ITALIAN INTELLIGENCE REFORM: EXTERNAL/INTERNAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 001793

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PTER IT
SUBJECT: ITALIAN INTELLIGENCE REFORM: EXTERNAL/INTERNAL
SERVICES REDIFINED, FINAL IMPACT UNCLEAR

ROME 00001793 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Jonathan Cohen for r
easons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C/NF) Summary: On August 1, the Italian parliament
approved an intelligence reform law that will become
effective October 12, 2007. The new law more clearly
delineates domestic and external intelligence services while
creating a DNI-like coordinator and giving ultimate political
authority/responsibility to the Prime Minister. In addition,
the reform regulates the management of classified
information, increases parliamentary oversight, and gives
intelligence officers limited immunity from prosecution. The
government must still draft implementing regulations that
will influence the direction of the reforms and the extent to
which the reforms will impact U.S. intelligence cooperation
with Italy. That said, Post's initial assessment is that the
reform brings positive changes. End Summary.


2. (U) The Italian parliament approved intelligence reform
August 1. The official gazette published it on August 14,
and it will become effective October 12. The government has
up to 180 days from October 12 to issue implementing
regulations mandated by the law.

New Names, Missions Redefined
--------------


3. (SBU) The reform defines Italy's intelligence services
geographically. The current Military Intelligence and
Security Service(SISMI),to become the Information Agency for
External Security (AISE),will focus on operations abroad.
The current Service for Information and Democratic
Security(SISDE),to become the Information Agency for
Internal Security (AISI),will operate domestically. This
was already the tendency after recent leadership changes, but
the geographic specializations are now enshrined in law.

AISE--"E" for the External Service
--------------


4. (C/NF) AISE will be charged with protecting the integrity
and security of the Republic, specifically targeting external
threats. AISE will also have exclusive competence over
counter proliferation, threats to critical
infrastructure/other national interests, and external
counterintelligence. AISE will only be allowed to operate
domestically in cooperation with AISI and only when those
activities relate directly to on-going foreign operations.
(Note: AISE workforce is mostly resident in Italy, so it is
unclear how this change will impact staff and budget
concerns. End note.)

AISI--"I" for the Internal Service
--------------


5. (SBU) AISI will be responsible for protecting the
integrity and security of Italy's national territory. It
will focus on domestically-based criminal or terrorist
threats and counterintelligence. AISI can only operate
abroad with the cooperation of AISE and only when such
operations are directly linked to domestic AISI cases.

DIS-Italy's DNI
--------------


6. (C/NF) The Department for Security Information (DIS),
previously known as the Executive Committee for Intelligence
and Security Services (CESIS),will coordinate the work of
Italy's intelligence services; conduct information exchanges
with the police; monitor the legality of intelligence
activities; establish and enforce classification guidelines;
and manage Italy's intelligence archives. Our contacts have
told us the GOI envisions transforming the DIS into an
organization analogous to the US Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, DNI.

Political Responsibility Held by Prime Minister
-------------- --


7. (U) The new law places ultimate responsibility for
intelligence activities within the Office of the Prime
Minister. The directors of each intelligence service and the
DIS will report directly to the PM, in addition to parallel
reporting requirements to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Defense and Interior. Prior to the reform, the directors of
the AISE and AISI reported to the Defense and Interior
Ministers, respectively. The PM may delegate functional
oversight responsibility for both services to either a

ROME 00001793 002.2 OF 002


Minister without Portfolio or an Undersecretary in the
Council of Ministers, but the PM will remain ultimately
responsible.

Handling Classified Information
--------------


8. (C/NF) A case involving the alleged rendition of Muslim
cleric Abu Omar and the prosecution of former SISMI Chief
Pollari sparked a domestic debate on the need for and
oversight of state secrets. The current system allows the
government to indefinitely classify intelligence activities.
According to the new law, classified material will be
declassified automatically by one level after five years and
fully declassified after an additional five years. Under
special procedures, material can remain classified for up to
15 years, and only the PM will be able to extend
classification beyond 15 years. These provisions will not
block access by the Constitutional Court, Italy's highest
court, to classified material.


9. (C/NF) In cases where maintaining secrecy stems from
international agreements, the material can be declassified
only with approval by the agreement's international partner.
However, the law will permit declassification under
extenuating circumstances.

Protecting Intel Officers
--------------


10. (C/NF) New measures to protect intelligence officers are
designed to insulate them from the risk of prosecution for
acts committed in the course of regular duty. However, the
PM must explicitly determine that their actions are
"essential for institutional reasons" for this provision to
apply, and it will not apply in cases that affect the "health
or freedom of others." Under the previous law, officers were
obliged to abide by Italian law even when conducting
operations overseas. It is unclear how or if the new law
will modify this legal restriction.

Increased Parliamentary Oversight....Sort of
--------------


11. (U) The new law will also increase parliamentary
oversight. It increases the membership of the joint
bipartisan committee charged with overseeing intelligence
activities. The expanded committee can declassify
information for investigative purposes with a unanimous vote.

Details to be Ironed Out
--------------


12. (C/NF) The reform does not clarify how the services will
coordinate on transnational threats or how the DIS will
mediate inter-agency disagreements, given that both service
chiefs report directly to the Prime Minister. As noted
above, the law will permit declassification of information
obtained through liaison activity under extenuating
circumstances but does not precisely define those
circumstances. Our contacts tell us that once the law comes
into force, the GOI will form an implementation committee
that will address these important details. The process of
drafting and approving the implementing regulations is
expected to last about six months. We anticipate the current
directors of CESIS (DIS),SISMI (AISE) and SISDE (AISI) will
be reconfirmed in their new capacities.

Comment
--------------


13. (C/NF) The reform goes a long way toward better defining
the responsibilities of Italy's sometimes competing
intelligence services, though strictly defining the two
intelligence services along geographic lines raises the
concern of how they will coordinate against transnational
threats. Separately, clarification of classification
procedures is a positive step, as is the granting of limited
prosecutorial immunity for intelligence officers.
Ultimately, the success or failure of the reform and its
impact on U.S. cooperation with Italian intelligence agencies
will depend on the implementing regulations and other
decisions taken by the implementation committee.
Nevertheless, our preliminary assessment of the reform is
positive. End comment.
SPOGLI