Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07RIYADH2356
2007-11-27 09:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:  

THE "SAUDIZATION" OF SERMONS IN THE EP

Tags:  KIRF KISL PGOV PREL PTER SOCI SA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6399
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHRH #2356/01 3310916
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 270916Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7089
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 002356 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DHAHRAN SENDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2017
TAGS: KIRF KISL PGOV PREL PTER SOCI SA
SUBJECT: THE "SAUDIZATION" OF SERMONS IN THE EP

REF: RIYADH 01058

Classified By: Consul General John Kincannon for reasons 1.4 b and d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 002356

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DHAHRAN SENDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2017
TAGS: KIRF KISL PGOV PREL PTER SOCI SA
SUBJECT: THE "SAUDIZATION" OF SERMONS IN THE EP

REF: RIYADH 01058

Classified By: Consul General John Kincannon for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) SUMMARY: According to conversations with worshippers
at various Eastern Province mosques, the Ministry of Islamic
Affairs (MOIA) began a policy of "Saudizing" the delivery of
the Friday sermon during the late summer of 2007. The
alleged policy allows only Saudi citizens licensed by the
MOIA to serve as the "khateeb," the mosque official that
delivers sermons, while seeming to permit exceptions for
politically well-connected foreign preachers. The policy
does not apply to imams, as foreign citizens continue to
serve as prayer leaders. While the MOIA appears to be
intervening more actively in the appointment of prayer
leaders in the Eastern Province, it is unclear to Post if
this is a SAG policy seeking to moderate religious
expression. END SUMMARY

--------------
"Saudizing" Mosques
--------------


2. (C) Post received information from various sources that
the SAG's Ministry of Islamic Affairs (MOIA) began
"Saudizing" mosques in late summer 2007 by prohibiting
non-Saudi "khateebs," or Islamic preachers, from giving
sermons. This policy is reportedly being enforced throughout
the Eastern Province (EP),although Post is aware of at least
two khateebs that have averted prohibition thanks to their
popularity and powerful connections.


3. (C) Contacts first noted the recent increase in MOIA
intervention in the case of the popular, politically-minded
Islamic leader Sheikh Mohammad al-Qahtani, a Saudi national.
Until July 2007, al-Qahtani led the Ahmad bin Hanbal Mosque
located in al-Khobar. He attracted large crowds with his
powerful and often politically-charged sermons, regularly
involving topics such as Israel, Iraq, and U.S. foreign
policy. Subsequently, al-Qahtani went on extended leave,
only returning in the second week of October to lead prayers
and deliver an Eid sermon. Even during this brief Eid

return, however, al-Qahtani did not deliver the Friday
sermon, considered the most important of the holiday. In his
place, the MOIA has sent rotating substitute imams. Deprived
of their charismatic leader, worshippers at the mosque are
reportedly unhappy and attendance at this major mosque is
dropping.


4. (C) The MOIA also removed an Egyptian sheikh at the small
Mubarak al-Suwaiket mosque, located in al-Khobar, in early
September 2007. He continues to serve as the mosque's imam,
but in a recurring province-wide trend, the role of khateeb
is now filled by a rotating representative who is sent by the
MOIA on a weekly basis. Worshippers at Mubarak al-Suwaiket
are similarly upset with the policy. As a result of the
assigned khateeb's absence, there was no prayer offered on
the first Friday of Ramadan. The Egyptian khateeb was in
attendance that day, but stood by without stepping forward
when the assigned substitute failed to arrive.


5. (C) In a slightly more complicated case, Post contacts
report that popular imam and khateeb Sheikh Abd al-Qadir
Abdullah Badouk, who formerly led the Rahma Grand Mosque of
al-Khobar and enjoyed a large following extending to other
GCC states, continues to be held at the Riyadh interrogation
center of the General Directorate for Investigation. Abd
al-Qadir, a Yemeni-national of Eritrean birth, was reportedly
arrested in February 2007 on charges of aiding terrorism when
his name appeared on documents found with a weapons cache and
SR 20 million in cash. After being cleared and released from
prison, Abd al-Qadir was arrested again in July on charges of
money laundering (NOTE: At that time, businessman Ma'an
al-Sane'a employed Abd al-Qadir as purchasing manager of the
Saad group. Some contacts suggest that Abd al-Qadir's July
arrest is related to his benefactor's previous legal problems
(reftel). END NOTE). The sheikh's followers claim that the
SAG invented false charges to discredit the moderate
religious leader. Abd al-Qadir is reportedly disliked by the
Saudi religious establishment because of his popularity as a
faith healer (he ran a faith healing clinic until it was shut
down by the SAG in 1999) and his promotion of interfaith
dialogue.

--------------
Exceptions to the Rule
--------------


6. (C) Post contacts report that despite the new government
policy, there are at least two cases in which political power

RIYADH 00002356 002 OF 002


and "wasta" has earned foreign khateebs a respite from
"Saudization." Imam/khateeb Sheikh Mohammad Saleh
al-Munajjid, a Syrian national, continues to serve as the
leader of the important Omar bin Abdulaziz Grand Mosque,
delivering sermons to a large following. Al-Munajjid,
generally seen as an extremist voice, has been affiliated
with this mosque since its opening in the late 1980s and is a
local investor with substantial property and media holdings.
HRH Prince Abd al-Aziz bin Ahmad, son of Vice Interior
Minister Ahmad bin Abdulaziz, constructed the mosque that
al-Munajjid leads. However, it is possible that al-Munajjid
has been spared because he is the preferred preacher of the
area's religious establishment, evidenced by the fact that
many members of the Mutawwa'in attend both his Friday prayers
and weekly Tuesday night lectures.


7. (C) A second example of a foreign khateeb who continues
to preach is liberal imam/khateeb Sheikh Adel al-Ghunaim, an
Egyptian whose followers are largely foreign nationals.
Al-Ghunaim, an associate professor for Islamic studies at
King Faisal University in Dammam, has been imam and khateeb
of the Anas bin Malik Grand Mosque since the mosque's
inception in 1982. Unlike al-Munajjid, al-Ghunaim's
son-in-law reports that the sheikh's continued presence has
less to do with his importance and more to do with the power
of his benefactors, the al-Zamil family. The al-Zamils,
among the Eastern Province's wealthiest billionaire families,
built and continue to fund the Anas bin Malik Grand Mosque.
Post contacts report that when the MOIA requested the
al-Zamils remove al-Ghunaim, family head Hamid al-Zamil
refused. Al-Ghunaim's son-in-law told Post that Hamid,
former President of the National Council of Saudi Chambers of
Commerce and Industry, refused to remove the sheikh until the
SAG could find a leader equal
in knowledge and acceptance among worshippers. The MOIA has
not made another demand.


8. (C) COMMENT: This report represents numerous conversations
between FSNs and regular worshippers and insiders at various
Eastern Province mosques and has not been confirmed by SAG
officials. It is clear that there is greater MOIA
intervention in managing key mosques in the region and that
some attempts are being made to "Saudize" the clergy at these
mosques. However, "wasta" and influence networks play a
large role in foiling MOIA interventions. It remains unclear
if this reflects a concerted Saudi strategy to moderate
preaching at major mosques in the region. END COMMENT.

(APPROVED: KINCANNON)
GFOELLER