Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07RIYADH475
2007-03-07 13:12:00
SECRET
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:  

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE JOINT WORKING GROUP MEETS

Tags:  EPET PTER PGOV SA 
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VZCZCXRO8332
OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHRH #0475/01 0661312
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071312Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4609
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH IMMEDIATE 8419
RHRMAKS/COMUSNAVCENT IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 RIYADH 000475 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DOE PASS TO GPERSON
CIA PASS TO TCOYNE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2017
TAGS: EPET PTER PGOV SA
SUBJECT: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE JOINT WORKING GROUP MEETS
MARCH 4-5, ADOPTS ACTION PLAN FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY UPGRADES

REF: A. RIYADH 355

B. RIYADH 259

Classified By: Economic Counselor Robert Silverman for reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d).

---------
Summary
---------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 RIYADH 000475

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DOE PASS TO GPERSON
CIA PASS TO TCOYNE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2017
TAGS: EPET PTER PGOV SA
SUBJECT: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE JOINT WORKING GROUP MEETS
MARCH 4-5, ADOPTS ACTION PLAN FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY UPGRADES

REF: A. RIYADH 355

B. RIYADH 259

Classified By: Economic Counselor Robert Silverman for reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (S) On March 4-5, the US-Saudi Joint Working Group on
Critical Infrastructure Protection met in the MOI Officers
Club in Riyadh, co-chaired by the Ministry of Interior's
Director of Modernization Saud al-Semari, and Embassy
Economic Counselor. The two government delegations met March
4, followed on March 5 with technical workshops conducted by
the US delegation for Saudi company industrial security
engineers and managers. On March 4, DOE Senior Advisor de
Alvarez presented findings from his late February site
assessment visits to critical infrastructure sites, and
presented an action plan (para 6). He noted that while Saudi
Aramco has made significant progress in improving security
procedures and had initiated a rapid reaction force, more
permanent capital investments in security upgrades await
passage of new industrial security regulations. These new
regulations are in process, an effort in which de Alvarez is
assisting the MOI. NAVCENT Captain Cox briefed the JWG on
rising Iranian belligerence in daily interactions with
coalition naval forces in the Arabian Gulf. Ministry of
Interior senior advisor to Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, MG Saad
al-Jabri, said Prince Muhammad bin Nayef wanted to meet with
the JWG group on the plan for adopting physical security
upgrades, scheduled for March 12. Jabri asked the JWG to
broaden its focus in two areas: measures aimed at protecting
Saudi infrastructure from a military threat from Iran; US
cooperation in training the new Facility Security Force
(FSF),and mounting up its new training academy. The JWG
plans to have have a detailed series of recommendations on
March 12, following site visits currently underway in the
Eastern Province. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
Concern with Iranian Rhetoric and Maritime Security
-------------- --------------



2. (S) The MOI is increasingly concerned with Iranian
capabilities and intentions, according to MOI MG Saad
al-Jabri, and he asked that the JWG be a venue to bring in
USG expertise about the Iranian threat and potential counter
measures to protect Saudi infrastructure. In response to
this request, NAVCENT Captain George Cox, Director of the
Friendly Forces Coordination Center, attended the JWG with
other NAVCENT officers and gave a detailed and well received
brief on Iranian naval capabilities and activities in the
Gulf. The Saudi side took careful notes. Jabri stressed
that Iran has publicly threatened it has the capability to
reach Saudi petroleum facilities, and its rhetoric indicates
it is willing to do so. Cox noted that Iranian
Revolutionary Guards are making increasingly deliberate
probes of NAVCENT's operational line, ("opline") in the North
Arabian Gulf, testing U.S. reactions and capabilities.
Captain Cox emphasized that NAVCENT remains committed to
"de-pressurizing" the environment in the Arabian Gulf.
However, he stated, our maritime success will depend on
engaging Iran with a coalition, including nations from the
region. Both NAVCENT and MOI representatives agreed the
threat from small boats was the most difficult to counter.
They agreed to discuss further the option of integrating Ras
Tanura into a Point Defense System (PDS).


3. (S) MOI ensured the attendance of two MOD officers
throughout the JWG, including Colonel Fuad al-Nasser of the
Royal Saudi Navy.

--------------
Site Assessments: Some Improvements,
but Key Vulnerabilities Remain
--------------

RIYADH 00000475 002 OF 004




4. (S) The Department of Energy senior advisor briefed on
his February site visits to the key facilities last visited
by US experts in May 2006 as well as to the additional
critical energy infrastructure sites in Jubail and Yanbu'
(which house large refineries and petrochemical plants). He
indicated he was generally pleased with progress on the
ground, but also highlighted key remaining vulnerabilities.

Improvements:

--There is better and more streamlined command and control
systems. Security procedures have improved.

--Saudi Aramco guards have been armed and trained in bearing
weapons.

--Saudi Aramco has implemented a quick reaction force, and
provided them with anti-terrorism training.

--Saudi Aramco has implemented temporary pipe barriers.
Aramco and other companies have accentuated natural
obstacles, such as trenches.

Inadequacies:

--Saudi Aramco lacks a senior executive level security
manager with a direct reporting relationship to the Aramco
CEO. Currently there are several management layers between
the General Manager for Security (Samir Raslan) and the CEO,
which delays decision-making and implementation of security
programs.

--No sites had a formal threat definition, i.e., a defined
level to which the company was committed to protect its
facility before calling on outside help.

--Company security guards lacked anti-terrorism training.

--Current industrial security regulations, last formulated in
the 1970s, are inadequate to protect against current threats.
In Saudi Arabia's regulatory-base system, the companies are
waiting for new regulations to make capital investments in
security infrastructure. While these new regulations are
being drafted, only temporary improvements have been put in
place.

--The Jubail City water cooling plant remains highly
vulnerable and outside the security perimeter. All industries
in Jubail rely on this one plant to cool sea water, the water
used by all industries there.

--------------
FSF Recruitment and Training
are High Priorities
--------------


5. (S) MG al-Jabri emphasized the FSF is a "major subject
for this group, and a major concern for the two governments."
He told us the following:

-- FSF is recruiting new members. It hired 10,000 new
recruits over the past year, and would hire a further 7,000
in the next three years, working towards the goal of a 35,000
member force.

-- All FSF soldiers will shortly receive basic military
training at an MOI emergency evacuation center in Mecca,
temporarily converted into a training center. FSF are
currently using various Army and National Guard training
facilities elsewhere. Pakistani military trainers will start
basic military training for FSF recruits at the converted
Mecca center in April. Jabri stated that the Saudis "need a
lot of input" to design a training program for the FSF. MOI
is continuing to work with Saudi Aramco to identify a site
for a permanent facility in the Eastern Province. He added
that the British have offered to help with the FSF, and might
join an associated research and design center. He emphasized

RIYADH 00000475 003 OF 004


the academy should have a maritime training component.

-- DS/ATA Agent Soler noted the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center (FLETC) could offer a venue for training the
FSF, or alternately, FLETC trainers could travel to KSA to
offer training. Both parties agreed to further examine
training programs in cooperation with U.S. law enforcement,
particularly those based on a train-the-trainer model.

-- The FSF Commander, MOI MG Saad al-Majed, attended the
entire two-day JWG, asked numerous questions and participated
actively.

--------------
Schedule Moving Forward; MbN to Meet with JWG
--------------


6. (S) The schedule for the JWG TDY team for the remaining
time in the Kingdom stands as follows:

--March 6-10: Two joint teams, one land-based and one
maritime-based, to visit critical infrastructure sites (e.g.,
Ras Tanura, Qateef Junction, and Abqaiq) to discuss specific
security upgrades with local managers. (Note: These site
visits will be the first for the JWG to include a specific
maritime component staffed by maritime subject-matter
experts, including from NAVCENT. End note.) Teams to meet
at CG Dhahran to draft recommendations for presentation to
the JWG Executive Committee (the two co-chairs plus DOE
senior advisor, DS/ATA, S/CT and the Higher Commission on
Industrial Security director).

--March 11-12: Teams brief the JWG Exec Committee on
site-specific recommendations. JWG finalizes the
recommendations.

--March 12 or 13: JWG Executive Committee presents the
recommendations to Assistant Minister of Interior Prince
Muhammad bin Nayef (Note: MG al-Jabri requested that the team
brief MbN).

--Late March: The MOI's High Commission on Industrial
Security adopts the approved recommendations, begins to
implement those recommendations relating to it, and conveys
the other recommendations to the relevant companies.

Moving forward, the JWG has proposed the following for the
next few months:

--March: Identification of specific Saudi utilities (power
and desalination plants) to include in the JWG as critical
infrastructure protection;

--April: Joint MOI, MinPet and Saudi Aramco visit to Sandia
Labs, US offshore petroleum facilities, and USG security
training sites;

--May: Sandia Labs official Gardner to conduct a "Design
Basis Threat" workshop for the Higher Commission on
Industrial Security and for Saudi industry, in Riyadh. (Note:
This is a technique used by Sandia Labs to identify
weaknesses in and improvements needed for security of
critical infrastructure sites, such as U.S. nuclear labs or
power stations. End note.)

--June: The third JWG meeting takes place in Washington.


7. (S) The senior Saudi participants in the March 4-5 JWG
were:

Dr. Saud al-Semari, MOI Director of Modernization and JWG
co-chair.
MG Saad al-Jabri, senior advisor to Assistant Minister of
Interior Prince Muhammad bin Nayef
MG Saad al-Majed, FSF Commander
MG Khaled al-Humaidan, MOI Director of International Liaison
MG Misfer al-Ghamdi, MOI Assistant DG for Operations, Border
Guard

RIYADH 00000475 004 OF 004


Dr. Khaled al-Ageel, MOI Director of the Higher Commission
for Industrial Security
Colonel Fuad al-Nasser, Saudi Royal Navy
Colonel Said al-Qahtani, MOI Mubahith
Major Abdul Hamid al-Badr, MOI Coast Guard
Captain Thamer al-Ageel, MOI Mubahith
Samir Raslan, General Manager of Industrial Security, Aramco
Nasser al-Lajam, Project Engineer for Industrial Security,
Aramco
Waleed al-Fayyad, General Manager of Industrial Security,
SABIC
Ghazi Hariri, Manager of Industrial Security, Saudi
Electricity Company.


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