MARCH 12 JOINT WORKING GROUP MEETING WITH PRINCE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000523

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DOE PASS TO A/S HARBERT, MWILLIAMSON, KKOLEVAR AND GPERSON
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2017
TAGS: EPET PTER PGOV SA
SUBJECT: MARCH 12 JOINT WORKING GROUP MEETING WITH PRINCE
MOHAMMED BIN NAYIF

REF: A. RIYADH 475


B. ROSS-FEIERSTEIN E-MAIL 14 MARCH 2007

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES C. OBERWETTER FOR REASONS
1.4 B, D, AND E.


1. (U) Action Request: This is an action request.
Please see paragraph nine.

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SUMMARY
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2. (S) After two weeks of meetings and site visits,
USG experts from the Joint Working Group (JWG) on
critical infrastructure protection (CIP) capped
off their visit with a highly successful meeting
on March 12 with AssistantMinister of Interior
Prince Mohammed bin Nayif. Prince Mohammed
underscored the Saudi government,s view of the
seriousness of the threat to petroleum
infrastructure. He listened attentively as
Department of Energy's Senior Advisor to the
Ministry of Interior (MOI) de Alvarez
outlined a series of recommendations on security
improvements. The meeting, scheduled for a half hour,
extended to two hours with Prince Mohammed's follow-up
questions. He said he seeks to implement
technological solutions to Saudi Aramco's security
challenges in order to minimize both human error
and internal sabotage. He noted the MOI needed to
be prepared to meet threats to the petroleum
infrastructure from either terrorists or nation states.
Prince Mohammed communicated a sense of urgency and
emphasized his interest in measures that could be
implemented immediately. He clarified that the MOI
needed assistance on the Iran threat, in contingency
planning for the continued operation of strategic
petroleum facilities in the event of hostilities.
Economic Counselor noted military measures should
remain in military channels, though
contingency planinng for keeping petroleum facilities
operating could be a JWG issue. Prince Mohammed liked
the JWG briefing, and asked his staff to translate it
into Arabic so he could brief it to the King.
End summary.

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Meeting Participants
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3. (C) On the Saudi side, meeting participants included:

--Assistant Minister of Interior Prince Muhammad bin Nayif,
--Dr. Saud al-Semari, MOI Director of Modernization and JWG
Co-Chair,
--MG Dr. Saad al-Jabri, Chief of Staff to Assistant
Minister of Interior Prince Muhammad bin Nayif,
--MG Saad al-Majed, FSF Commander,
--MG Misfer al-Ghamdi, MOI Assistant DG for Operations,
Border Guard, and
--Dr. Khaled al-Ageel, MOI Director of the Higher
Commission for Industrial Security.

De Alvarez presented the JWG's technical recommendations
to Prince Mohammed (ref B).

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MOI: Trust in Technology, Not People,
Fearful of Internal Sabotage
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4. (S) Prince Mohammed described his philosophy
for improving security at critical infrastructure
sites: "We want to minimize reliance on the human
factor, and we want to institute systems for
detection, deterrence, and interdiction of terrorism."
He lamented the fact that people who work inside

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can be a threat and noted that the tendency to
turn suicide bomber seemed to spread from
person to person, "like a virus." In light of
Saudi's internal threat, he concluded, "we want
to depend more on machines."

-------------- --
Implementing the "Design Basis Threat" Framework
for Strategic Saudi Energy Facilities
-------------- --


5. (S) De Alvarez and Gardner explained the Design
Basis Threat process, utilized by the USG to evaluate
threats to strategic sites, such as U.S. nuclear
plants. DOE recommended that large petroleum
installations in Saudi Arabia, such as Abqaiq, be
designated as globally strategic facilities and
subject to the Design Basis Threat analysis and
planning process. They suggested that a nation
should spend the most resources to protect those
facilities and components that are most critical,
rather than attempting to protect all facilities
equally, which roughly describes the current Saudi
model. The Design Basis Threat process produces
plans to protect strategic national sites to
the highest level of security and guides decisions
on the human, material, and technological
resources required to provide this security.
In addition, the Design Basis Threat process
produces a national policy document that outlines
the threat level to which strategic sites will
be protected.

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Exiting the Stovepipe: Developing Joint Operations
between Government Security Forces and Industry
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6. (S) Dr. Saud al-Semari, Director of Modernization
for the MOI (and JWG Co-Chair),noted the JWG
recommended that all relevant security organizations
- the High Commission on Industrial Security, the
Facilities Security Force (FSF),the Border and
Coast Guards, and Saudi Aramco Industrial Security,
be involved and exposed to the DBT framework. Prince
Mohammed remarked that he was "happy to hear the
forces would be working as a team." The USG
JWG members emphasized the need to break through
the traditional Saudi stovepipes to promote joint
training and control centers. This is particularly
true in the maritime area, as Saudi Aramco, the
Coast Guard, and Royal Saudi Naval Forces all
have different sectors of responsibility, but would
nonetheless have to coordinate closely to implement
effective anti-terrorism measures. The team noted
that, unfortunately, they had not yet had an
opportunity to observe any joint maritime efforts,
but they looked forward to the opportunity
to do so during the upcoming maritime team visit.

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Focus on Quick Results
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7. (S) Zooming in on the need for quick results,
Prince Mohammed asked which recommendations could be
implemented immediately. DS Soler noted the immediate
need to implement anti-ram barriers at key facilities,
and the immediate purchase of Itemizer equipment to
detect those entering sites with explosive materials.
DS provided specifications and drawings of tested
anti-ram barriers to the MOI. On the maritime side,
Captain Grant recommended the maritime team return
in the near future to assess the Ras Tanura Single
Point Mooring (SPM) junction. He also counseled
immediately implementing authentication procedures
for liquid petroleum gas (LPG, a highly volatile
fuel) vessels, which pass very near critical Ras Tanura

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facilities, such as Sea Island and the SPM junction.

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Focusing on the Iran Threat:
Recovery in Event of Attack
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8. (S) Prince Mohammed asked bluntly, "What can the
internal forces do to minimize damage (to petroleum
installations) when at war with Iran?" He emphasized
the need for contingency planning, and stated he was
not sure whether to shut down at-risk facilities,
evacuate civilians from sites such as Jubail City,
or take other measures in the event of hostilities.
Economic Counselor thanked Prince Mohammed for the
clarification. He noted that military measures would
have to be considered within direct military to
military channels, but contingency planinng for
petroleum facilities was an issue the JWG could
consider. De Alvarez noted that after the U.S.
experience in coping with energy supply disruption
from 9/11 and Hurricanes Rita and Katrina, we
found "you don't shut down the facilities you
need to respond or recover." De Alvarez also
described the U.S. experience in carrying out
post-9/11 joint tabletop exercises with federal,
state, local, and industry officials to plan for
possible disruptions to the energy supply.
He noted that private companies could be contracted
to run such contingency planning exercises.
Prince Mohammed indicated that the JWG's mission
was very important, "as Iran and the terrorists
won't hesitate to use whatever they can," and
estimated the threat to Saudi oil facilities
originated "60% from terrorism, and 40% from
national threats," i.e., Iran. Wrapping up,
Prince Mohammed thanked the delegation, stating,
"Thank you for taking this seriously. My leadership
supports your work. Our countries have trusted us,
and we need results. We want to feel we did the
maximum we could every day."

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Comment and Action Request
--------------


9. (S) The MOI enthusiastically received the JWG
meetings and follow-on site visits. Dr. al-Jabri
requested at the immediate conclusion of the
meeting with Prince Mohammed to move the next
meeting of the JWG forward to late April or early
May in the U.S., rather than waiting until early June.
The MOI site visits are tentatively planned
to conclude in San Diego on or about April 28.
The request to move up the next session
reflects MOI concerns with tense relations with
Iran. We request Washington's guidance on the
preferred timing for the JWG's next session.

OBERWETTER