Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ROME1310
2007-06-14 11:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

UNSCR 1747/OECD: ITALY WOULD LIKELY SUPPORT UNSCR

Tags:  PREL EFIN ETRD EXIM OECD UN EU IR IT 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHRO #1310 1651145
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141145Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8331
INFO RUEHSS/OECD POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 2454
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 8736
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 2615
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001310 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE, KATHLEEN ALLEGRONE AND ANDREW YOUNG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2017
TAGS: PREL EFIN ETRD EXIM OECD UN EU IR IT
SUBJECT: UNSCR 1747/OECD: ITALY WOULD LIKELY SUPPORT UNSCR
ON NO NEW EXPORT CREDITS TO IRAN

REF: A. STATE 81876


B. STATE 81875

C. ROME 667

Classified By: Economic Minister Counselor Tom Delare
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001310

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE, KATHLEEN ALLEGRONE AND ANDREW YOUNG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2017
TAGS: PREL EFIN ETRD EXIM OECD UN EU IR IT
SUBJECT: UNSCR 1747/OECD: ITALY WOULD LIKELY SUPPORT UNSCR
ON NO NEW EXPORT CREDITS TO IRAN

REF: A. STATE 81876


B. STATE 81875

C. ROME 667

Classified By: Economic Minister Counselor Tom Delare
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Econoff met June 14 with Filippo Giansante, Ministry
of Finance Chief of the Paris Club Division, to discuss
options to restrict export credit flows to Iran through the
OECD (refs A and B). (Note: Giansante is also an advisor to
Ignazio Angeloni, President of Italy's export credit agency,
SACE.) Giansante reported that it was unlikely Italy would
respond to USG questions to OECD members in ref B, as Italy
does not believe that the OECD is the proper forum to pursue
further action against Iran on export credits. Rather, the
U.S. should seek to include clear language on no new export
credits to Iran in a third UNSC resolution. This way, he
explained, OECD member states would merely act on the UN
resolution and not be put in the "uncomfortable" position of
pursuing a role outside of OECD's mandate.


2. (C) Giansante conceded that the OECD could be an
excellent forum to discuss ceasing export credits to Iran --
but only after a third UNSC resolution requiring all member
states to not issue any new credit guarantees to Iran was
passed. He presented Econoff data showing that SACE's
exposure to Iran currently stands at 2.9 billion euros
(mostly for machinery, he claimed) and will drop further by
year's end. "But export credits are very fungible," he
added, explaining that SACE's reduction of exposure to Iran
will not prevent other nations from filling the void. If the
OECD were to take a more aggressive stand, that would not
prevent non-OECD members like China from assuming OECD
members' old Iran business, he stated. Only an UN resolution
on export credits to Iran would guarantee a "level playing
field." A third UN resolution would also embolden OECD
members to make symbolic gestures, as the fear of emerging
market competitors taking old Iran business would vanish.


3. (C) Giansante wanted to ensure that the U.S. understands
that, while Italy would likely support a third UNSCR calling
on all member states to halt new export credits to Iran, it
could not support any UN language calling for the
cancellation of outstanding credits. If SACE were not to
honor outstanding credits, it could face legal actions for
damages.
Spogli