ITALY AGREES HYBRID AU/UN FORCE IN DARFUR A

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 001388

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2017
TAGS: KPKO PREL LE XF SU CD UN IT
SUBJECT: ITALY AGREES HYBRID AU/UN FORCE IN DARFUR A
PRIORITY; UNIFIL MANDATE UNLIKELY TO CHANGE

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Classified By: Acting Political Minister-Counselor Jonathan R. Cohen fo
r reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: During June 21 meetings with Italian
officials, IO/PSC Office Director Douglas Wake discussed
Sudan, Lebanon, Chad, and peacekeeping operations. On
Darfur, Wake stressed the need to move forward quickly with
the hybrid force while remaining willing to consider
sanctions if Khartoum starts to backtrack. Wake thanked
Italy for its leadership in UNIFIL and discussed tactics for
mandate renewal. The Italians agreed authorizing the AU/UN
hybrid force in Darfur was essential. They were doubtful on
the prospect of enhancing UNIFIL's mandate. End Summary.

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Italy Agrees Darfur Hybrid Force Urgent
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2. (C) In discussion on Sudan with MFA Director General for
Sub-Saharan Affairs Armando Sanguini, Wake said he was
cautiously optimistic after Khartoum's apparent acceptance of
the hybrid AU/UN peacekeeping force and hoped this
represented a real opportunity. He added, however, that we
must remain cautious until we see changes in Sudanese actions
and suggested Khartoum's acceptance could be more shrewd
politics by President Bashir, buying breathing room for the
time being, but allowing him to erect future roadblocks to
standing up the peacekeeping force. Wake said our priorities
for establishing the hybrid force include clarifying: UN
command and control; financing; and the force's exact mandate
under UN Chapter VII authority.


3. (C) Sanguini emphasized the political origins of the
crisis in Darfur and warned that any attempt to resolve it
must address the fundamental roots of the conflict, including
the distribution of essential resources. He noted that a
meaningful resolution cannot be based exclusively on
pressuring Bashir and the GOS, and must include major rebel
groups. He agreed that action is needed immediately to move
the hybrid force through the UNSC, but said in the meantime
the AU remains on the ground and requires support.


4. (C) MFA UN Coordinator Giamberto De Vito said Italy is
concerned about the precedent set by the proposed hybrid
AU/UN force in Sudan, and that as a major financer of UN
peacekeeping missions, Italy could be assessed for missions
undertaken by regional organizations such as the AU. After
Italy leaves the UNSC at the end of 2008, it would have no
voice in such decisions.


5. (C) Wake said the USG shares concerns about the cost of
financing non-UN missions through UN peacekeeping
assessments, and that the hybrid force would need to look as
much like a UN operation as possible, including its
accounting procedures. He also suggested that savings could
be made by reducing the size of some long-standing
peacekeeping missions, such as those in Cote d'Ivoire and the
DRC.

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GOI Sees UNIFIL Mandate Unlikely to Change
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6. (C) Wake discussed Lebanon with MFA Middle East Office
Director Luciano Pezzotti, Prime Minister's Diplomatic
Advisor for the Middle East Marco Carnelos, and De Vito. He
thanked each for Italy's significant contribution to UNIFIL.
While discussing the upcoming debate on UNIFIL's mandate,
Wake pointed out that parts of UNSCR 1701's mandate remain
unfulfilled because the Lebanese government has not requested
UNIFIL action as required under the resolution. While noting
that Washington had not finalized its position on the UNIFIL
mandate renewal resolution to be adopted by the end of August
2007, and that the U.S. was keen to hear the views of major
troop contributors like Italy, he raised the possibility of
broadening the mandate to allow UNIFIL to act more freely.
Even if the eventual mandate was unlikely to be made
stronger, Wake asked whether for tactical negotiating
purposes it might be useful to push for mandate changes to
stave off attacks from those who would try to weaken it.


7. (C) De Vito, Pezzotti, and Carnelos all considered a
strengthening of the mandate unlikely. Looking toward the

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renewal of UNSCR 1701, De Vito suggested that because of
Italy's presence as a troop contributor, it would be
difficult for Italy to suggest a mandate change. He said
such a suggestion would be best coming from an independent
party, preferably the UNSYG.


8. (C) Pezzotti pointed out that UNSCR 1701, although
imperfect, balanced complicated international and domestic
Lebanese interests and would be difficult to broaden while
maintaining this delicate equilibrium. He also said pressure
by Israel for UNIFIL to be more aggressive was unhelpful,
particularly as this amounts to asking UNIFIL to do what
Israel was unable to do itself last summer. He said for the
time being UNIFIL is able to keep Israel safe, but asking
UNIFIL to dismantle Hizballah was unrealistic. Pezzotti said
UNIFIL's top priorities must be reinforcing the Lebanese
government and army and facilitating political compromise
within Lebanese society. Pezzotti agreed on the need to stop
weapons transfers on the Syrian border, but said the only way
to do so would be through a political agreement within
Lebanon and with Lebanon's neighbors.


9. (C) Carnelos thought that suggesting a change in UNIFIL's
mandate could create dangerous domestic trouble for PM
Siniora. Proposing stronger mandate language only to have it
eventually weakened could also be interpreted as a defeat, he
warned. From his recent visits to Beirut, Carnelos said he
has concluded that Israeli damage to Hizballah was
significantly less than originally hoped. While weapons
smuggling across the Syrian border is unacceptable and a
violation of UNSCR 1701, he did not believe that it altered
the fundamental security situation.

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Cautious on French Peacekeeping Initiative in Chad
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10. (C) De Vito raised a French initiative to send a
peacekeeping force of 9,000 to 11,000 peacekeepers to Chad,
and said that Italy remains cautious and prefers to continue
analyzing the political situation to see if such a force is
truly necessary. He asked how a mandate for such a mission
would be defined. Would peacekeepers protect only Chadian
IDPs or also Darfurian refugees? Would they operate only
inside the camps or more broadly? De Vito said the French are
circulating a proposal that calls for an EU role in Chad
through ESDP that Italy is still examining.


11. (C) Wake replied that the facts on the ground have been
clear for some time, and that the USG favors speedy action to
establish a robust mission in Chad. Wake said it would be
impractical for peacekeepers to be asked to distinguish
between different IDPs and refugees.


12. (U) IO/PSC Office Director Douglas Wake cleared this
cable.
Spogli