WESTERN SAHARA: TOUGH APPROACH TO NEXT ROUND,

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 001814

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/MAG, IO/UNP, EUR/WE AND DRL/NESCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV PBTS MO WI
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: TOUGH APPROACH TO NEXT ROUND,
POSSIBLE CHANGE ON THE GROUND

REF: RABAT 1807

Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: Moroccan MFA Chief of Staff Bourita
projected that the impending third round of negotiations for
the Western Sahara with the POLISARIO would be a real
challenge. The GOM believes it should focus on substance,
but not at all on independence. While appreciating USG
support, he hoped from more backing from the other "Friends."
At the same time, the GOM is frustrated with the current
UN-appointed arbiter in the conflict, who appeared unduly
deferential to the POLISARIO and Algeria. While accusing
Algeria and the POLISARIO of a smear campaign to malign the
GOM,s human rights record in Western Sahara, Bourita
suggested the GOM would work to limit abuses, a changed
approach apparently substantiated by an MOI contact. We will
look carefully for any improvement on the ground. End
Summary.

Third Round of Negotiations Pivotal
--------------


2. (C) On November 27, PolCouns, visiting Morocco Desk
Officer Randall Kaailau, and PolOff met with GOM MFA Chief of
Staff and I/O Director Nasser Bourita. Bourita said the
tough questions of substance must to be addressed in the
third round of negotiations with the POLISARIO round lest
critical momentum and the credibility of the negotiations be
lost. He complained that countries such as Spain, Russia,
and the UK, in contrast with the U.S., were not pushing hard
for "concrete" results during the third round as they were
satisfied with the status quo. Morocco believed the Sahara
question cannot be resolved by a referendum including an
independence option, self-determination is part of the
solution but must be defined and must be short of
independence. UN Secretary General and Personal
Representative for the Western Sahara Peter Van Walsum must
accept existing UN Security Council resolutions. Bourita
insisted that they give more favorable treatment to the
Moroccan proposal as the basis of negotiations, vice the
POLISARIO proposal, which he characterized as nothing new.


3. (C) At the same time, Bourita said the GOM believed: the
Sahara question must be resolved peacefully;
&self-determination8 of the Sahrawi people is an integral
part of any solution; and, despite the fact that decisions
are made in Algiers, Morocco accepts the POLISARO as its
recognized negotiating partner, with which a &win-win8
solution must be found. Bourita called Morocco,s arrival at
this position as the fruition of a sixteen-year
&psychological evolution,8 representing difficult and hard
won compromises within the GOM.

Frustration with UN Arbiter
--------------


4. (C) Bourita criticized Van Walsum as being a "prisoner of
his own logic" and for imposing peace process recipes from
other regions (Note: likely a reference to the Balkans) that
do not account for the uniqueness and evolution of the Sahara
negotiations since fighting stopped in 1991. Specifically,
Bourita said that Van Walsum continues to insist that the
parties enter into negotiations with no existing
pre-conditions, an orientation that would essentially nullify
the recent UN Security Council resolutions, endorsement of
Morocco,s latest peace proposal. Bourita speculated that
Van Walsum was insisting on "no preconditions," in order to
gain the trust of the POLISARIO, given its inherently weaker
negotiating position.

Algeria Still the Main Obstacle to Peace
--------------


5. (C) Bourita said that Algeria (GOA) continues to lack the
political will to support a negotiated solution between
Morocco and the POLISARIO and appears to be making efforts to
retard future progress. According to Bourita, given the
recent GOM progress in the UN on the Sahara issue, the GOA
has reverted to a policy of UN "containment." This strategy
calls for blocking further GOM advantages in the UN
negotiations, while executing a public relations campaign,

both at home and abroad, especially in Europe, designed to
undercut Morocco,s international support by highlighting and
exaggerating its human rights transgressions in the Western
Sahara. Bourita called the GOA,s strategy &active and well
thought out,8 and, to underscore the point, he said that the
GOA was facilitating the travel of Sahrawis to Europe in
order to publicize alleged GOM human rights abuses. Bourita
complained that these activists are abusing their right to a
Moroccan passport by traveling to Europe only to smear the
government that had issued their travel documents.


6. (C) Nonetheless, Bourita admitted that the GOM has had
human rights transgressions in Western Sahara, particularly
incidents of beating and intimidation of pro-separatist
demonstrators, but underscored the relatively small number
and reduction of these incidents in recent years. He also
cited recent progress on prosecuting offenders of these
abuses and the training of security forces to guard against
future transgressions. At the same time, Bourita indicated
that the GOM would be willing to do more to improve
safeguards against future human rights transgressions.

"The Gentler Gamer is a Sooner Winner"
--------------


7. (C) PolCouns spoke favorably of GOM progress so far on
the reduction of human rights abuses in the Western Sahara,
and he acknowledged Bourita's assertion that some of the
activists use the issue to promote their pro-separatist
agenda. He appreciated the ongoing dialogue with the GOM
that was feeding into the preparation of the State
Departments annual human rights report. PolCouns urged the
GOM to move even, citing that a lighter GOM hand in Western
Sahara will win more adherents to the peace process in
Laayoune and add to the momentum of the autonomy proposal.
This, in turn, could create pressures on the POLISARIO
leadership in Tindouf to be more conciliatory at the
negotiating table. Appreciative of Bourita's suggestion of
additional the GOM openness on the issue, PolCouns urged that
the GOM continue to issue passports and allow Sahrawis to
travel, and above all seek to halt abuses. That would speak
loudly of Morocco,s toleration and respect.

MOI Too Sensitive-- At Least in Words
--------------


8. (C) During a subsequent PolCouns/DeskOff meeting November
30 at the Interior Ministry, Governor Rachid Rguibi, the MOI
International Relations Chief, displayed an unusually, for
him, more open attitude to the human rights/hearts and minds
question. (Note: Rguibi, traditionally the spokesperson for
the MOI's hard line, himself hails from a notable Sahrawi
family.) From the perspective of MOI, which heads the
negotiations for the GOM, goals are twofold -- humanitarian,
to rescue the poor Sahrawis confined to the camps and
exploited by their "revolutionary leadership," and
geopolitical and anti-terrorist considerations. Citing
"proof," although without any specifics, he charged that
"elements" of the POLISARIO had supported extremists in the
heart of the Sahara. He could not substantiate reports in
local media on Tuareg separatist involvement in the recent
rocketing at the Algerian airbase at Djanet. Moroccan
information was that it was AQIM aided by someone inside the
Algerian military.


9. (C) We pressed hard on reports of abuses by security
forces in Sahara. We noted the importance for the
negotiations of wining hearts and minds of those who are not
activists, but may share their leanings against Moroccan role
for practical reasons. He complained that the
pro-separatists have full individual rights, even though they
are acting as agents for the POLISARIO, citing free issuance
of passports (note: the lifting of all restrictions is quite
recent.). They go around the world insulting our country and
we let them return without any bother. He repeated the
long-standing position that Morocco cannot permit the
existence of separatist organizations, even if totally
non-violent. "We refuse to open discussions with the
separatists of the interior."


10. (C) Rguibi indicated, however, that the Government has
begun to review this approach. Recently, instructions have
been given to security forces to exercise restraint. The

authorities cannot permit demonstrations, which might lead to
civil war. However, when police intervene there is always a
risk of overreaction, by individual officers. Morocco has
demonstrated that it would punish abuses by the jailing of
the officers in the beating death of Hamid Lambarki. They
are currently awaiting trial in the Laayoune prison. This
has had a deterrent result, but he indicated that now the
Government is trying to broaden its prohibitions against
abuse.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) Based on Bourita's assessment, other interlocutors,
and commentary we have seen in the press, the Moroccan
approach to the just-confirmed round 3 (reftel) will be tough
and inflexible regarding discussion of the POLISARIO
proposal. In contrast, we are struck by indications of
changing thinking about treatment of the Sahrawis in the
territories, particularly from long-time hard-liner Rguibi.
Possible GOM evolution from using sticks to carrots in
dealing with the Sahrawi population and political dissidents,
may reflect Embassy and USG representations, and increasingly
those of other countries here. It may also stem from the
recent engagement in the Sahara of the CCDH (Royal Human
Rights Council, which has a direct line into the Palace).
Other embassies have told us they also detect a change in MFA
tone, including an increased openness to have foreign
visitors in the territory. It remains to be seen, however,
if this change in tone is just for our benefit or whether it
translates into actual improvement of conditions on the
ground. End Comment.



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