GOE TO GET TOUGHER ON ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS;

C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 001351

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS
TAGS: PGOV PREL INRA MARR CO EC
SUBJECT: GOE TO GET TOUGHER ON ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS;
LOOKING TO DEEPEN SECURITY COOPERATION (C-AL7-00365)


Classified By: PolOff Jarahn Hillsman for reasons 1.4 (b&d).


1. (C) Summary: Correa's national security minister
coordinator, Fernando Bustamante, told the Ambassador on June
8 that the GOE planned to strengthen its security posture in
the north to restrict the activities of Colombian illegal
armed groups in Ecuador. He said Correa was very concerned
over the GOE's lack of control over the region, and asked for
additional USG security support. In a previous meeting with
Embassy officials, Bustamante acknowledged that security
cooperation with the U.S. is a sensitive issue here and would
need to be carefully managed, but said that one of Plan
Ecuador's foremost policy objectives - control of illicit
activities, requires continued and enhanced cooperation.
Ecuador has traditionally been more inclined to blame
Colombia for its border problems rather than squarely face up
to their own side of the equation. Correa's order appears to
signal a welcome and potentially significant new pragmatism.
End Summary.

Biographical Information: Fernando Bustamante


2. (U) Fernando Bustamante, 56, was born in New York to an
Ecuadorian diplomat. He did his undergraduate work in
Sociology at the Catholic University of Chile in Santiago.
He holds advanced degrees in Urban & Regional Planning from
the Latin American Institute of Economic and Social Planning
and Public Administration from Harvard's Kennedy School of
Government. Bustamante pursued advanced study at the
Catholic University of Chile and the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. His professional background is academic,
serving mostly as a researcher, analyst, consultant, and
professor. He taught at the University of San Francisco with
President Rafael Correa. Bustamante currently serves as
Correa's Minister Coordinator for Internal and External
Security, charged with charting the GOE's national security
policy objectives. His office is charged with coordinating
Plan Ecuador.

Ambassador Seizes Opportunity; Presses Security Cooperation


3. (C) The Ambassador met with Bustamante at her residence on
June 8 to discuss his upcoming trip to Washington to lobby
for ATPDEA renewal and to discuss security cooperation. The
Ambassador explained that Congress will decide on ATPDEA
extension, and that the Administration supports a short-term
extension for all countries. Bustamante asked for advice on
how to make the GOE case for ATPDEA most convincingly. He
specifically asked about the sensitivities of making the
geopolitical argument, saying that within the Correa
administration there is a group of moderates (he included
himself, the Foreign Minister and the Defense Minister in
this group) who argue with the harder line advisors who want
to take the government farther left. He said that
non-renewal of ATPDEA would greatly strengthen the hand of
the hard line contingent.


4. (C) Turning to security cooperation, the Ambassador
offered Bustamante assistance from the Defense Department's
Center for Civilian-Military Relations to build capacity for
Ecuadorian defense ministry personnel newly under civilian
leadership. Bustamante eagerly responded to the offer asked
for more information (note: a meeting between Bustamante and
the Center has been scheduled for during his visit).
Responding to Bustamante's desire to deepen technical
security assistance to Ecuador, including tracking of
airspace in the Northern Border region, the Ambassador
explained the Cooperative Nations Information Exchange System
(CNIES) currently pending before the Foreign Ministry. She
explained that CNIES, which was cutoff in mid-2005 for
failure by Ecuador to sign an agreement on use of the
information, would give Ecuador real-time radar tracking
information. Bustamante was very receptive, expressing
surprise that the GOE had not moved on this opportunity. He
vowed to find the holdup and push forward. The Ambassador
expressed USG concerns over reports that the 25 Special
Forces Battalion permanently deployed in the northern
province of Esmeraldas might be recalled to the 9th Special
Forces Brigade in the central highlands city of Latacunga,
Cotopaxi province. Bustamante appeared unaware of the rumored
shift and promised to look into it.

Bustamante Offers More on Plan Ecuador; Stresses USG Support



5. (C) USAID Director and PolOff met with Bustamante on May
31 to discuss Plan Ecuador and clarify the role of the
Northern Border Development Unit (UDENOR) - USAID's current
interlocutor. Bustamante said that Plan Ecuador is a
national security plan focused on improving the lives of
northern border residents through development. Increased GOE
presence and control of the area will be necessary to achieve
this, he admitted. Bustamante explained that the GOE under
Plan Ecuador will for the first time have a nationally
coordinated strategy to address conditions in the north. The
plan, he noted, has seven objectives in the areas of
institutional strengthening; education; health; basic
services, control of illicit activities; human rights; and
territorial integrity. International donors, through the
Foreign Ministry's coordination unit (INECI),would be able
to select an area of interest under the seven pillars to
support. This will allow the GOE to channel support into
previously identified areas of concern and hopefully see more
significant results, he explained.


6. (C) Director General for Border Relations with Colombia
Mario Guerrero told PolOff on June 12 that the GOE is
currently completing the second phase of Plan Ecuador
planning - identifying and assigning inter-agency roles. He
confirmed that MFA-INECI would oversee international donor
contributions, and the Northern Border Development Unit
(UDENOR) would only serve as a technical implementing agency.
Guerrero said that an inter-agency body, headed by
Bustamante, would identify project areas, secure funding for
these projects, and assign them to UDENOR and other agencies
for implementation. He admitted, however, that other
governments and international partners had expressed some
anxiety over the lack of details surrounding the plan, and
asked for patience while the GOE works out what he believes
to be a very serious policy agenda.

Bustamante Makes a Surprise Pitch for U.S. Military Assistance


7. (C) As the May 31 meeting was coming to a close,
Bustamante made an unpredicted push for greater security
cooperation. He said that Correa in a May 29 security
briefing on the northern border ordered him to find ways to
secure Ecuador's border. He asked for USG assistance to
build up to 35 new military posts along the Ecuador-Colombia
border, and to increase the Ecuadorian military's radar and
technological capabilities. The government is serious about
this and our efforts to increase national security will also
help the U.S., Bustamante affirmed. Switching to English, he
told PolOff that military cooperation with the U.S. remains
sensitive here, but that Plan Ecuador's fifth objective
(control of illicit activities) was specifically designed to
give the GOE political cover.

Comment


8. (C) Bustamante's position and authority exceed those of
the Defense and Foreign Ministers, and he has Correa's
confidence on the most important national security matters.
We consider him to be increasingly pragmatic about security
cooperation with the U.S. as he gains experience and
knowledge about regional threats facing Ecuador.
Bustamante's visit to Washington offers an important
opportunity to engage with a key Correa administration player.
JEWELL