ITALIAN SPACE AGENCY'S AGILE LAUNCH: RATIONALE FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001216

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/DTCP AND PM/DTC
PARIS FOR NASA EUROPEAN OFFICE - DMILLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2017
TAGS: ETTC KOMC PARM IT
SUBJECT: ITALIAN SPACE AGENCY'S AGILE LAUNCH: RATIONALE FOR
DISREGARDING U.S. EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS

REF: A. ROME 1168


B. STATE 71981

C. ROME 860

D. ROME 310

E. 2006 ROME 1585

Classified By: Ecmin Thomas L. Delare for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 13.


2. (C) Summary. Separate discussions at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Universities and Research, and
the Italian Space Agency (ASI) indicate that the decision to
proceed with the launch of ASI's AGILE satellite from India,
despite USG export control concerns and allegedly contrary
advice from both ministries, was made at ASI.
Newly-installed ASI President Giovanni Bignami denied any
wrong-doing, however, and provided copies of documents that
he claimed show State Department approval of the re-export to
India of a satellite component included in the U.S. Munitions
List (USML). These documents were previously seen by us and
do not, in themselves, provide authorization. Bignami
conceded that the authorization was possibly ambiguous, but
claimed the decision to launch was an appropriate response to
a bureaucratic error on the U.S. side and lack of formal
written communication from Washington. Bignami expressed his
hope that the legal status of the USML item's re-export to
and launch from India can be clarified, removing any barriers
to cooperation between ASI and NASA. Bignami would also like
to clear the air prior to the June 18-24 Paris Air Show, at
which he will meet NASA Administrator Michael Griffin.
Embassy concurs with utility of clarifying the legal status
of the USML export as an appropriate first step to securing a
serious review of GOI treatment of controlled items,
including by "autonomous agencies" of the Italian Government.
End summary.

All Roads Lead To ASI
--------------


3. (C) In meetings with officials at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) (reported ref B) and Ministry of Universities
and Research (MUR) on May 29 and 30, MFA and MUR officials
outlined internal GOI deliberations in the weeks leading up
to the April 23 launch of ASI's AGILE research satellite from
Sriharikota, India. Both Giovanni Manfredi, the MFA official
responsible for Space and Science and Technology Cooperation,
and Domenico Giorgi, Diplomatic Advisor to the Minister of
Universities and Research, stressed that because ASI is an
independent agency, it "has the power to implement any
activity," and does not report directly to either the MFA or
MUR. Giorgi went so far as to say that "even in the presence
of written instructions, ASI can decide to act differently --
even in international relations." Both also noted that
bureaucratic control over ASI was complicated in the period
immediately prior to the launch because ASI did not have a
President or Board of Directors, and was being administered
by a
n "External Commissioner."


4. (C) Manfredi and Giorgi said USG concerns regarding the
launch of the AGILE satellite from India and the re-export to
India of the USML-controlled reaction wheel assembly were
discussed at interagency meetings in the weeks prior to
AGILE's launch. Manfredi cited meetings between the Italian
Embassy in Washington and State Department officials,
including one at the Ambassadorial level, and a April 10
meeting at the MFA, attended by the Ecmin and Science
Counselor, at which MFA, MUR, and ASI representatives
discussed USG concerns regarding AGILE's Indian launch and
the related U.S. export license, as examples of the MFA
efforts to ensure USG views were taken into consideration
prior to AGILE's April 23 launch. In separate meetings, both
Manfredi and Giorgi emphasized that the final decision to
launch AGILE was ASI's, and that it was within ASI's power as
an independent agency to go forward with the launch despite
advice from the MFA and MUR to the contrary.


5. (C) Both Manfredi and Giorgi underscored that ASI acted
based on assurances from Goodrich (the U.S. exporter) and GOI
attorneys that all of the papers regarding the re-export of
the reaction wheel assembly were in order, and noted that
copies of the relevant papers were provided to the Embassy at
the April 10 meeting. Ecmin responded that Embassy Rome and
Department officials had told ASI, the MFA, the Italian
Embassy in Washington, and representatives of Carlo Gavazzi
Space (AGILE's manufacturer) of USG concerns over the

re-export to India of the reaction wheel assembly and that
the Embassy had requested the papers provided at the April 10
meeting over a year earlier. These subsequent meetings and
expression of USG concerns should have overridden any
assurances based on previous paperwork. Ecmin also noted
that the provision of documents on April 10 was too little,
too late. AGILE was already in India, in apparent violation
of U.S. export control regulations, and only two weeks away
from launch when
the GOI provided the USG with copies of the papers upon which
ASI based its decision to go ahead with AGILE's launch.


6. (C) At the conclusion of his meetings at the MFA and
MUR, Ecmin noted that ASI, an independent GOI agency, had
disregarded repeated USG expressions of concern over the
re-export of a USML-controlled item to India and possible
violations of U.S. export control regulations. Regardless of
ASI's ability to act autonomously and the MFA and MUR's lack
of oversight over ASI, ASI's apparent indifference to USG
concerns calls into question the GOI's ability to live up to
commitments the GOI makes when it receives sensitive goods
and services controlled by U.S. export regulations. Both
Manfredi and Giorgi said they understand the USG concerns,
but reiterated that the decision to launch was ASI's.
Manfredi ended the meeting by expressing hope that
repercussions from this case will not have negative
consequences for other areas of USG-GOI cooperation.

ASI: "THE BUCK STOPS HERE"
--------------


7. (C) Ecmin delivered ref B demarche to ASI's
newly-installed President, Giovanni Bignami, on May 31.
Bignami, who took office on April 26, three days after
AGILE's launch, said that "I am ASI's President and have full
responsibility for this situation." He elaborated that "I
know exactly what I'm talking about -- we have all of the
answers," and concluded that "the buck stops here." After
delivery of ref B points, Bignami turned over copies of
documents which he said justified ASI's decision to proceed
with AGILE's launch despite USG objections and statements of
concern. A description of these papers, which were also
provided to the Embassy during the April 10 meeting at the
MFA, follows:

-- A letter dated June 17, 2004 from Goodrich Optical and
Space Systems to PM/DTC. The letter's subject is "DSP-5
Application, Request for Permanent Export to Italy of
Unclassified Defense Articles (Reaction Wheel Assembly) for

SIPDIS
AGILE Satellite Program." The letter specifies that AGILE's
launch "company/vehicle/site/date" have been changed from
those in the original license application, and lists the
original, approved, Technical Assistance Agreement (TAA) as
number TA 1177-03. The letter identifies AGILE's new launch
site as "Sriharikota - India," and states that AGILE will be
launched by "Antrix" using a "PSLV." This letter bears the
reference number "04BEUAP0068."

-- A permanent export license, number 931427, issued by
PM/DTC on June 24, 2004, for the export of a reaction wheel
assembly. The destination country (item three) is listed as
Italy; the applicant is identified as Goodrich Corp.; the
foreign end use (item 14) is listed as ASI (Italian Space
Agency),Rome, Italy; the foreign consignee (item 16) is
listed as Carlo Gavazzi Space, Milan, Italy. The number
"04BEUAP0068" is printed below item 20 (Specific Purpose).
Item 20 identifies the reaction wheel assembly as "Part of
Attitude Ctrl Sys for AGILE Satellite Program (Reference Case
TA-1177-03)."

-- An invoice from Goodrich Optical Space Systems dated
February 1, 2005, for the reaction wheel assembly. The
consignee is listed as Carlo Gavazzi Space, Milan, Italy.
The invoice references "State Department License 931427" and
states that "these commodities are authorized by the U.S.
Government for export only to Italy for use by the parties
named on Department of State Export License 931427 (Carlo
Gavazzi Space and Italian Space Agency) and to the launch
site in India."

Scanned copies of these documents will be sent to the
Department (EUR/WE, PM/DTC, and PM/DTCP) via classified
e-mail.


8. (C) Bignami asserted that these documents show that ASI
acted within its rights in re-exporting the reaction wheel
assembly to India and in launching AGILE using an Indian PSLV

rocket. According to Bignami, Goodrich's June 17, 2005,
letter notified the Department of ASI's intent to launch
AGILE from India. (Note. ASI had previously planned to
launch the rocket from Kazakhstan, but switched launch sites
to India for cost reasons. End note.) According to Bignami,
PM/DTC's inclusion of the Goodrich letter's reference number
in PM/DTC's June 24, 2004, license shows PM/DTC received
Goodrich's June 17 letter and was aware of ASI's plans to
launch AGILE from India. Bignami argued that inclusion of
the reference number of the June 17 letter in the June 24
export license acknowledges receipt of the letter and
notification that AGILE will be launched from India.
Finally, according to Bignami, issuance of the license
signified approval of ASI's decision to switch launch sites
from Kazakhstan to India.


9. (C) Ecmin thanked Bignami for his explanation, but added
that part of the problem we have faced in bringing clarity to
the export licenses related to AGILE is the lack of a timely
response to our year-old requests for documents from ASI and
Carlo Gavazzi Space. Goodrich's June 17, 2004, letter would
have much more useful if it had been provided to the USG
prior to April 10, 2007, two weeks before AGILE's launch.
Ecmin also noted that it is highly unlikely the Department
would be able to issue a license for the export of a
sensitive USML-controlled item to India only a week after
receiving notice of a change in launch site, and that India
is not named anywhere on the June 24, 2004, export license.
While we did not raise the issue with Bignami, it is also
worth noting that the copy of the Goodrich letter provided by
the GOI does not indicate when it was received by PM/DTC.
Additionally, it is not clear to us that the reference number
on the letter is unique to the June 17 letter, it may refer
to all correspondence between Goodrich and PM/DTC related to
the license for the reaction wheel assembly. If that is the
case, the reference number included on the June 24 license
may have been copied from an earlier letter from Goodrich
related to the same export.


10. (C) Moving beyond the significance of the documents
presented by Bignami, Ecmin pointed out the larger problem of
ASI's disregard of USG concerns over the re-export of the
reaction wheel assembly to India. These concerns were made
known to the GOI on numerous occasions in Rome and
Washington, and appeared to have been disregarded in the
weeks leading up to AGILE's launch. Bignami responded that
although ASI was aware of the USG concerns, it never received
anything in writing telling ASI not to move forward with
AGILE's export to India and its subsequent launch. In the
absence of a written document explicitly revoking the export
license, Bignami said he considered the export license and
assurances from Goodrich and Agile that everything was in
order sufficient for ASI to proceed with AGILE's launch. In
fact, he observed that ASI believed USG concerns to be based
on a bureaucratic error made by the Department, and hence,
inconsequential. Ecmin responded that conveying USG concerns
to the Italian Ambassador in Washington should have sufficed
to bring the launch process to a stop.


11. (C) Bignami ended the meeting by noting that, as a
practical matter, once Carlo Gavazzi Space finished AGILE's
assembly, the satellite was sealed, and there was no way to
gain access to the reaction wheel assembly without unsealing
the satellite and taking it apart. Additionally, he said
that when the sealed satellite reached India, it was
monitored at all times by ASI personnel prior to being placed
inside the PSLV's faring and launched into space.


12. (C) Comment. This case is disturbing on several levels.
First, we are stunned by the MFA and MUR's seeming inability
to force ASI, an Italian government agency, to abide by
technology transfer control agreements entered into by the
GOI, and Bignami's assertion that ASI was correct to act on
assurances provided by Goodrich and Carlo Gavazzi Space in
proceeding with AGILE's launch from India. ASI's cavalier
attitude towards U.S. export control regulations and its
dismissal of repeated USG statements of concern over a
lengthy period of time concerning the re-export of the
reaction wheel assembly to India is also disturbing. Our
experience with the AGILE case points to the need for
high-level USG-GOI export control consultations, first
proposed ref D, to bring U.S. and Italian export control
officials together and to ensure that GOI officials
understand their obligations under technology transfer
agreements entered into between the U.S. and Italy. End
comment.


13. (U) Action request. Post requests Department's
assistance in responding quickly and definitively to ASI's
assertion that it had the export licenses necessary to
re-export the reaction wheel assembly to India. End action
requested.
Spogli