LATVIAN REACTION TO RUSSIAN CFE MOVES - PLANS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIGA 000533

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NOFORN
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PARM KCFE MARR RS LG
SUBJECT: LATVIAN REACTION TO RUSSIAN CFE MOVES - PLANS,
PLEASE

REF: MOSCOW 3451

Classified By: Charge d'affaires a.i. Tamir G. Waser. Reason 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) Summary: Putin's July 13 decree on CFE did not
surprise Latvia, which expected a move like this after the
escalating rhetoric of recent months. But Latvian officials
are using it as a reminder that Latvia's border with Russia
is a key reason Latvia wanted to join NATO. Public rhetoric
has been calm, with most officials expressing regret over
Moscow's decision. Quietly, though, Latvian officials say
they will use this action to push again for the NATO
contingency planning they have always expected would come
with Alliance membership. Latvia also wants to ensure that,
although not a party to the CFE treaty, they remain part of
the NATO dialogue in formulating a response and agreeing on
next steps. End summary.


2. (U) When news of Putin's decree first broke, senior
officials in the MFA and PM's office were immediately in
touch with Charge to seek any US reaction to use in
formulating their responses. FM Pabriks was quoted initially
as saying that the decision "creates a threat for the
security of NATO member states, including Latvia." He later
said he was misquoted and he meant only that the move would
harm the confidence between NATO and Russia and have negative
consequences in the long term for regional stability. The
Foreign Ministry issued a statement "regretting" the Russian
action and reaffirming Latvia's intention to join the adapted
CFE treaty when it came in to force, but recalling Russia's
Istanbul Commitments. President Zatlers said much the same
in a radio interview. Maris Riekstins, Chief of Staff to PM
Kalvitis, said on TV that the decision could "create a new
reality" in the region, but added that no one should
"overdramatize" the situation.


3. (U) Reporting in the Latvian language press has been
largely factual with editorials suggesting that Russia is
reasserting itself and noting the domestic political value of
these actions. Coverage in Latvia's Russian language press
has been mixed, with the more responsible press being largely
factual, but the more yellow press suggesting that this the
only choice Russia had after the Baltic States were brought
in to NATO with no move by the Alliance to ratify the adapted
treaty.


4. (C) Russian Ambassador Kahluzhny called on FM Pabriks on
July 16 to explain the decision and ask for Latvia's help "in
explaining Russia's actions" to others in NATO. According to
the MFA director of Security Policy, Kaspars Ozolins, Pabriks
reminded Kahluzhny of the Istanbul Commitment and said that
Russia needed to take responsibility for explaining its
actions to others. Ozolins said that he thought Russia might
provide a fuller presentation in capitals of states party to
the treaty and asked for the U.S. to provide any additional
information we might receive.


5. (C/NF) At a diplomatic function July 16, MFA State
Secretary Penke told Charge that Latvia would instruct its

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Embassies in Washington and London to "quietly discuss with
select friends" in government Latvia's desire to get
contingency planning from NATO as a result. PM Kalvitis'
foreign policy advisor Peteris Ustubs confirmed this on July
18, saying that the topic would be discussed at a meeting of
the Latvian National Security Council the week of July 23
(strictly protect, as NSC agendas are classified). Ustubs
said that in addition to the tasking to explore the
possibility of contingency planning, he also expected that
Latvian intelligence services would be asked to step up
collection and reporting on Russian military activity near
Latvia's border.


6. (C/NF) Comment: The Latvians are generally restrained in
their public reaction and none of the more nationalist
political forces have tried to make much out of the Russian
decision. The Latvians have long sought contingency planning
at NATO, which they expected to come with their NATO
membership card. They want to see paper that shows them that
NATO has a plan to defend Latvia from attack (ideally an
attack from Russia). Despite efforts at NATO to explain that
this is not really an exercise that NATO does these days, the
Latvians continue to push for this. The CFE move by Russia
does not, in our opinion, make Latvia feel less secure or
increase the urgency of this request, but we believe they see
it as an opening to request something they have wanted all
along, hoping we will change our minds in response to
Moscow,s move. The Latvians' other concern is that we
continue to keep them fully informed of our thinking on this
issue, even though they are not party to the CFE treaty.
They greatly appreciated our briefing in advance of June's

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extraordinary conference and hope such dialogue will continue
in Riga, Washington, Brussels and Vienna. This is especially
true if we are willing to show any flexibility on the
Istanbul Commitments or take other action that would attempt
to bridge the gap with Russia. The Latvians will likely
support most ideas we would float as long as they know about
it in advance.
BAILEY