UNGA, and Senior
Diplomatic Advisor to the PM Sannino told the Ambassador that
Italy would like to provide financial, logistical and
training support to the AU-UN hybrid force in Darfur if its
budget can sustain it.

Afghanistan
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9. (C/NF) Italy's commitment to Afghanistan remains strong
(2300 troops),despite opposition to it by several parties in
the Prodi Government. MOD Parisi addressed the Chamber of
Deputies in mid-September to announce the deployment of an

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additional 250 troops to support Italy's assumption of
command of ISAF HQ in Kabul saying, "this is not a
humanitarian mission" and drawing criticism from the far
left. Having just announced a plus-up, Italy will not
consider addition troops for Afghanistan at this time. If we
are going to ask them to do more there, we should encourage
Italy to strengthen their participation in the ISAF
Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) embedded in the
Afghan National Army. The Italians remain particularly risk
averse regarding casualties, kidnappings, and public
acknowledgment of their engagement in combat in Afghanistan
out of sensitivity to possible negative public reaction.
However, when two Italian ISAF soldiers were kidnapped this
weekend (and subsequently rescued by ISAF forces - both were
injured, one seriously),the Italian extreme far-left was
isolated as the only voice in Italy calling for a pull-out in
response, suggesting that Italian staying power in
Afghanistan may be stronger now than it has been in the
recent past.

SPOGLI