Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ROME1919
2007-09-10 14:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:
ITALY: IAEA/IRAN PLAN OF ACTION NO SUBSTITUTE FOR
how-toVZCZCXRO2781 OO RUEHRN DE RUEHRO #1919 2531426 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 101426Z SEP 07 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0797 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8947 RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0113 RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME IMMEDIATE 0136 INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1784 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1410 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2323
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001919
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2022
TAGS: AORC IAEA IR IT KNNP MNUC
SUBJECT: ITALY: IAEA/IRAN PLAN OF ACTION NO SUBSTITUTE FOR
UNSC ACTION; IRANIAN DFM JALILI TOLD TO COOPERATE
REF: A) STATE 124823 B) STATE 123352
Classified By: Classified by Ronald P. Spogli, Ambassador, for Reasons
1.4 (B) and (D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001919
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2022
TAGS: AORC IAEA IR IT KNNP MNUC
SUBJECT: ITALY: IAEA/IRAN PLAN OF ACTION NO SUBSTITUTE FOR
UNSC ACTION; IRANIAN DFM JALILI TOLD TO COOPERATE
REF: A) STATE 124823 B) STATE 123352
Classified By: Classified by Ronald P. Spogli, Ambassador, for Reasons
1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (C) On September 6 the Ambassador spoke with FM D'Alema to
convey reftel points highlighting continued USG concerns over
the Iranian nuclear program. D'Alema, who was on his way to
the Gymnich ministerial requested an immediate copy of the
points to review on his way to Portugal, which we provided.
2. (C) Separately, Poloff met with MFA Deputy Director of
the Office of Iranian and Persian Gulf Affairs, Lorenzo
Kluzer, on September 7 to discuss the IAEA/Iran "Plan of
Action" (Reftel) and the visit of Iranian Deputy Foreign
Minister for European and American Affairs Saeed Jalili to
Rome on September 5. Kluzer said that the U.S. Non-Paper on
the Iran/IAEA Plan of Action (ref b) matched the Italian
position on the subject, namely that Iranian cooperation with
the IAEA was a positive step, but that it was not a
substitute for full compliance with the UN Security Council
Resolutions. He said that Italian Prime Minister Romano
Prodi and Deputy FM Ugo Intini had conveyed the Italian
position to Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Jalili during his
visit to Rome on September 5. Jalili, who also visited
Berlin, Paris and London, met briefly with PM Prodi (the bulk
of the meeting, according to Kluzer, was with Prodi's NSA
Stefano Sannino),before meeting with Deputy FM Intini and
Umberto Ranieri, Head of the Foreign Affairs Commission in
the Chamber of Deputies.
3. (C) Jalili told Intini that the IAEA Report was proof that
Iran was cooperating in good faith with the international
community and hoped that Italy would not be swayed by the
negative reactions of certain countries. He presented Intini
with a tour d'horizon of the political situation in the
Middle East and invited Italy to collaborate with Iran to
avoid a worsening of the situations in Lebanon, Iraq, and
Afghanistan. Intini responded that the IAEA report was a
positive step but that Iran still had to comply with the
Security Council Resolutions.
4. (C) When asked to what degree Italy was willing to
reinforce this message with interlocutors in the runup to the
IAEA Board of Governors' Meeting, Kluzer replied that Italy's
position in favor of strict compliance with the UNSCRs had
always been clear, both in the Security Council and in other
international fora. In addition, Italy has been assiduous in
enforcing UNSCR provisions by seizing potential dual-use
material destined for export from Italy to Iran and in
blocking potential sources of financing for Iranian nuclear
activities, as illustrated in the Bank Sepah case. However,
the Italian fear is that by placing excessive emphasis on the
requirement that Iran cease all enrichment and reprocessing
activities, at the expense of encouraging Iran's nascent
cooperation with the IAEA, we run the risk of pushing Iran
further into isolation and depriving ourselves of the ability
to monitor its activities. Hence the need to encourage
Iran's cooperation with the IAEA, while continuing to
emphasize importance of the UNSCRs. Comment: While Italy
has been reasonably cooperative in blocking dual-use exports
and in ratcheting down financial activity, Kluzer paints a
much too positive picture of overall cooperation. End
Comment.
SPOGLI
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2022
TAGS: AORC IAEA IR IT KNNP MNUC
SUBJECT: ITALY: IAEA/IRAN PLAN OF ACTION NO SUBSTITUTE FOR
UNSC ACTION; IRANIAN DFM JALILI TOLD TO COOPERATE
REF: A) STATE 124823 B) STATE 123352
Classified By: Classified by Ronald P. Spogli, Ambassador, for Reasons
1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (C) On September 6 the Ambassador spoke with FM D'Alema to
convey reftel points highlighting continued USG concerns over
the Iranian nuclear program. D'Alema, who was on his way to
the Gymnich ministerial requested an immediate copy of the
points to review on his way to Portugal, which we provided.
2. (C) Separately, Poloff met with MFA Deputy Director of
the Office of Iranian and Persian Gulf Affairs, Lorenzo
Kluzer, on September 7 to discuss the IAEA/Iran "Plan of
Action" (Reftel) and the visit of Iranian Deputy Foreign
Minister for European and American Affairs Saeed Jalili to
Rome on September 5. Kluzer said that the U.S. Non-Paper on
the Iran/IAEA Plan of Action (ref b) matched the Italian
position on the subject, namely that Iranian cooperation with
the IAEA was a positive step, but that it was not a
substitute for full compliance with the UN Security Council
Resolutions. He said that Italian Prime Minister Romano
Prodi and Deputy FM Ugo Intini had conveyed the Italian
position to Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Jalili during his
visit to Rome on September 5. Jalili, who also visited
Berlin, Paris and London, met briefly with PM Prodi (the bulk
of the meeting, according to Kluzer, was with Prodi's NSA
Stefano Sannino),before meeting with Deputy FM Intini and
Umberto Ranieri, Head of the Foreign Affairs Commission in
the Chamber of Deputies.
3. (C) Jalili told Intini that the IAEA Report was proof that
Iran was cooperating in good faith with the international
community and hoped that Italy would not be swayed by the
negative reactions of certain countries. He presented Intini
with a tour d'horizon of the political situation in the
Middle East and invited Italy to collaborate with Iran to
avoid a worsening of the situations in Lebanon, Iraq, and
Afghanistan. Intini responded that the IAEA report was a
positive step but that Iran still had to comply with the
Security Council Resolutions.
4. (C) When asked to what degree Italy was willing to
reinforce this message with interlocutors in the runup to the
IAEA Board of Governors' Meeting, Kluzer replied that Italy's
position in favor of strict compliance with the UNSCRs had
always been clear, both in the Security Council and in other
international fora. In addition, Italy has been assiduous in
enforcing UNSCR provisions by seizing potential dual-use
material destined for export from Italy to Iran and in
blocking potential sources of financing for Iranian nuclear
activities, as illustrated in the Bank Sepah case. However,
the Italian fear is that by placing excessive emphasis on the
requirement that Iran cease all enrichment and reprocessing
activities, at the expense of encouraging Iran's nascent
cooperation with the IAEA, we run the risk of pushing Iran
further into isolation and depriving ourselves of the ability
to monitor its activities. Hence the need to encourage
Iran's cooperation with the IAEA, while continuing to
emphasize importance of the UNSCRs. Comment: While Italy
has been reasonably cooperative in blocking dual-use exports
and in ratcheting down financial activity, Kluzer paints a
much too positive picture of overall cooperation. End
Comment.
SPOGLI