Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PRISTINA760
2007-10-29 15:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Pristina
Cable title:  

KOSOVO: NORTHERN SERB LEADERS HARDEN POSITION,

Tags:  PGOV PINR SOCI KV UNMIK 
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RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0987
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000760 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR SOCI KV UNMIK
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: NORTHERN SERB LEADERS HARDEN POSITION,
ACKNOWLEDGE "PARALLELISM" AS A POLICY GOAL

Classified By: Chief of Mission Tina Kaidanow for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000760

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DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE
NSC FOR BRAUN
USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI
EUR/ACE FOR DMAYHEW

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR SOCI KV UNMIK
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: NORTHERN SERB LEADERS HARDEN POSITION,
ACKNOWLEDGE "PARALLELISM" AS A POLICY GOAL

Classified By: Chief of Mission Tina Kaidanow for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. There were no surprises in our recent
meetings with hardline northern Kosovo Serb leaders. We
emphasized the leaders' responsibility for security and
sought to maintain open lines of communication. For their
part, our interlocutors were consistent in asserting that
Kosovo Serbs will not initiate violence in the tense period
after resolution of final status, though they made no
promises about maintaining a Serb police presence in the
multi-ethnic Kosovo Police Service. To the contrary, Serb
National Council (SNC) leader Milan Ivanovic emphasized
parallelism (and in particular the return of Serbian army and
police units) as the best option for Kosovo Serbs. Though
less extreme-sounding figures such as SNC Mitrovica chief
Nebojsa Jovic and Zvecan mayor Dragisa Milovic see the risk
for Serbs in the south if they boycott the upcoming Kosovo
elections, no one, including international officials,
foresees anything but an almost total Serb boycott on
November 17. While our Serb interlocutors presented
differing faces, all appeared confident the north -- and
implicitly the Serb enclaves in the south -- will remain
firmly under their control. Increasingly, the Serb
leadership of Kosovo, guided by Belgrade, is articulating a
policy of total separation from Kosovo institutions, a
provocation sure to -- and perhaps designed to -- goad ethnic
Albanians into rash counter-moves. END SUMMARY.

Message from USOP


2. (C) Poloffs met with hardline northern Serb leaders,
including Serb National Council (SNC) leader Milan Ivanovic,
SNC North Mitrovica chief Nebojsa Jovic, and Zvecan mayor
Dragisa Milovic on October 19 and 25, to emphasize both the
need for open communication and the importance of maintaining
security in the coming months. USOP reminded key Serb
leaders that primary responsibility for security and

stability in the north rests with them and the organizations
they control. We urged them to ensure that there be no
violence or provocations around the November 17 elections or
in the period following, as the status resolution process
again takes on serious momentum.

Open to dialogue


3. (C) Not surprisingly, Ivanovic (along with his "media
chief" Radomir Nekojevic) pursued his usual hard stance on
all issues, although he agreed that open lines of
communication would be important in the coming period.
Milovic and Jovic appeared even more open to communication
and stressed that they wanted to maintain contact with USOP,
regardless of the final status settlement. Milovic spoke
about his municipality's need for economic assistance, and
thanked USOP and USAID for past projects, while Jovic said
repeatedly that increased dialogue and contact were vital,
given current tensions in the run-up to final status.

UDI


4. (C) Ivanovic made it very clear that he and other
hardliners will consider any declaration or form of
independence for Kosovo illegitimate, and he parroted
Belgrade's threat to cut off relations with countries or
institutions recognizing an independent Kosovo. Jovic and
Milovic were more measured, avoiding threats altogether, but
affirming clearly that no Serb would ever accept an
independent Kosovo. Nevertheless, neither threatened to cut
off contact should independence be the outcome.

Security - "We won't start things"


5. (C) Both Ivanovic and Jovic claimed that Kosovo Serbs
would not initiate any violence. As in the past, Ivanovic
alleged that Kosovo Albanians are "completely" under American
control, which in their view makes the U.S. responsible for

PRISTINA 00000760 002 OF 003


provocations or violence from the Albanian side. Jovic was
less accusatory, saying "you will have no problems from us"
and that politicians on both sides need to speak out to
reduce tensions. Both declared that northern Serbs would
"protect themselves" if all else failed, with Ivanovic
warning that "if KFOR fails again, our state (Serbia) will
prevent a pogrom." Jovic took a similar line, but displayed
a more positive estimate of KFOR's ability to maintain order.
Nonetheless, he discussed openly what he said was the Serbs'
strategy of goading the Albanians into violent action: "This
part of the game will last a long time, and the side which
makes the first mistake will lose. We will not make the
first mistake."

Elections


6. (C) The leaders we spoke to, along with international
interlocutors working in the north, confirmed the widely-held
view that Serbs would boycott the upcoming November 17
central and municipal elections in Kosovo. All we spoke with
were also in agreement that Serbs are "not motivated" to
vote, even if there were no pressure from Belgrade. Ivanovic
complained that UNMIK had not consulted the SNC about
elections, but both he and Jovic said they would not prevent
any Serbs from voting. Jovic, however, added that he would
be out on election day explaining to people why they should
not vote. Ivanovic did not respond when asked about a
rumored attempt -- at his own urging, as well as that of
fellow hardliner Marko Jaksic -- to schedule parallel
municipal elections on November 11, but Jovic blamed "some
individuals" within the SNC for pushing such a plan.
(Comment: To our knowledge, the idea of holding parallel
municipal elections around the time of Kosovo elections has
apparently been discarded by Belgrade -- an interesting slap
at the northern Serb leadership, not acknowledged by Ivanovic
-- but will almost certainly be scheduled for spring 2008,
when Serbian municipal elections will likely take place. End
Comment.)

Effects of a boycott


7. (C) When asked what would happen in the southern,
Serb-majority municipalities of Strpce and Novo Brdo in the
event that Albanians gained control after a Serb boycott of
the elections, Ivanovic dismissed the potential for trouble,
again saying that Serbs would not start violence and that
Albanians could be kept under absolute American control.
Jovic and Milovic, however, admitted that sitting Serb
administrations in those municipalities would be at risk of
losing their seats to newly elected Albanian or Serb
micro-party candidates and asked us to make sure that KFOR
would protect Serbs south of the Ibar.

Strengthening of parallel structures


8. (C) In a harbinger of the northern leadership's strategy
post-status, Ivanovic clearly echoed Serbian Minister for
Kosovo Slobodan Samardzic's recent comments that Serbia would
increase the size, reach, and scope of parallel government
institutions for Kosovo Serbs after status, including areas
south of the Ibar. Both he and Milovic argued that Serb
institutions in the north, such as the hospital, university,
and telecommunications service, functioned more effectively
than "Albanian" institutions elsewhere in Kosovo. Flanked by
posters calling for the return of the Serbian police and army
to Serbia's "southern province" in the name of UNSCR 1244,
Ivanovic told us that "only our institutions" can protect
Serbs in Kosovo. When asked whether parallelism would be a
dramatic provocation for Kosovo Albanians, Ivanovic declared
the current division of Mitrovica a "model of multiethnicity"
for Kosovo, saying that the two sides lived next to each
other without violence. His colleague Nekojevic told us
"they (Albanians) had their parallel structures in the
1990's, and we will now have ours. We are prepared for
this."

PRISTINA 00000760 003 OF 003



Image of Moderation


9. (C) Jovic, as he often does when speaking with
international interlocutors, portrayed himself as a
reasonable moderate within the SNC, calling for
"responsibility" from all leaders and for internationals to
deal only with "serious" politicians. He discounted reports
of violent and provocative threats from hardline figures as
the words of "individuals, not the organization," going on to
warn that "some people say we should respond to Albanians
waving flags on the south bank of the Ibar with our uniformed
MUP (Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs) police and Serbian
flags, but these are not serious people."

Comment


10. (C) Our hardline Serb interlocutors were polite and
well-behaved during our meetings, asserting repeatedly that
they will not be the ones to instigate violence. This tells
us they are confident of retaining control of northern Kosovo
-- and by implication, the southern Serb enclaves, as well --
regardless of what final status may bring. With direct
guidance from Belgrade, Kosovo's northern Serb leadership is
now boldly articulating a strategy of consolidating what
amounts to a Serb entity in Kosovo, with its own set of
governing institutions, its own logistical and funding chain
back to Belgrade via north Mitrovica, and its own set of
political imperatives, aimed largely at de facto separation
from Kosovo.


11. (C) Comment, cont. We have very little influence to
stop or reverse this process and -- as the Serbs wisely
divine -- the intensified pace of constructing their parallel
governing arrangements will increasingly be a red flag in
front of the ethnic Albanian bull. The robust posture of
both KFOR and UNMIK police in the north, as well as strenuous
international efforts to exert control over hothead Albanian
politicians, will be necessary to keep things calm during the
overheated status and post-status period. We are
underscoring to all interlocutors, Serb and Albanian, our
determination and resolve to maintain security, noting
specifically that it is their responsibility to ensure the
situation remains within specified boundaries no matter what
the provocation. End comment.
KAIDANOW