SAUDI OPPOSITION GROUP REACTIVATED IN PUBLIC SPHERE

S E C R E T RIYADH 000932

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2027
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KISL SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI OPPOSITION GROUP REACTIVATED IN PUBLIC SPHERE

REF: A. 06 RIYADH 6372

B. 06 RIYADH 6472

C. 06 RIYADH 8723

D. 06 RIYADH 6925

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission David Rundell
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: The London-based Saudi opposition group
Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA) began another
unsuccessful public call on March 22 for protests in local
mosques in Riyadh and Jeddah. The last time that MIRA called
for protests was in August 2006 during the Lebanon crisis.
Those efforts were unsuccessful (Ref A and B). MIRA issued
four near-consecutive public statements in the week leading
up to the proposed March 30 protest date. In addition to its
usual claim of corruption against the SAG, MIRA leader Dr.
Sa'ad al-Faqih also criticized the government for its
"servitude" to the United States. As in the past, Al-Faqih
targeted tribal loyalties, calling on tribal sheikhs and
leaders from the Shammar tribe to protest. However, he
employed fellow exiled oppositionist Talal al-Rashid to lead
the call for the tribal support. Despite limited attendance
at the March protests, al-Faqih issued a series of public
statements in April on MIRA's London-based television channel
Al-Islah, calling for further protests and contradicting
claims that MIRA is a weak organization. Although it appears
that these renewed broadcasts do not enjoy any groundswell of
domestic support, they are likely indicative of a renewed
source of funding. END SUMMARY.

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Opposition Group Renews Calls for Tribal Support
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2. (S) The London-based Saudi opposition group Movement for
Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA) began another unsuccessful
public call on March 22 for protests in local mosques in
Riyadh and Jeddah via its London-based satellite television
channel Al-Islah. The protests were to be held on March 30
during Friday prayers at designated mosques. Because the SAG
cannot ban mosque gatherings, MIRA leader Sa,ad al-Faqih
declared that it could not stop these protests. This call
for protests was MIRA,s largest public comeback since August
2006, when it called for similar protests, though al-Faqih
has regularly broadcast anti-Saudi rhetoric on Al-Islah.
(NOTE: The most recent statements of interest include the
October 2006 statement criticizing the formation of the
Allegiance Commission and the new succession law, and January
2007 statements: one criticizing the Saudi response to Sadaam
Hussein's execution, and the second criticizing claims of
corruption surrounding the Eurofighter deal (Ref C). END
NOTE.)


3. (S) In his initial 90-minute broadcast, al-Faqih aired a
six-minute message by Talal al-Rashid of the Shammar tribe,
in which he urged his tribal members to support MIRA and
prepare for the "coming change" in Saudi Arabia. Al-Faqih
focused the broadcast on this message and provided a
telephone number where listeners could call al-Rashid to
express their support for MIRA. (NOTE: Talal al-Rashid is
also an oppositionist in exile. In August 2006 he announced
the formation of the "Saudi Democratic Opposition Front" from
Paris. While this announcement appeared in foreign press--
namely the Arabic-language newspaper Quds al-Arabi noted for
its anti-Saudi stance-- there was no public announcement or
visible support inside the Kingdom (REF D). END NOTE.)
Al-Faqih continued with his usual criticisms of the SAG--
corruption and the lack of accountability and transparency--
specifically criticizing the King's failure to reshuffle the
cabinet as had been expected. Additionally, for the first
time, al-Faqih criticized the SAG for its "servitude" to the
United States, commenting that it is one of the few issues
that binds the entire Al Saud family together.


4. (U) In three subsequent broadcasts leading up to the
March 30 protest date-- each ranging from two to two and a
half hours, al-Faqih reiterated his call for protests at
designated mosques in Riyadh and Jeddah. He urged his
followers to withstand pressure from the SAG and not fear
potential repercussions. He repeatedly praised the Shammar
tribe for its support and criticized the SAG for pressuring
the family of key Shammar tribe members so as to hinder their
continued public support for MIRA. Al-Faqih also specified
what he claims is the greatest weakness of the SAG--
inadequacy of the security forces and infrastructure -- and
proposed measures to correct this.


5. (S) The March 2007 call for protests was similar to past
attempts, such as the December 16, 2004 call that was
preempted by Saudi riot police, to use tribal affiliations to
gain domestic support, as well as the frequency and type of
information released. The 2006 call appealed to the
Kingdom's conservative religious community, urging it to band
together at mosques and pray regularly in mass gatherings.
The 2006 statements focused more on the location and timing
of the protests-- the 44 mosques were repeatedly named and
early arrival was identified as instrumental in the protests'
success. Additionally, the statements that were often issued
on MIRA's website or radio station were short in duration and
featured only al-Faqih. The 2007 call for protests took a
different approach, mirroring MIRA's 2004 efforts-- both the
2004 and 2007 statements targeted tribal affiliates and
leaders and even named several supporters. Additionally, the
specifics of the mosque locations and timing were not
highlighted, as they were in 2006. Rather, 2007 statements
were substantive, focusing on tribal allegiance, criticisms
of the SAG, and other policy issues. The protest calls that
were broadcast on television featured alleged signed
statements from resident Saudi tribal leaders and employed
viewer support as a means to demonstrate MIRA,s increasing
strength and a growing following.

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Television Broadcasts Continue Despite Protest Failures
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6. (U) The March 30 protests were poorly attended and were
not reported in any media or on any Saudi-based website.
Despite this failure at public engagement, al-Faqih continued
to broadcast messages on Al-Islah. The statements in April
were more fervent, of greater frequency, and more defensive
than those in March. He even cited the satellite company
that hosts the television channel in Saudi Arabia and
commented on its temporary closure in the southern region of
the country. Al-Faqih continued to defend MIRA's policies
and goals, maintaining even in the wake of criticism for the
failed protests that that MIRA is strong. Additionally, he
contradicted March's statements by dedicating an entire
broadcast on April 18 to the regional and tribal neutrality
of MIRA, ignoring his previous pleas for the Shammar tribe's
support. (NOTE: In December 2004, al-Faqih continued
broadcasting for several months after the Saudi government
prevented the attempted protests; he even attempted to
organize smaller protests, albeit unsuccessfully, before he
went quiet again. END NOTE.)

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Background of the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia
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7. (C) The head of MIRA, Dr. Sa'ad al-Faqih, is a Saudi
dissident and physician living in exile in London. He was
one of the signatories of the 1992 "Memorandum of Advice"
submitted to the late King Fahd, and he was jailed
immediately following the memorandum's public release. He is
a bin Laden supporter, who in past interviews has referred to
bin Laden as part of a new "social structure" that opposes
America, as well as Arab and Muslim regimes allied with
America. During his time in London, he formed IRA, which
called for Islamic reform in Saudi Arabia and the removal of
the Al Saud family. He opened radio, television, and
internet sites to promote his cause. According to media
reports, al-Faqih has posted al-Qaeda messages on MIRA's
website, and in 2001, assumed the role of al-Qaeda
spokesperson in London following the arrest of Egyptian
Islamic Jihad terrorist Yassir al-Sirri.


8. (C) MIRA was designated by both the United Kingdom and
United States as having alleged links to al-Qaeda. On
December 24, 2004, under United Nations Order 2001, the Bank
of England froze MIRA's assets because the Treasury had
"reasonable grounds for suspecting that the organization is
acting on behalf of Sa,ad al-Faqih, who was listed by the
U.N. as an associate of al-Qaeda on December 23." Similarly,
on July 14, 2005, the U.S. Department of Treasury designated
MIRA for providing support to al-Qaeda, based upon the
designation of al-Faqih.


9. (S) COMMENT: Al-Faqih's forceful return to the television
airwaves with lengthy and numerous broadcasts after months of
intermittent broadcasts potentially indicates a renewed
availability of resources and, possibly, though less likely,
a membership surge. Although the source of funding and range
of broadcasting is a key issue, it might simply be, as it was
in 2004, a means to remain in the spotlight a bit longer.
However, more important is al-Faqih's play on the tribal and
religious establishments. Al-Faqih's loyalties have
floundered between these two areas, and in less than one year
he completely flipped again. Last time, his appeal to the
religious establishment was the primary concern; now it
appears to be obtaining a tribal following. However, the use
of al-Rashid for supposed tribal support calls into question
whether he is really hoping to gain tribal loyalties or if
these two opposition leaders are attempting to join forces to
gain a domestic following in opposition to the SAG. Although
al-Faqih has clearly demonstrated his personal staying power,
there is no measured evidence of domestic support, and his
inability to target a consistent audience brings into
question the depth and nature of his support. END COMMENT.
GFOELLER