Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07RABAT704
2007-04-23 07:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rabat
Cable title:  

ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR SAYS GOA MIGHT BE READY TO

Tags:  MO PBTS PHUM PREL AG WI 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6380
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 4388
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3282
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 5699
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 3469
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 4607
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 9260
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 2950
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0692
C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000704 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG,

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2009
TAGS: MO PBTS PHUM PREL AG WI
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR SAYS GOA MIGHT BE READY TO
TALK TO MOROCCANS

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for Reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000704

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG,

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2009
TAGS: MO PBTS PHUM PREL AG WI
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR SAYS GOA MIGHT BE READY TO
TALK TO MOROCCANS

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for Reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Algerian Ambassador Belkheir told Ambassador
Riley April 17 that although Algeria was not prepared to
listen to the Moroccans about their autonomy proposal,
Algiers might accept a delegation from Rabat "after the end
of the Security council debate," if it was not to talk about
the Sahara. He repeated familiar Algerian positions that
Algiers is not a party to the dispute and was determined to
support the principle of self-determination. Amb./Gen.
Belkheir, a longtime member of the Algerian military elite
said security cooperation on counterterroism between the
Maghreb neighbors was good and ongoing. End Summary.


2. (C) Algerian Ambassador to Morocco General Larbi Belkheir
accompanied by his number two, Ambassador-ranked Boumedienne
Guennad, hosted Ambassador Riley and Polcouns April 17.
Belkheir, a senior player on the Algerian side for decades,
spoke of the long history of friction between the two Maghreb
neighbors. Belkheir, a regular visitor to Washington during
his days as Presidential Chief of staff and virtual National
Security Adviser spoke of his close contacts with senior
officials and with a succession of US ambassadors. After
Baker's resignation, Algeria had wanted the USG to nominate a
senior figure to replace him as Personal Envoy, and was
disappointed that this did not happen . Belkheir praised the
series of recent contacts between his staff and Embassy Rabat
and believed the two embassies should work more closely
together.

Shared Fight Against Terror
--------------


3. (C) Ambassador Riley offered condolences for the losses
in the recent terrorist attacks in Algiers. Belkheir offered
his for Blacksburg. The Algerian ambassador said that the
bombings in Algiers had not been suicide bombers, unlike
those in Morocco. Nonetheless Algiers believed that all had
some kind of link to the GSPC Al Qaeda in the Lands of the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). He maintained there is already good

cooperation between Morocco and Algeria on
security/counterterrorism, which has been getting stronger.

Sahara
--------------


4. (C) Ambassador outlined U.S. positions on the serious and
credible nature of the Moroccan initiative and in support of
unconditional negotiations, noting these had been conveyed in
Algiers. He urged that the GOA encourage the POLISARIO to
enter talks without preconditions. Belkheir repeated
standard Algerian rhetoric on its principled approach to
self-determination, insisting that Algeria was not a party.
(Ambassador Riley pushed back on this, noting that Algeria
had been closely involved in previous U.N.-led efforts to
find a solution.) Belkheir also stated, somewhat
inconsistently, that if the Polisario and HOM were to come to
an agreement, Algeria "would be the first to applaud it".
When pressed, he admitted that support would apply even if
the self-determination did not include an option of
independence.


5. (C) Belkheir cited the POLISARIO proposal as a mark of
responsiveness drawing attention to new elements, such as its
undertaking to establish close relations post independence
with Morocco and to allow citizenship for Moroccans present
in the territory for 10 years. He did say however that
Algeria might be able to support negotiations if they were
not based on Moroccan sovereignty. He confirmed that the GOM
had offered to go to Algiers to brief on their plan but that
his government could not accept this, repeating that Algeria
was not a party to the dispute.

Bilateral relations: Maybe an opening?
--------------


6. (C) However, Belkheir said clearly that if Morocco
offered to send a delegation to Algiers it is possible his
government would accept it, if it was to discuss bilateral
relations and not the Sahara. He stressed that this would
only work if it were proposed after the end of the Security

Council debate and MINURSO rollover, so that it didn't look
like they were discussing the Sahara. Belkheir repeatedly
insisted Algeria and Morocco were brothers, but, digging deep
into the historical record as he saw it, made no secret of
the intense and deep-seated differences between them. He
railed against the Moroccan press which he said regularly
insults President Bouteflika (and himself). Still, he said,
there was a chance for improvement. King Mohammed VI's
statement of condolences for the Algiers bombings had been
very well received. If the Sahara problem were solved, it
would immediately lead to a normalization of relations,
opening of the border, and progress in Maghreb integration,
he opined. He stressed that Algeria was long committed to
the stability of Morocco and to the continuation of the
monarchy here.

COMMENT:
--------------


7. (C) Belkheir's suggestions of a Moroccan delegation to
Algiers might be a good one, even if initially focused just
on bilateral relations. We are skeptical of their interest
in a resolution of the issue, and certainly of their denial
of having a decisive role. Also, given the long rivalry
between these neighbors, we doubt that even a solution to the
Sahara would immediately lead to full-scale rapprochement.
Rather the other way around, warmer bilateral relations would
improve the prospects of a settlement on Sahara . As we
pursue a Sahara resolution, we should continue, even
intensify a parallel effort to get these two to engage on
both fighting their common Jihadist enemy and on the other
issues that they have in common as well as those which divide
them.
******************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
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RILEY