Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07RANGOON489
2007-05-24 09:22:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

BURMA AI UPDATE: NEW OUTBREAK IN RANGOON

Tags:  EAGR EAID AMED PGOV CASC TBIO KLFU BM 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5159
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHGO #0489 1440922
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 240922Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6087
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1424
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0309
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 4545
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1943
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3863
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7404
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4956
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 1136
RUDKIA/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI TH 0984
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
UNCLAS RANGOON 000489 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; USDA FOR FAS/PECAD, FAS/CNMP, FAS/AAD;
BANGKOK FOR USAID/RDMA: JMACARTHUR, APHIS: NCARDENAS, REO:
JWALLER; PACOM FOR FPA

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAGR EAID AMED PGOV CASC TBIO KLFU BM
SUBJECT: BURMA AI UPDATE: NEW OUTBREAK IN RANGOON

REF: A) RANGOON 324, B) RANGOON 315, AND PREVIOUS

UNCLAS RANGOON 000489

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; USDA FOR FAS/PECAD, FAS/CNMP, FAS/AAD;
BANGKOK FOR USAID/RDMA: JMACARTHUR, APHIS: NCARDENAS, REO:
JWALLER; PACOM FOR FPA

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAGR EAID AMED PGOV CASC TBIO KLFU BM
SUBJECT: BURMA AI UPDATE: NEW OUTBREAK IN RANGOON

REF: A) RANGOON 324, B) RANGOON 315, AND PREVIOUS


1. (SBU) Summary: On May 22, an outbreak of Avian Influenza
in chickens occurred at an isolated poultry farm in Rangoon
owned and controlled by the Burmese military. Officials
destroyed all the birds and disinfected the premises, but
did not institute any controls on the transport of poultry
in the area. Livestock Breeding and Veterinary Department
officials notified us, but did not confirm whether they
would inform OIE. No cases of human infection are
suspected. End summary.


2. (SBU) On May 24, an advisor to the Livestock Breeding
and Veterinary Department (LBVD) informed us that fifteen
chickens at a farm in Saw Bwa Gyi Gone in Insein Township
in northwest Rangoon died on May 22, and many others were
sick. The dead birds tested positive for H5N1 by Rapid
Test Kit and PCR testing. On May 23, 400 more chickens
died. Under the supervision of LBVD officials, farm
workers destroyed all remaining birds, using PPEs to cull
and bury the chickens and disinfect the area. Altogether,
workers destroyed approximately 800 birds.


3. (SBU) The military's Rangoon Division Command owns the
farms where it keeps broilers and layers for income
generation. The farm has facilities to house over 10,000
chickens, but after the recent February-March AI outbreaks
in Rangoon, most birds were sold off, and only about 800
twenty-four-week-old layers remained.


4. (SBU) According to our contact, because the farm is
isolated, officials have not instituted controls on the
movement of poultry in the area. He did not know whether
LBVD would notify OIE about the outbreak, and said that the
Minister of Livestock and Fisheries would make that
decision shortly. This is Burma's first recurrence of AI
in poultry since April 23, when officials lifted the
restrictions on the transport of poultry instituted in
response to the February-March AI outbreaks in Rangoon
(reftels). The advisor expressed his belief that the virus
is still present in the city.


5. (SBU) Comment: LBVD's prominent role in the response and
quick report to us of a new AI outbreak on a military-run
poultry farm is reassuring. Their delay in notifying OIE
and imposing traffic restrictions to control the latest
case, however, is troubling. The GOB has been unusually
open in cooperating with international experts on AI issues
to date, but outbreaks within the military's extensive
poultry production facilities hit close to vested
interests. High level decision makers will choose whether
to notify OIE and the public, and follow the steps that
have been effective in responding to past outbreaks, or
whether to allow commercial impact on military producers
and their desire to maintain military secrecy to prevail in
this case. End comment.
STOLTZ