Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07RIGA629
2007-08-21 11:29:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Riga
Cable title:  

LATVIA REMAINS CAUTIOUS ON PLANS FOR A/CFE

Tags:  PARM KCFE MARR PREL PINR RS LG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5659
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHRA #0629/01 2331129
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 211129Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY RIGA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4287
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIGA 000629 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2027
TAGS: PARM KCFE MARR PREL PINR RS LG
SUBJECT: LATVIA REMAINS CAUTIOUS ON PLANS FOR A/CFE

REF: A) STATE 116194 B) RIGA 533 C) USOSCE 321

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Stuart M. Seldowitz. Reason: 1.4
(c and d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIGA 000629

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2027
TAGS: PARM KCFE MARR PREL PINR RS LG
SUBJECT: LATVIA REMAINS CAUTIOUS ON PLANS FOR A/CFE

REF: A) STATE 116194 B) RIGA 533 C) USOSCE 321

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Stuart M. Seldowitz. Reason: 1.4
(c and d)


1. (S/NF) Summary: Latvia continues to be wary of any plan to
move forward on ratification of A/CFE that might leave them
behind. They welcomed hearing more detail on our action for
action plan and will have more thoughts in upcoming US/Baltic
consultations on CFE. The Latvians are looking to get
something in return for their flexibility -- feeling that
Russia is being rewarded for its eight year stall on its
Istanbul commitments. They continue to focus on NATO
contingency planning as essential, and have now officially
begun to suggest that additional FMF assistance might be
needed. When we pushed back on the idea of NATO contingency
planning, the political director responded, "We know the
Russians will enter these negotiations having made their
contingency plans, we need ours as well." We believe that
the Latvians have some flexibility in the exact shape of the
assistance in thinking through future scenarios, but believe
they are serious in wanting something in exchange for what
they perceive as flexibility on their part. Beyond planning
and monetary assistance, they may also seek additional
intelligence support. Additionally, there are several items
that appear to us to be redlines for the Latvians as this
moves forward. Namely, no multilateral discussion with
Russia of Baltic accession to A/CFE without the Balts in the
room; no wavering on the necessity for Russia to fulfill the
Istanbul Commitments prior to entry into force of A/CFE; no
request for the Balts to make commitments now on future
territorial ceilings; and no requests for the Balts to do
something extraordinary to show their commitment to join the
adapted treaty absent Russian movement to fulfill Istanbul.
End summary.


2. (C) Pol/econ chief delivered reftel points to Latvian MFA
political director Ilgvars Klava on August 20, who was joined

by two officials from the MFA's arms control section. Klava
took detailed notes and regularly interrupted with questions
and clarifications. At the end, Klava said that the points
and non-paper would be sent immediately to FM Pabriks and
widely circulated around the GOL.


3. (C) Klava said that he appreciated the briefing,
especially in advance of the briefing in Washington later in
the day. He said Latvia was ready to talk, but that they
would need additional assurances from Allies, including the
U.S., regarding Russia before proceeding. Recent events,
including the missile incident in Georgia, left Latvia
feeling uneasy about Russian intentions. He reiterated a
request made earlier (ref B) for NATO contingency planning
for Latvia. When pol/econ chief asked about possible
bilateral assistance in developing national defense plans
instead, Klava replied that this would also be welcome, but
Latvia was standing firm on contingency planning. He said
that Latvia could not go into the process without
understanding the "basic math" in play, especially if there
is a willingness to reopen the treaty at a later date that
could lead to changes in the flank regime. Latvia had been
working with general assumptions about what its territorial
ceilings would be, but that could all be moot now. Klava
added something we have heard rumored previously, but this
was the first formal mention we've heard -- once it
understands the various permutations of possible arrangements
and has the contingency planning, Latvia might seek increased
FMF assistance to implement those plans. When pol/econ chief
again asked if NATO contingency planning was really that
important Klava responded, "We know the Russians will enter
these negotiations having made their contingency plans, we
need ours as well."


4. (C) Klava was very focused on the proposed calendar, which
he noted was "very tight." He was glad that US/Baltic
consultations on CFE would take place in August and said that
the GOL would use our paper to develop more concrete points
for discussion at that meeting. The proposed September
discussion of Baltic accession to A/CFE also generated many
questions from Klava. How would this synch with the next
planned US-Russia experts' discussion with Russia? Did the
US have in mind to use the already scheduled Sep. 26 NRC
Ambassadorial to discuss or another meeting? (If so, Klava
noted the conflict with UNGA leaders' week, which meant
instructions would need to be drafted earlier.) How detailed
would the September discussions be? He wanted to be sure
that there would be pre-coordination of Allied positions and
he had a clear expectation that Latvia would be in the room
when the issue was discussed with Russia. Klava saw no
problem with Latvia participating in such discussions, but
how forward leaning they would be would depend on what they
could get from the Allies. He was very cautious about the
proposed December statement reaffirming their intention to

RIGA 00000629 002 OF 002


join A/CFE, saying that Latvian willingness to be forthcoming
would depend on Russian action on the Istanbul Commitments.


5. (C) Klava concluded by saying that if Baltic willingness
to be forthcoming on A/CFE in the face of Russian
intransigence is "of interest to the Allies, they will need
to help (the Baltic states)." He stressed that the Latvians
would also be talking about their concerns with European
Allies like the French and Germans.


6. (S/NF) We also shared the substance of the message with
the offices of the President and Prime Minster and got
similar reactions. We could not get to the MOD August 20,
but DATT discussed the issue of CFE with outgoing and
incoming MOD Undersecretaries Janis Kalsbergs and Janis Sarts
in a lunch the week before. They too pressed on the
contingency planning, although they were far more open to
bilateral US assistance to develop a national plan as opposed
to NATO planning, and increased FMF to implement the plan.
They also requested US assistance in enhancing their sigint
capability to better monitor Russian military activity near
the border.


7. (C) Comment: The Latvians are sticking to their positions
on this issue. As we noted following their demarche in
Vienna (ref C),Brussels and Washington taking a fairly
hardline position, they really feel that Allies are trying to
use the Balts to get more flexibility from Russia. From the
Latvian perspective, Russia has mostly dragged its feet for 8
years on the Istanbul Commitments while Latvia repeatedly
reaffirmed its willingness to accede to A/CFE once in force.
Our willingness to reopen the adapted treaty once in force,
seemingly without precondition, makes them worry that
thinking they did on how the A/CFE regime would apply here
(especially on territorial limits) is outdated and makes them
a) desirous of the planning assistance and b) wary of what
other concessions we might be willing to offer. Based on the
discussions with MOD, there may be some flexibility on the
idea of US bilateral assistance to develop national defense
plans in lieu of NATO contingency planning, but we expect the
Latvians to be very dug in on several points -- no
multilateral discussion with Russia of Baltic accession to
A/CFE without the Balts in the room; no wavering on the
necessity for Russia to fulfill the Istanbul Commitments
prior to entry into force of A/CFE; no request for the Balts
to make commitments now on future territorial ceilings; and
no requests for the Balts to do something extraordinary to
show their commitment to join the adapted treaty absent
Russian movement to fulfill Istanbul.
SELDOWITZ