Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07RABAT565
2007-03-28 17:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rabat
Cable title:  

MFA ON SAHARA: SEEKING ANOTHER WASHINGTON MEETING

Tags:  PREL PTBS MO FR AL 
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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0565/01 0871737
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281737Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6187
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 4364
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0489
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3251
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0389
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 3451
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 4571
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1032
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0678
C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000565 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2017
TAGS: PREL PTBS MO FR AL
SUBJECT: MFA ON SAHARA: SEEKING ANOTHER WASHINGTON MEETING


Classified By: Charge Wayne J. Bush for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000565

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2017
TAGS: PREL PTBS MO FR AL
SUBJECT: MFA ON SAHARA: SEEKING ANOTHER WASHINGTON MEETING


Classified By: Charge Wayne J. Bush for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1.(C) Summary and action request: MFA sources are upbeat on
the results of the Western Sahara roadshow, but recognize
there is much to be done. They are pressing for a high-level
Washington meeting the week of April 2, and also seeking a
follow-up with UNSYG Ban. It is unlikely the Moroccans will
have much more of substance for a return meeting, but are
likely to use it to push for a 12 month MINURSO rollover and
seek U.S. commitment to support its diplomatic efforts to see
its autonomy ideas. They want a long rollover to provide
time to negotiate and to win hearts and minds on the ground
(and perhaps to get past September elections here). While
they hope the delegation could meet Secretary Rice, they
would likely not insist on that level. Embassy would
appreciate being instructed to convey Washington's answer on
the proposed consultation to the GOM. End summary and action
request.

2.(C) DCM met March 27 with Youssef Amrani, Director-General
for Bilateral Affairs (the #4 in the Ministry). Amrani was
upbeat, having just returned from a Latin American tour with
Minister Benaissa and CORCAS head Kalihenna Ould er Rachid
which included stops in Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Colombia,
and Mexico. Amrani underlined that they did not go to
Venezuela. The purpose of the trip was to build support for
Morocco's approach on autonomy for Sahara. He asserted that
Latin interlocutors reacted positively to the plan, but
stressed that the solution must be negotiated. Amrani said
Morocco was feeling confident -- the GOM is no longer on the
defensive over Sahara. He was pleased that Morocco is
willing to depart from what he termed its "inherited
Bonapartist" (i.e. highly centralized) structures in favor of
decentralization and autonomy. He emphasized that Morocco is
open to dialogue with the POLISARIO.

3.(C) Polcouns followed up the same day with International
Organizations Chief (A/S equiv.) Nasser Bourita, who has been
the key working level contact for (and likely architect of)
the diplomatic push. He said he had been to Paris to meet
with the GOF for further discussions, indicating that the GOM

is consulting first with friends, principally the USG and
France and secondarily with Spain, while keeping the UN and
other P5 members informed. It wanted to complete visits to
all UNSC members before presenting the plan. With the four
principals having met the Belgians and gone to Rome that very
day, a few more stops remain, including African members.

4.(C) Bourita urged that Washington accept the GOM proposal
to send a delegation the week of April 2. The GOM is also
seeking to see UNSYG Ban Ki Moon and Personal Envoy Van
Walsum the same week, but planned to present its papers in
final to the UN only April 10. He understood that the
Secretary might not be available, but indicated the

SIPDIS
delegation would be happy instead to meet again with U/S
Burns. Moroccan goals for a USG meeting were:

--to present additional details about the autonomy plan and
answers to USG questions, and to convey that Morocco is
willing to be as flexible as possible in negotiations.

--to discuss what should be published about the plan.
Morocco does not intend to provide all the details to the
UNSC that it had shared with the USG.

--to discuss follow on strategy, particularly GOM interest in
obtaining a longer-term, preferably 12-month rollover.

5.(C) Overall Moroccan strategy was now focused on
negotiations. They would seek agreement with the POLISARIO
and Algeria. That agreement could be put to an up or down
referendum in the territory, which if positive, could be
construed as self-determination. No option of independence
need explicitly be presented, he said, contending that self
determination had in other UN decolonization cases been such
a process. Bourita said that if the POLISARIO did not want
to negotiate, Morocco could find some subset with would.

6.(C) Bourita said a 12-month rollover was important,
although he responded in the negative to Polcouns query
whether this was linked to the Government's desire to
concentrate on the upcoming September elections. This
longer period was instead necessary to give Morocco more time
-- to negotiate with the other parties and for Van Walsum and
others to engage, to come up with more ideas on some of the
existing issues, to intensify its hearts and minds confidence
building efforts in the territory, and also so that this
would not come to the UNSC during the throes of the General
Assembly.

7.(C) COMMENT: European diplomats reported that MFA
Minister-Delegate Fassi Fihri briefed the EU COMs April 23
stressing Morocco's interest in negotiations and that it
would be very flexible in those negotiations. Fassi Fihri,
asked about Kalihenna's comment to the press that if
negotiations did not proceed that the GOM would implement
autonomy anyway, refuted the CORCAS head, saying that Morocco
would, however proceed with a strong version of its
nation-wide program of decentralization. A French diplomat,
appreciating Washington's close coordination with Paris,
reported that Egyptian President Mubarak had told the French
he was prepared to host talks between morocco and Algeria on
the Sahara and regional issues. The Europeans remain very
concerned about the Russian position in the UNSC, given
Russia's apparent interest in driving a wedge between Europe
and Algeria. Polcouns pointed out that the Moroccan
invitation to the GOR to tender for a nuclear power plant may
have partly been intended to blunt the traditional Russian
tilt toward Algiers. End Comment.

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Bush