Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ROME162
2007-01-25 08:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

A/S FRIED DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN, KOSOVO, MIDDLE

Tags:  PREL PGOV MOPS NATO IT 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7827
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHRO #0162/01 0250851
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 250851Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7016
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0540
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0266
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0291
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0344
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0644
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0843
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0329
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0924
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 2095
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0419
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 8257
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 2230
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0699
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ROME 000162 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS NATO IT
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN, KOSOVO, MIDDLE
EAST WITH ITALIANS

ROME 00000162 001.2 OF 005


Classified By: Classified by Ronald P. Spogli, Ambassador, for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
- - - -

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ROME 000162

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS NATO IT
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN, KOSOVO, MIDDLE
EAST WITH ITALIANS

ROME 00000162 001.2 OF 005


Classified By: Classified by Ronald P. Spogli, Ambassador, for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
- - - -


1. (C/NF) EUR A/S Daniel Fried discussed Afghanistan, Kosovo
and the Middle East with GOI officials in January 10-11
meetings in Rome. (Fried meetings with PM Prodi and FM
D'Alema reported septel) On the Middle East, Fried stated
that the administration would focus significant attention on
the region with the goal of a two-state solution to the
Israel-Palestinian conflict by the end of this
administration. MFA DG for Middle East Cesare Ragaglini
urged the U.S. not to insist on the Roadmap's step-by-step
approach, but rather move as quickly as possible toward a
two-state solution. On Afghanistan, Fried said the U.S.
wanted to use the upcoming NATO ministerial as a chance to
push a unified military and political strategy forward in
advance of an expected Taliban spring offensive. Fried asked
the Italians to reduce caveats and consider additional
contributions they can make to Afghanistan. MFA Afghanistan
Office Director Anna Della Croce and MFA NATO Office Director
Gianni Bardini said Italy would have difficulty altering
their caveats and that it would also be difficult for Italy
to increase its pledge of assistance so soon after the Riga
summit.


2. (C/NF) On Kosovo, Fried outlined the U.S. goal of
achieving a rapid solution with supervised independence and
pledged continued U.S. engagement in the region.
Additionally, he supported the idea of restarting
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) talks with
Serbia. MFA Balkans Director Raimondo De Cardona told Fried
that U.S. support for SAA for Serbia would be crucial in
order to get other Contact Group and EU nations on board. He
asked for support during the January 17 Quint meeting in
order to make an EU announcement during the February 13 GAERC
meeting. On Iran, Fried urged quick action on Bank Sepah and
hoped the international community could work together to

combat proliferation activities. MFA DG for Political
Affairs Giulio Terzi said that the EU Political Directors
would meet to form a common position and adopt common
measures. On Russia, Fried encouraged Italy to work with the
EU to diversify supply and routes to avoid problems. Terzi
agreed and said that Italy was losing time. Within 20 years
the proportion of Europe's energy supplied by Russia could
double. End Summary.

Middle East: Italians Urge Faster Progress
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


3. (C/NF) On January 10 A/S Fried met with MFA DG for
Political Affairs Giulio Terzi, DG for Americas Claudio
Bisogniero, DG for the Middle East Cesare Ragaglini, MFA NATO
Office Director Gianni Bardini, MFA Balkans Office Director
Raimondo De Cardona, MFA Afghanistan Office Director Anna
Della Croce and MOD Diplomatic Advisor Achille Amerio to
discuss the Middle East, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Iran.


4. (C/NF) A/S Fried noted that the administration wanted to
push ahead with an ambitious foreign policy program that
would focus heavily on the Middle East in its last two years.
Its plans included a two-state solution to the
Israel-Palestine issue before the end of the President's
second term. The primary problem in achieving a two-state
solution was the weakness of the Israeli PM and the miserable
state of Palestinian politics. The U.S. recognized that this
would be an uphill battle but was going to work with
countries that supported progress, including those that were
"responsible authoritarians" and resistant to change (Saudi

ROME 00000162 002.2 OF 005


Arabia and Egypt) as long as their participation was
positive. The U.S. would continue to try to isolate the
negative influence of Syria and Iran and their clients Hamas
and Hizballah. Siniora had proven surprisingly resilient in
the face of attacks from Hizballah and the U.S. hoped that
the Paris conference would provide an additional opportunity
to bolster him and diminish the influence of his detractors.
The Secretary would travel to the region immediately after
the President's Iraq speech to meet with regional leaders.
She hoped to show support for Abbas in the short term and
accelerate progress on the Roadmap in the long term.


5. (C/NF) Ragaglini said the international community should
not insist on the stages prescribed by the Roadmap. A
step-by-step approach meant that any party could use any
provocation to prevent the process from proceeding to the
next step. Instead, the Quartet needs to move as quickly as
possible on as many issues as possible and press for direct
Israeli - Palestinian final status talks to get to a
two-state solution. Having weak governments was not
necessarily negative since they were more susceptible to
pressure. He and Fried agreed that the majority of
Palestinians and Israelis understand what a two-state
solution would involve, and there is 90 percent agreement on
the substance of an accord. Remaining issues such as
Jerusalem, refugees and borders could be worked out
relatively quickly if a framework agreement were reached.


6. (C/NF) Ragaglini also argued in favor of engaging Hamas
since they were likely to remain a significant political
force for a long time to come. He said Israel made a serious
mistake in freezing cooperation with Abu Mazen until Shlit is
released. He added that the time to release prisoners to Abu
Mazen is now or Hamas will get credit for releases following
Shlit's liberation. In fact, the more the international
community denigrated Hamas, the more popular they became.
The increasing popularity of radicals in the region was
another reason to move quickly. The international community
needed to look for ways to strengthen Abu Mazen. He
recommended that Olmert release a significant number of
prisoners to Abu Mazen to give himself more credibility, and
that the Quartet be given a more active role.


7. (C/NF) A/S Fried countered that the problem with moving
too quickly was that we needed to ensure that parties could
live up to their commitments and the PA was ready to govern.
Israel would insist on an end to rocket and terror attacks,
points on which Abu Mazen was not strong enough to deliver.
Hamas had to meet the conditions to be welcome at the table.
Fried also cautioned against Europe using Israel as a
"punching bag." The Gaza withdrawal was supposed to be the
precedent for a well-run PA-governed territory. Instead it
showed that the PA was too weak and divided to govern.

Afghanistan: More Commitment Needed
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


8. (C/NF) A/S Fried noted the need for NATO and other
partners to defeat an expected Taliban spring offensive with
their own offensive - both a military one that would
decisively defeat the Taliban on the battlefield and a
political initiative that would provide support for the
Afghan government, increase anti-narcotics efforts, improve
standards of living and encourage Pakistan do more showing
the Afghans that the future did not belong to the Taliban but
to the Afghan people. To set the groundwork for this
offensive, the U.S. saw the upcoming NATO ministerial as a
strategy session that would set a clear path forward for the
allies and for Afghanistan. The U.S. would be encouraging
countries to drop caveats that are limiting NATO's ability to
defeat the Taliban and to set up a coordinated system of

ROME 00000162 003.2 OF 005


providing political and reconstruction assistance. The U.S.
will be encouraging nations to talk about what they can do
and what they can provide in assistance, not what they can't
do. Additionally, the U.S. would be looking for a mechanism
to coordinate assistance - either through a contact group or
through the JCNB. From its side, the U.S. was not asking
allies to provide unilaterally. The U.S. will increase
funding for Afghanistan.


9. (C/NF) Terzi said the Italian Government's refunding of
the Afghanistan mission was a near miracle and agreed that
the international community needed to move ahead aggressively
to strengthen Karzai's weak government and improve the
relationship between the central government and the
provinces. This was Italy's rationale for proposing a
conference on Afghanistan. Italy already had some ideas on
new initiatives that included increased assistance on Rule of
Law issues that might include a 130-150 ESDP mission to train
law enforcement officials. Bardini stated that the US
position was music to his ears, however, the NATO meeting
could unreasonably raise expectations for some kind of new
breakthrough. The situation on the ground and in allied
capitals had not changed significantly since the Riga Summit
and it could be difficult to achieve new results. Della
Croce noted that there was international consensus and
support for the mission in Afghanistan. The GOI was
submitting a funding request to the Parliament, in Feb. 2007,
to cover the next 12 months of Italy's Afghanistan mission.
The GOI would be prepared, therefore, to discuss their
contributions at the conference. She added that Italy would
fund and host a Rule of Law conference in April.
Nevertheless, it might be difficult for Italy to pledge more
support than what was already offered at Riga. Bardini and
Amerio said the Italian political situation would make
additional changes to the position taken on caveats at Riga
highly unlikely - a lot of countries, Amerio said, gave all
they could at Riga. Amerio hoped for a Jan 26 message
focused more on political and reconstruction coordination and
solidarity. Fried again urged them to make an effort to
re-examine the caveats, and lead with what they could do, not
what they couldn't.

Kosovo - Toward Supervised Independence
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


10. (C/NF) A/S Fried stated that the US would not withdraw
from KFOR or disengage from Kosovo after a status decision.
Withdrawing from Kosovo would send the wrong signal to
nationalists on both sides. The US hoped that a supervised
independence decision on Kosovo would be done through a UNSC
resolution that reflected Ahtisaari's recommendations, but if
the Russians blocked a resolution, the U.S. believed the
international community should be prepared to move forward
without one. A/S Fried stressed that this would be the
worst-case scenario - providing ample opportunities for
Serbian and Kosovar Albanian efforts not to implement
recommendations in the Ahtisaari report as a result of the
ambiguity caused by recognition problems. Without a
resolution the status of the international presence would be
in doubt. The U.S. had already engaged Russia and sent a
strong message that Kosovo should be decided for Kosovo's
sake and not on the basis of leverage on other issues. A/S
Fried encouraged the Italians to send a similar message -
that NATO troops were in harm's way, not Russian troops, and
that the Balkans were in Europe's backyard and the effects of
instability would affect Europe, not Russia. Therefore, the
U.S. and EU needed to work closely together to avoid having
Russia exploit potential differences as it had on the Iran
resolution.


11. (C/NF) After the status decision, the U.S. and EU needed

ROME 00000162 004.2 OF 005


to coordinate closely on recognition. The U.S. would
recognize Kosovo only after it accepted and pledged to
implement a UNSC resolution that included all the elements of
Ahtisaari's proposal. The U.S. did not expect for all the
conditions to be fulfilled immediately, however. Fried added
that the U.S. envisioned a "truly European" Serbia which
could be integrated into the EU. He supported granting
Serbia SAA status soon as useful and well-timed. Fried also
noted that the U.S. supports a timetable on UNSC discussions
before the formation of a Serbian government in order to
avoid parties from blaming any particular government and to
avoid giving Serbs an excuse to indefinitely delay forming a
government to avoid the inevitability of the decision. He
also urged greater NATO-EU and US-EU consultations on this
matter. In addition to Serbia, Albania needed to be closely
watched as well. If elections in Albania threw the NATO
option off track and the Kosovo decision (or lack thereof)
occurred at the same time, it could create pressure for
stronger Albanian nationalism.


12. (C/NF) Terzi was pleased to hear that the U.S. had no
intention of leaving KFOR and saw the need for a UNSC
resolution. He said the European countries needed to work
through the EU and bilaterally to ensure Russia did not block
a UNSC resolution. While Terzi joked that the U.S. was "not
yet" an EU member, both he and De Cardona welcomed Fried's
statement that the U.S. was supportive of SAA for Serbia.
Both added that if the US expressed support for SAA during
the January 17 Quint discussions in Washington, it could
convince other Quint members to go along. They envisioned an
SAA announcement on Serbia could be made as early as the 13
Feb GAERC. Terzi noted, however, that close coordination on
recognition was crucial since many regional EU countries were
concerned about the effects of an independent Kosovo without
clear expectations on political and democratic development.
He argued that the international presence needed to include
the continuation of KFOR for a significant period coupled
with an OHR-like implementation organization or institution.


Iran: Now is the Time to Implement UNSC Resolution
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


13. (C/NF) Terzi said he'd just come from inter-departmental
meeting on 1737 implementation. He stated that there will be
a common decision by EU political directors in the next few
days followed by the adoption of measures by EU. Meanwhile,
GOI is looking at need to adopt new legislation to counter
proliferation of finance activities by banks operating in
Italy. Terzi said Bank of Italy would also circulate a
follow-up notice to banks in the wake of the U.S. designation
of Bank Sepah. Fried said that the U.S. will circulate our
Executive Order as a follow up to the previous circular
warning. Fried said that it was extremely important to
follow up on resolution 1737 to maintain pressure on Iran,
especially on the financial side. While the U.N.'s potential
is not clear, the international community needs to work
together to narrow opportunities for such proliferation
activity. Fried hoped that Italy's legal system would be
able to take quick action on Bank Sepah.

Russia: Still No Progress on Energy Security
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


14. (C/NF) Fried told Terzi that he had first raised with his
European counterparts the issue of energy security and EU
dependence on Russian energy over a year ago, and since then
Russia's behavior had not improved. He again urged Italy to
work to diversify energy sources and supplies - including
supporting the development of southern corridor pipelines to
transport oil and gas from the Caspian region without

ROME 00000162 005.2 OF 005


transiting Russia. Russia is trying to undermine that
option by filling southern route pipelines with Russian oil
and gas. The EU needed a community-wide approach since
individual countries could not accomplish this alone. Fried
added that this is something that NATO needed to address as
well. Terzi agreed and said that Italy was losing time. In
20 years, the percentage of the EU's supply coming from
Russia could double. While Europe was pushing for greater
control of supplies, Italy couldn't be certain that any
agreements made now would be honored by Russia in the future.



15. (U) This cable was cleared by A/S Fried.

SPOGLI