Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07RANGOON168
2007-02-20 09:57:00
SECRET
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

BURMA: RESPONDING TO THE REGIME'S "ROADMAP TO

Tags:  PGOV PREL BM 
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RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 000168 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP AND IO; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: RESPONDING TO THE REGIME'S "ROADMAP TO
DEMOCRACY"

REF: A. RANGOON 166

B. RANGOON 41

Classified By: P/E Chief Leslie Hayden for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 000168

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP AND IO; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: RESPONDING TO THE REGIME'S "ROADMAP TO
DEMOCRACY"

REF: A. RANGOON 166

B. RANGOON 41

Classified By: P/E Chief Leslie Hayden for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Burma's military regime is preparing to wrap
up its National Convention, debut a new constitution, and
move forward with a national referendum within the next year.
In doing so, the regime hopes to gain domestic and
international acquiescence to a constitution that will cement
the military's rule and permanently sideline Aung San Suu
Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) and all other
pro-democracy opposition parties. The "Seven Step Roadmap to
Disciplined Democracy" is the regime's primary tool for
nullifying the results of the 1990 parliamentary elections,
which the NLD won by an overwhelming majority. As the regime
debuts it own constitution and moves forward with its
roadmap, the international community should insist that all
political parties be allowed to participate in the
constitutional process and that Burma's people be allowed to
debate its pros and cons freely and vote on it by secret
ballot. At the same time, we should remind the opposition
that compromises on all sides will be necessary for any
political dialogue to succeed. End summary.

The "Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy"
--------------


2. (U) On August 30, 2003, former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt
announced the regime's plans to move forward on a "Seven Step
Roadmap to Disciplined Democracy." The first step was the
resumption of the National Convention (NC),a procedure the
regime began in January 1993, before adjourning it in March

1996. Its purpose was to draft a set of "guiding principles"
for a new constitution. Although that step now seems to be
winding up at last, the second step of the roadmap is vague.
It states that after the National Convention, there will be a
step-by-step implementation "of the process necessary for the
emergence of a genuine and disciplined democratic system."
Next is the drafting of the constitution, followed by its
adoption through a national referendum. Steps five and six
are the holding of "free and fair" elections for a parliament
and the convening of parliament. The final step is the

building of a "modern and democratic nation" by its elected
leaders and state governments.


2. (SBU) The regime established the NC in lieu inviting the
winners of the 1990 elections to draft the new constitution.
Indeed, the NC has been the regime's primary tool for
nullifying the result of those elections. One of the six
objectives the regime laid out for the NC was to provide a
way for the military to be able to participate in the
political leadership of a future state. When the NC first
convened, only fifteen percent of the delegates had been
elected in the 1990 elections. Of 677 total delegates, only
86 were from the NLD, even though it won eighty percent of
the seats in 1990. All other delegates were hand-picked by
the regime. The delegates from the NLD participated in the
NC for just over two years. In November 1995, Aung San Suu
Kyi issued a press statement criticizing the NC for being
undemocratic in both its composition and procedures.
Specifically, she criticized the regime for only including a
small minority of those elected by the people; for not
allowing the NC objectives or procedures to be established by
the delegates themselves; for censoring the delegates' papers
and discussions; for deciding issues before they were fully
discussed; and for making decisions not only on broad
principles for the proposed constitution, but also on its
details. Shortly after her statement, the NLD delegates
walked out of the convention in protest, and on November 29,
1995, the regime officially expelled them.


3. (SBU) Post has reported extensively on the lack of free
debate in the National Convention and the frustration of the
ethnic cease-fire groups, whose grievances have not been
addressed and whose suggestions are repeatedly brushed aside.
Most troubling is the regime's undemocratic method of

RANGOON 00000168 002 OF 004


stifling any criticism of the NC: the anti-subversion law.
The anti-subversion law, or 5/96 as it is commonly known,
carries a penalty of 5 to 20 years for those found
"disturbing and opposing" the NC. It is one of the laws
under which the regime threatened to charge the five 88
Generation Students leaders during their recent detention.
It is a threat regularly cited to NC delegates when they try
to debate an issue.

Moving Ahead
--------------


4. (C) Many of our contacts participating in the NC claim
the regime has already completed its new constitution and
that the NC process is strictly for appearances. According
to recent statements by Burma's Foreign Minister and
information given to the CDA by the Chinese Ambassador (Ref
A),the regime expects to wrap up the convention sometime
this year, debut its constitution, and move forward with a
referendum. There is no indication the Generals intend to
slow down or revise this process to allow for any genuine
dialogue with the opposition in advance of presenting a new
constitution for approval. On February 6, the regime's
mouthpiece daily, the New Light of Myanmar, ran a three-day
series under the Minister of Information's pen-name attacking
the UNSC resolution's demand for a genuine political dialogue
and declaring the NC process sufficient.


5. (U) Recently, NC attendees have informed us of a number
of the key NC decisions, while others have been confirmed by
regime media. Most significant are the following:

-- There will be a Union Parliament made up of two bodies: a
House of Representatives consisting of 330 elected members
plus 110 appointed military representatives, and a House of
Nationalities made up of 168 elected members plus 56
appointed military reps. In sum, twenty-five percent of
Parliament's seats will be reserved for the military.

-- The Union Parliament will chose the President from among
three candidates, one chosen by elected members of the House
of Representatives, another by elected members of the House
of Nationalities, and the third by the military
representatives. The two candidates not elected will both
become Burma's Vice Presidents.

-- The Commander in Chief of the military will be equal in
rank to the Vice Presidents and will be charged with
"safeguarding the constitution."

-- The constitution will allow the military to exercise a
coup as necessary.

-- Political parties who contact insurgent groups or anyone
determined by the state to be "terrorists" will be disbanded.

-- Political parties receiving direct or indirect financial,
material, or other assistance from governments, religious and
other associations, or individuals of a foreign country will
be disbanded.

-- There will be a rigid procedure for amending the
constitution and it can only be amended with complete
agreement of seventy-five percent of the Union Parliament.

-- The central government, rather than state governments,
will hold residual power to handle critical matters. Many
believe the regime will use this principle to maintain
central government control of key natural resources, most of
which are located in Burma's ethnic minority states.

Preparing for a Transition
--------------


6. (C) We see several indications the regime may be
preparing for a constitutional referendum and transition to a
"civilian government" in the near future. Many believe the

RANGOON 00000168 003 OF 004


recent replacement of military Township Peace and Development
Council chairs with civilians is a sign of this intent. The
creation of a General Administration Department within the
Ministry of Home Affairs signals the regime is working to
create a civilian administrative apparatus. The recent
requirement that all citizens renew their national
registration cards and update family registration lists may
also be the regime's attempt to conduct an informal census in
preparation for a national referendum. Rumors persist that
Than Shwe and Maung Aye plan to step down from the military
and appoint No. 3 General Thura Shwe Mann as Commander in
Chief, preparing themselves to occupy the most powerful
positions in the future "democratic" government: President,
Vice President, and military chief. But two wild cards
remain in the regime's roadmap: the referendum on the
constitution and parliamentary elections, plus the reluctance
of Maung Aye to forego leadership.


7. (C) Although the regime has not yet announced which
political parties will be allowed to participate in future
elections, the broad restrictions established at the NC may
be used to provide justification for disbanding the NLD or
disqualifying its members. The regime regularly accuses the
NLD of being backed by neocolonialists and "outside
destructive elements." They also often accuse the leaders of
the 88 Generation Students of receiving foreign support and
being associated with "terrorists." In what may be a sign of
its intentions, last week the regime summoned Acting NLD
Chairman U Aung Swe and other leaders of the Committee
Representing the People's Parliament (CRPP) and told them the
CRPP was an illegal organization and had contacts with
outside "terrorists." On February 9, the New Light of
Myanmar noted that the NLD will only have the right to run in
any future elections if it is still found to be a legal
political party in accordance with the future constitution.
On the other hand, the Chinese have been told that the NLD
would be permitted to participate.


8. (C) Many, including several NC delegates, have told us
the regime is preparing to transform its mass-member
organization, the Union Solidarity and Development
Association (USDA),into a political party. Through coercion
and pressure, our sources say, the USDA hopes to win at least
thirty percent of parliamentary seats in any future election.
Contacts have told us the regime is handing USDA more
economic leverage over local businessmen throughout the
country by giving it control over selected government
contracts and export/import licenses. Many suspect USDA will
award these lucrative contracts and licenses in exchange for
votes.


9. (C) There is no assurance they will succeed. We see no
indication USDA enjoys any popular support. Most members are
forced to join because the regime requires it of their
professions. If a secret ballot is permitted, as in the 1990
elections, many may make promises to USDA, pocket incentives,
and then vote as they please. In 1990, the regime deployed
the National Unity Party to bribe, threaten, harass, and
coerce the population into voting for its candidates. Aung
San Suu Kyi was held under house arrest and the regime
fostered many break-off parties to divide the pro-democracy
opposition. Convinced it would win, the regime let the
election proceed with a secret ballot. In return, the
Burmese handed it a stunning defeat. The public is likely to
respond the same way if again allowed to vote freely.

Response of the Pro-Democracy Opposition
--------------


10. (C) The defeat of the UNSC council resolution has
focused both the pro-democracy opposition and the ethnic
minorities on the regime's determination to move forward with
their roadmap. Many of the groups, including the NLD, are
engaged in vigorous internal debate on how to influence the
outcome of the roadmap effectively. The NLD "uncles" seem
paralyzed, and have run out of new ideas. Younger members of
the NLD want the party to become more active and reach out to

RANGOON 00000168 004 OF 004


generate public support for an inclusive dialogue with the
regime. This is the same approach the 88 Generation Students
have tried to initiate with their recent campaigns (Ref B).
The critical decision for the NLD is whether to continue to
call for the regime to honor the results of the 1990
elections, boycotting any future referendums or elections, or
to join the fray and campaign vigorously to renew their
mandate. NLD spokesman U Myint Thein told us recently the
NLD Central Executive Committee is currently discussing these
options. However, no decisions can be made until the regime
outlines who will be able to participate in the elections and
how the votes will be conducted.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) Successful constitutions require political bargains.
A new constitution will not contribute to Burma's stability
if it allows one group to be far better off than the others.
The Generals are trying to cement their power by imposing
their vision of "disciplined" democracy from above, while
cutting off the freedom of assembly, free speech, vigorous
debate, and development of grass roots NGOs and civil society
that Burma needs to overcome decades of division, distrust,
and neglect. We should prepare for the regime's next steps
by emphasizing to China, India, ASEAN, and like-minded
countries that the U.S. cannot and will not accept the
rubber-stamping of a sham, imposed constitution as an
acceptable alternative to true dialogue and lasting reform.
All political parties, including the NLD, should be allowed
to hold public discussions, and the international community
should insist that secret ballots and international
monitoring be permitted in any future referendums or
elections. At the same time, we should remind the opposition
that compromises on all sides will be necessary for any
dialogue to succeed. The regime's greatest fear is the
uncensored voice of their own people. Although they will try
to choreograph the process, Burmese voters will not be
fooled, and neither should others. End comment.
VILLAROSA