Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07RANGOON227
2007-03-05 10:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

BURMESE MILITARY STILL INTERESTED IN TALKING WITH

Tags:  PGOV PREL BM 
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VZCZCXRO7688
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051053Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5807
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0203
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3774
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7299
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4859
RUDKIA/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0897
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 3078
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0717
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-3//
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI//J2/HSE/DIA-REP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000227 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP; PACOM FOR FPA

( C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - ADDED ADDRESSES )

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL BM
SUBJECT: BURMESE MILITARY STILL INTERESTED IN TALKING WITH
US

REF: A. 05 RANGOON 1115

B. 05 RANGOON 1010

RANGOON 00000227 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000227

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP; PACOM FOR FPA

( C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - ADDED ADDRESSES )

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL BM
SUBJECT: BURMESE MILITARY STILL INTERESTED IN TALKING WITH
US

REF: A. 05 RANGOON 1115

B. 05 RANGOON 1010

RANGOON 00000227 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Charge and DATT met with LTG Myint Swe on
March 3 for another of their periodic exchanges of views (ref
A). Deputy Foreign Minister Kyaw Thu also sat in on this
meeting, unlike previous meetings, but he did not actively
participate in the discussion. Charge tried to draw the
General out on specific follow up steps the regime plans as
the National Convention draws to a conclusion. Myint Swe
offered minimal clarification but did indicate that the
regime does not yet see a role for the National League of
Democracy. He made it clear that the regime views free
debate over a constitution as a waste of time. He resisted
entreaties to consult with other countries for lessons
learned in developing enduring constitutions on the grounds
that Burma is unique. In order to gain international
acceptance of its constitutional process, Charge said that
the regime needed to open up the process to make it more
inclusive, permit political parties to freely operate, and
release political prisoners, especially recognized political
leaders like Aung San Suu Kyi and Hkun Htun Oo. We also
repeated our interest in resuming annual Opium Yield Surveys
and searching for World War II remains. In contrast to the
vitriolic anti-American campaign underway in the regime's
mass media, neither Myint Swe nor Kyaw Thu criticized the
United States and indicated interest in continued exchanges
of views. End Summary


2. (C) LTG Myint Swe agreed to meet Charge and DATT late
Saturday afternoon March 3. We received about five hours
notice after repeated requests for meetings had gone
unanswered since last November. Unlike previous meetings,
the Deputy Foreign Minister sat in on this meeting, although
he did not actively participate in the discussion and mostly
circled his eyes around the room appearing bored. Due to
their inability to find a translator at short notice, the
Deputy Director General of Protocol had to serve as

translator.


3. (C) Charge began the discussion seeking clarity about the
next steps envisioned after the National Convention (NC)
concludes in May. She noted that this offered an opportunity
to open the process and make it more inclusive to gain
international support. LTG Myint Swe acknowledged that the
NC process had taken a lot of time, that "the drafting of the
basic principles is at an end," and that it should conclude
soon, although he never specified any date beyond "as soon as
possible." What's next? "The NC Process will be followed
automatically leading to a constitution," replied the
General. Charge sought more clarity regarding who would
draft the constitution, which we understood to be based on
basic principles agreed by the NC. He never directly
responded to repeated questions about whether the Attorney
General or a subset of NC delegates would draft the document,
instead he mentioned that obtaining ethnic minority and
majority support for "an everlasting constitution for the
benefit of all" was the regime's top priority. He blamed the
prolonged nature of this first step on the National League of
Democracy (NLD),which walked out. (Note: because they were
not allowed to debate or publicly comment on issues under
discussion. End note) He claimed that "if the NLD had not
walked out, we would have been finished already."


4. (C) Charge asked if NLD would be invited to participate
in Step Two. Myint Swe replied "Because the NLD didn't
participate in Step 1, then I don't think Step 2 will include
the NLD." Charge urged that NLD be invited to make the next
step more inclusive, but the General indicted that they would
not, claiming that since NLD had not participated in the
detailed discussions about the basic principles, they would
slow the process down that now runs "very smoothly and is
about to finish." Charge said that a lasting constitution

RANGOON 00000227 002.2 OF 003


requires full debate and compromises to get buy-in from all
those affected by it, citing our own Constitution's
200-plus-year longevity as an example. He responded that NLD
might be able to participate in the follow-on referendum and
election, "if it is still a legal party," and suggested that
Charge meet with Secretary One General Thein Sein to get the
details of how the process will unfold. Charge noted that we
had repeatedly requested meetings with him without any
response, so would appreciate Myint Swe's assistance in
making that meeting happen. She also inquired if the regime
planned to make NLD illegal. "That depends on the NLD. . .if
they are involved in illegal activities, in meeting with
insurgents. . or anti-government activity, then they might be
declared illegal. . .we have reports of contacts between the
NLD and destructive elements/activities," came the reply.


5. (C) The Charge said that the U.S. wants to see ALL
political parties playing an active role in the development
of their country, even if they sometimes criticize the
government. She repeated our four goals: an open and
inclusive process; political parties can freely operate;
release of political prisoners, including recognized
political party leaders like Aung San Suu Kyi and Hkun Htun
Oo, and removal of restrictions on humanitarian access.
Myint Swe claimed that parties can freely function unless
they are involved in illegal activities, but could not name
any when asked which could freely operate now. Instead, he
claimed ten parties currently operate, and noted that U.S.
Embassy officials regularly visit NLD Headquarters. He added
that all of the parties have to operate in accordance with
the law. Charge asked if any group of people could form a
party now. "They have to register first, responded Myint
Swe, "If they have registered, then they can function."


6. Charge said that only by opening up the constitutional
process would Burma gain international credibility and create
the stability it sought. She emphasized that we will
continue to speak out about this and also urge other
countries to do the same. Myint Swe made it clear that the
regime would continue to resist. If there is an opening of
the process, he said, then there will be lots of opinions
coming in and the process will be stopped. He claimed the
military had achieved stability after a long history of
instability. When he tried to claim that history showed that
debate just created more instability, Charge cited the
positive experience of other countries whose constitutions
were products of debate, such as Thailand, Indonesia and
South Africa. Myint Swe rejected the examples, saying,
"they have their own situation...we know our own country."
Charge said that without debate, a constitution will not
survive, and urged the regime to ask other countries which
have passed through recent political transitions for useful
lessons learned. Again he rejected the advice, "You cannot
compare this country with other countries. We've been facing
insurgency since independence. Only now are we achieving
stability with our arms for peace programs. . .it's only
recently that we've had the stability to move forward."


7. (C) Sensing his desire to continue the debate was waning
Charge noted that while we would continue to speak out in
support of an open political process, there were areas where
we had cooperated in the past, such as the opium yield survey
and searching for the remains of our World War II missing in
action. Myint Swe said those issues should be taken up with
the Ministries of Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs. Charge
said she had been told directly by the Minister of Health
that we could resume the Opium Yield Survey, but that it had
gone nowhere despite our follow-up inquiries. DATT added
that he had asked Military Security Affairs so often about
remains recovery that finally he was told not to even ask
anymore. He said he would go back again, if Myint Swe
thought he could get the cooperation to move forward, and
asked if conditions had changed in Kachin State. Myint Swe
acknowledged that security conditions in Kachin State, and
the many splinter groups there, may have been the reason that

RANGOON 00000227 003.2 OF 003


we had not received permission. He added that the Ministry
of Defense was only concerned about the security aspects, and
repeated that we should follow up with the Ministry of Home
Affairs.


8. (C) Charge thanked Myint Swe for agreeing to meet and
said she would continue to seek regular exchanges of views
with him. Myint Swe replied that "we still regard the US as
our friend," that these meetings were in our mutual
interests, but that sometimes he would not be available. At
that point the Deputy Foreign Minister woke up and said that
he also wished to convey interest on the party of his
government to engage in discussions similar to recently
concluded discussions with the European Union. He said that
they had frank and candid discussions and taken the
participants to visit other parts of Burma, including Karen
State so they could get a view of the peace process with the
Karen. Since "I just realized it is natural to see each
other often and ask questions" to build confidence, he wanted
to extend this offer to Americans, including Congressmen and
Senators. However, he added that there can be no
pre-conditions (like seeing Aung San Suu Kyi? interjected the
Charge). He continued, they can look, they can ask questions
and they will get candid, frank talk. "That is our offer, if
you are interested." Charge replied that she would relay
this offer back to Washington. She added that she understood
the recent discussions with the EU primarily involved
academics, and noted that many U.S. academics regularly visit
here already. She pointed out that the Foreign Ministry used
to organize informative trips around the country which
enabled diplomats to get a clearer picture of what was
happening and requested that they resume. She said that the
recent trips organized by other ministries had not offered
much flexibility in permitting the diplomats to see
conditions for themselves, so they had lost interest.


9. (C) Comment: Never once did Myint Swe allude to the
harsh condemnations of the U.S. that have been a daily staple
in the government-controlled media since January. He seemed
genuinely willing to try to explain the constitutional
process, even if he was not terribly persuasive. It also was
clear that the regime intends to keep the process under its
tight control, and regards itself as too unique to learn from
others. The threats against NLD are made regularly, which
serve to keep the NLD very cautious about speaking out. In
contrast to our previous meetings, he seemed more confident
than the last time, but no longer made any big claims about
his importance. He did not show any irritation with any
questions posed.


10. (C) Comment continued: Why Kyaw Thu joined this meeting
makes little sense unless he was seeking an official
imprimatur for resuming discussions that he broke off last
July (ref B). We have heard repeatedly from numerous
sources, who claim regular contacts with senior military
officials, that "they" want to talk with us, but do not know
how to go about it. It is never clear who precisely "they"
are, but this did appear to be an effort from a senior
general, reportedly close to Than Shwe, and a senior Foreign
Ministry official signaling a willingness to talk with us.
With regard to Kyaw Thu's offer above, the so-called Track
Two Dialogue has been described by others as an effort by
number three general Thura Shwe Mann to reach out to the
international community. Kyaw Thu's sister initiated
contacts with the Europeans several months ago when she was
assigned to Geneva. The resident European Ambassadors here
refused to participate because the Foreign Ministry offered
only the routine staged propaganda trips of recent years, as
well as obligatory meetings with government-sponsored
organizations. "They" clearly are not yet ready for
foreigners to meet with all the persons of interest in Burma
and travel freely to judge conditions themselves.
VILLAROSA