MOROCCO'S SEPTEMBER 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RABAT 001417

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FO: GRAY, CARPENTER, NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2012
TAGS: PGOV MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO'S SEPTEMBER 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

REF: RABAT 1395 AND PASSIM (SEE BELOW)

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Morocco's September 7 parliamentary
elections will be its first in five years and second of King
Mohammed VI's reign. A crowded, fragmented field of 33
political parties will be competing for the 325 seats in
Parliament's lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, of which
30 seats are on a list reserved for women. Most here expect
this will be the freest and most transparent election in
Morocco's history. International observers (funded by MEPI)
are in place for the first time ever, along with local
observers. Few expect the government to tamper with the
results, and even traditional local vote buying is likely to
diminish, but the structure of the electoral system ensures
that no party will dominate, keeping the throne in charge.


2. (C) Turnout may be as important as the party results, as
an indicator of confidence in the system. Our soundings
around the country affirmed that many Moroccans, and youth in
particular, are alienated from the political parties and over
the limited powers of Parliament, and thus are disinclined to
vote. However, some recent surveys suggest voter
mobilization efforts have had some impact, and turnout may
prove better than anticipated. Embassy will forward
separately its projection of results. End summary.

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A Crowded Field
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3. (C) 33 different political parties (22 of which are
currently represented in Parliament) will compete for 325
seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Of these, 295 members will
be elected out of more than 1800 local lists and an
additional 30 by a national list reserved (by mutual
agreement among the parties rather than by law) for women.
Among the candidates are 11 of the 34 members of Morocco's
cabinet of Ministers. Whatever the results, there will
likely be many changing faces in the next cabinet.

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System Upgraded
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4. (C) The GOM has made substantial and sometimes innovative
efforts to facilitate voter registration and promote voter
participation. In a country of some 33 million, there are
15.5 million eligible voters, 49% women, which is 1.6 million
more potential voters than in 2002. There are more than
38,000 polling places. Significant government resources have
been devoted to the elections. According to official
statistics, the GOM is spending USD 29 million to administer
the elections and has distributed USD 24 million for the
political parties to finance their campaigns. The GOM also
spent USD 5 million standardizing voter ID cards and USD 7.3
million updating the voters' registry. In addition to
traditional means, the GOM has adopted innovative tactics,
such as youth-oriented TV spots, setting up an effective
interactive voter registration website, and distributing
information by text messaging.


5. (C) A sample of the national ballot voters will use on
September 7, obtained by the Embassy, indicates to us the
potential for confusion. Each party symbol appears twice, in
two consecutive columns. Voters are to mark one for their
choice for the local list, and one for their choice for the
separate national list reserved for women. We see the
potential for many voters (a significant portion of whom will
be illiterate) to misunderstand that they need to mark the
ballots twice.


6. (C) So far we judge media access as fairly equitable, both
independent newspaper and broadcast outlets, which are
regulated. If anything skewed (per voter) somewhat in favor
of the smaller parties that don't have a seat in Parliament.
The four major parties each have their own party newspapers
which give ample exclusive coverage to their own candidates
and positions. We have been struck by the general absence of
political ads on the many billboards available and the
relative paucity campaign posters or banners. Most visual
campaigning is by flyer, and in many places the streets are
littered with flyers that appear to have been tossed away,
presumably by paid distributors. The deadline for
announcement of candidates and the start of the individual
campaign season was only two weeks before the elections. It
is not surprising then, that many voters have not made up
their minds, and many appear now to be deferring until the
very last minute. This increases somewhat the
unpredictability of the results.

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Transparency
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7. (C) The September 7 polls promise to be freer and more
transparent than any which have preceded it. Domestic
election monitors from civil society have been accorded
unprecedented official recognition, with the Royally-mandated
Consultative Human Rights Commission (CCDH) assigned to
coordinate and liaise between the participating NGOs and the
Ministry of Interior. Even more significantly, the GOM,
through the CCDH, has invited for the first time in Moroccan
history a delegation of international observers to watch the
polling on September 7.


8. (C) Prospects for the presence of international observers
seemed dubious as recently as late spring. Senior GOM
officials had expressed strong opposition to the concept.
Sustained U.S. advocacy for their inclusion, highlighted
during the May visit of NEA DAS Carpenter (Ref O-Para. 19
below),appears to have made an impact, and the GOM position
was reversed in late June, after the personal intervention of
the King. Organized by the National Democratic Institute,
funded through a MEPI grant, a group of 45 observers from 15
different countries including 7 Arab states, will be
accredited to fan out across the country on Election Day to
observe all stages of the balloting and counting process.
(Note: Embassy staff will also, less formally, be deployed
around the country to observe the conduct of the election and
its environment. End note.)

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Combatting Excess
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9. (C) In our travels across Morocco this summer (reftels),
discussions with politicians and civil society leaders have
revealed relatively few fears that the GOM will tamper with
the integrity of the electoral process or attempt to
manipulate the results. Though many are alienated from
politics and apathetic, "ordinary citizens" also generally
tell us they do not expect the government to involve itself
in fraud or manipulation. However, at the local level, many
individual candidates and local political party chapters have
been accused of various excesses and violations. As of
August 31, the GOM said that it had received over 700
complaints of violations, in which seven had already
generated specific prosecutions with at least 360 other
investigations launched. Even the previously untouchable
Fouad Ali El-Himma, who recently left his job as Interior
Minister-Delegate, has been targeted for formal complaints.


10. (C) We have repeatedly heard that the GOM's tough line
against electoral corruption has had a tangible impact across
the country. Several stern messages from the King in the
past year, and particularly last September's unprecedented
arrest and prosecution for electoral offenses of 15
candidates for the Chamber of Councilors, Parliament's Upper
House, sent a chilling message to many local elites long
accustomed to various forms of electoral fraud and
manipulation. Vote buying and other manipulative practices
have certainly not been purged from the system, but this year
they have gone farther underground.

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Turnout is the Key Indicator
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11. (C) Aside from the results themselves, the Palace will be
watching closely, and with some angst, for voter turnout on
September 7. The GOM has invested a large amount of its
resources, and consequently its prestige, in achieving the
largest possible voter turnout, clearly hoping to bill the
elections as a public vote of confidence in the Moroccan
political system. Throughout 2007, and particularly in the
past few months, on billboards, radio and TV spots, and in
the print media, the GOM has been sponsoring ads encouraging
citizens to let their voices be heard and fulfill their civic
duty to turn out and vote. Parallel, and more extensive
efforts to turn out the vote have been made by Moroccan NGOs,
with many of their activities funded by international donors
including USAID and MEPI.


12. (C) Our conversations with voters across the country
(reftels) indicate that those working to promote
participation have their work cut out for them. Popular
disaffection with the political system, and political parties
in general runs deep and wide. We have heard over and over
the view from Moroccans that their member of Parliament and
local political party representatives are only concerned with
their personal interests. That politicians visit them once,
just before elections, and make promises they quickly forget.

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13. (C) Public opinion surveys, including one recently
carried out by Al-Akhawayn University with support from a
MEPI grant, have scientifically documented public
disaffection with the parties. However, the same survey, for
which we obtained preliminary results on August 25, suggests
that the considerable efforts to promote participation this
September may be bearing fruit. Almost 79 percent of those
surveyed randomly in urban and rural districts in four
regions of Morocco reported that they intended to vote. Of
the same group of respondents, only 50 percent reported they
voted in 2002. A similar result was predicted in a survey
released by the pro-palace Daba 2007, which also has been
funded by the USG to stimulate turnout. If these
predictions come to fruition, it will be a pleasing result
for the GOM, which will with some justification be able to
sell it as a vote of confidence in the political system.


14. (C) Ironically, as payment was the principal motivation
for many to go to the polls, particularly in poor areas, the
anti-corruption and vote-buying campaign could have a side
effect of depressing turnout. We will have to parse the
results carefully.

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The Issues
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15. (C) Many of the parties have come out with more or less
detailed platforms, most for the first time. Most, no matter
where they sit on the political spectrum have focused on
voters' main concerns--the economy and employment.


16. (C) One issue that will define this election, however, is
the growth of the Islamic-oriented PJD and what voters will
indicate by what is widely expected to be a bigger share of
Parliament for them. Although we believe that much of the
appeal of the PJD is their stance on and reputation for good
governance, the prospect of increasing Islamic influence on
pubic life is not uncontroversial, particularly among the
western-identified new generation in places like Rabat or
Casablanca. So the vote is also partly a plebiscite on the
influence of "the bearded ones," which might encourage some
to vote.


17. (C) Despite the probably relatively clean election day,
structural engineering of the electoral system limits its
ability to produce a viable government reflecting the will of
the people. Moreover, the government itself has limited
powers, relative to the throne. Some of these issues were
noted in the preliminary report of the international
observers, and likely will be addressed in more detail in
their final report. This is an additional benefit of the
observation effort and help make this another step forward in
the process of political reform in Morocco.


18. (U) Additional information on the elections may be
obtained from the Interior Ministry website:
www.elections2007.gov.ma. (Note: Septel will offer Post
prognostications on likely electoral outcomes. End note.)


19. (U) Full List of reftels (NOTAL):

A. RABAT 1395

B. RABAT 1392

C. RABAT 1340

D. RABAT 1335

E. RABAT 1331

F. RABAT 1274

G. RABAT 1272

H. RABAT 1255

I. RABAT 1249

J. RABAT 1248

K. RABAT 1155

L. RABAT 1122

M. RABAT 1050

N. RABAT 996

O. RABAT 994

P. RABAT 852

Q. RABAT 680

R. RABAT 675

S. RABAT 638

T. RABAT 549

U. RABAT 360

V. RABAT 225
See also reporting from Casablanca. Several additional field
reports from Rabat or Casablanca are pending septel.


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RILEY