Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ROME1333
2007-06-18 12:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

KOSOVO: ITALIANS NOT READY TO DISCUSS INDEPENDENCE

Tags:  PREL PGOV UNSC SR YI IT 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8355
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0321
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1772
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1389
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 4356
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2284
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 2465
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 8749
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 2626
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0404
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0766
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 0330
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2880
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 001333 

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NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC SR YI IT
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: ITALIANS NOT READY TO DISCUSS INDEPENDENCE
WITHOUT UNSC RESOLUTION

REF: A) BLACK-ESCOBAR EMAIL 6/15/07 B) ROME 1305

ROME 00001333 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Classified by David D. Pearce, Acting Deputy Chief of Mi
ssion, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
- - - -

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 001333

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC SR YI IT
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: ITALIANS NOT READY TO DISCUSS INDEPENDENCE
WITHOUT UNSC RESOLUTION

REF: A) BLACK-ESCOBAR EMAIL 6/15/07 B) ROME 1305

ROME 00001333 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Classified by David D. Pearce, Acting Deputy Chief of Mi
ssion, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
- - - -


1. (C/NF) FM D'Alema is convinced of the need to exhaust
every means possible to reach consensus on a resolution even
if it meant a 120-180 day delay. The Italian MFA,
therefore, will not engage at this point on discussions
related to a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo
absent a resolution, even on a theoretical basis. Raimondo
De Cardona, Head of the Italian MFA Balkans Office,
underlined the sensitivity of this issue by telling poloffs
that moving ahead without a UNSC resolution risked splitting
the EU, destroying Italy's bipartisan support for Rome's
Kosovo mission, creating greater instability in the Balkans
and even endangering Italy's participation in KFOR. His
statements track closely with D'Alema's comments to Deputy
Secretary Negroponte on June 9 (ref b). De Cardona said that

SIPDIS
D'Alema was convinced after his June 14-15 visit to Belgrade
and Pristina that Kostunica had begun to think about options
to allow his government to save face. He also believed the
Kosovar Albanians would be prepared to wait a few more months
in order to settle Kosovo's status issue. End Summary.


2. (C/NF) On June 16, poloffs delivered ref a points on
possible alternatives for moving forward on Kosovo's
independence without a UNSC resolution. Normally open to
sharing his personal thoughts, De Cardona told poloffs, "I am
not authorized to discuss this." De Cardona noted that he
would not engage on this topic at the Quint meeting in
Sarajevo on June 19. He added that he had just spent 24
hours with D'Alema and noted that the FM preferred to exhaust
all possibilities on getting support for a resolution before
any discussions - regardless of how theoretical - on moving
ahead without one. Without a resolution, Italy was convinced

the EU would split on its decision to recognize Kosovo,
Italy's bipartisan support of the MFA's Kosovo policy would
be shattered, and the GOI might have trouble getting support
from the Italian parliament for continuing its 2,000-plus
KFOR participation. De Cardona also noted that any follow-on
ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) mission would not
be legitimate without a UN resolution, adding that the EU
must tread carefully because Kosovo will be a crucial test
for ESDP.


3. (C/NF) During D'Alema's visit to Belgrade, Kostunica
remarked that although Serbia continued to reject any
solution that would give Kosovo independence, he added that
he was confident that the international community could find
a solution acceptable to both Belgrade and Pristina. "The
international community has always been able to find good
solutions to difficult problems in the Balkans," Kostunica
told D'Alema. Kostunica's advisor and Kosovo negotiator
Samardzic noted that Dayton and Okhrid had been very good
solutions to seemingly intractable ethnic conflicts - perhaps
something similar could be devised for Kosovo. De Cardona
noted that Italy was open to discussing non-status portions
of the Ahtisaari plan, particularly if it could bring
Belgrade closer to accepting supervised independence. He
also suggested disconnecting elements of the plan from
Ahtisaari's name could ease acceptance, noting, "Ahtisaari
did a good job, but he could have done more. Maybe if the
plan had a different name.."


4. (C/NF) De Cardona stated that the GOI was supportive of a
120-180 day delay on Kosovo. D'Alema was convinced during
his visit to Pristina that the Kosovar Albanians could wait a
bit more if it meant finding a proper solution to their
status issue. Poloff noted that the longer the international
community asked the Kosovar leadership to wait, the less
leverage and influence we could expect to have. We could not
have an open-ended process. De Cardona agreed, but added
that the delay could also serve to show the rest of the
international community that we had done everything possible

ROME 00001333 002.2 OF 002


to secure a resolution.


5. (C/NF) Comment. Italy still stands by its policy of
supporting supervised independence and FM D'Alema has been
consistent in supporting the Ahtisaari proposal - although he
is not as firm on the non-status questions. Italy is
concerned about how to get there, however, and about how the
international community will deal with the aftermath. For
Italy, a unilateral declaration of Kosovo's independence
without the UN, without EU consensus, and with domestic
political opposition is a nightmare scenario. D'Alema
believes moving forward outside of the UN structure would be
politically dangerous for the Balkans, for the international
community, and - because moving without the international
consensus would be politically divisive - dangerous for his
weak government as well.
Spogli