KOSOVO: K-ALBANIAN PARTIES PREPARE FOR ELECTIONS;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRISTINA 000756

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, AND EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR
DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM UNMIK YI KV
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: K-ALBANIAN PARTIES PREPARE FOR ELECTIONS;
POST-ELECTION COALITION PROSPECTS STILL MURKY

Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The six Kosovar Albanian political parties
with a realistic chance of passing the five-percent
parliamentary threshold are scrambling to prepare for the
coming election campaign, which formally begins on October

26. The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) hopes to remain
the largest party but is struggling to overcome the
challenges of incumbency and tailor its message for the first
post-Rugova election. Junior coalition partner the Alliance
for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) is trying to stay afloat
despite party leader Ramush Haradinaj's absence to stand
trial in The Hague and funding shortages caused by the need
to pay for his defense. The main opposition parties --
especially the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) -- are
developing detailed campaign platforms and pledging to run
positive campaigns based on their economic and other
proposals. Meanwhile, the new parties -- Nexhat Daci's
Democratic League of Dardania (LDD) and Bexhet Pacolli's New
Kosovo Alliance (AKR) -- are trying to differentiate
themselves from others and to clear the threshold to enter
parliament. In an uncertain political environment, all
parties appear to be keeping their post-election coalition
options open, which augurs well for the civility of the
campaign but does not necessarily mean an easy or tumult-free
coalition building process once the election outcomes are
known. END SUMMARY.

LDK Struggles With Incumbency, Post-Rugova World


2. (C) In separate meetings on October 17, LDK Presidential
advisor Naim Jerliu and adviser to the Deputy Prime Minister
Izet Sadiku told poloff that the LDK faces the disadvantages
of incumbency without many of the advantages. They
complained that the party has been the larger member of the
governing coalition but -- because the AAK has held the prime
ministership and because Kosovo institutions do not have
authority over some key issues -- the LDK may be blamed by
voters for having failed to do things it was not in a
position to accomplish. Both expressed hope that the
departure from the LDK of its offshoot party, the LDD, and
autocratic LDD leader Nexhat Daci, will benefit the LDK in
the long run by ridding the party of corruption and cleaning
up its image. But Sadiku admitted that the split with the
LDD, the death of party founder and President Ibrahim Rugova
in 2006, and the challenges of incumbency could leave the LDK
with less support than in previous elections. Asked about
the party's election strategy, Sadiku emphasized the LDK's
"return to its original values" and selection of "honest" and
"intellectual" new candidates, especially at the municipal
level, where the party has kept only a few incumbent mayors
on its ticket. Both Sadiku and Jerliu acknowledged that the
LDK would need to address voters' future concerns rather than
merely stressing final status and its heritage as the "party
of Rugova," but gave little indication of a plan for doing
so. LDK campaign billboards prominently feature Rugova and
the slogan "On the Right Path."


3. (C) Jerliu and Sadiku both said they expected the LDK to
remain the largest party, though Sadiku acknowledged that it
was likely to be so by only a narrow margin. Both insisted
the LDK would field its own candidate for Prime Minister, to
give the LDK a chance to govern and end the "privileging of
small parties" that gave the much-smaller AAK the key role in
government. (The nomination of a prime ministerial candidate
is still a matter of some dispute within the party, with some
acknowledging that the LDK lacks a strong figure and could
harm itself by nominating the wrong person.) Speculating on
possible coalition partners, Jerliu suggested the
(mathematically unlikely) option of a majority coalition
between the LDK and Serb and other minority parties. Sadiku
said that in his opinion a coalition with the PDK, even with
Thaci as Prime Minister, would be the best option. This
ambivalence is reflected widely in the party, with some LDK
luminaries willing to consider a "grand coalition" with the
PDK and others far less inclined to let bygones be bygones,
even if Kosovo status demands a unified political approach.

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(Comment: Key to the LDK's coalition-building strategy will
likely be the electoral strength of smaller parties including
the AAK; if AAK garners a significant percentage of the vote
-- hard to assess at this stage -- the temptation will grow
within LDK to avoid a costly coalition arrangement with PDK.)

AAK Running Hard to Stay in Place


4. (C) In separate meetings on October 17 and 18, AAK Deputy
President and Assembly Presidency member Naim Maloku and
Assembly caucus leader Gjylnaze Syla told poloffs that the
AAK will face a difficult campaign with Ramush Haradinaj
absent and the party strapped for cash after it (and, by
implication, much of its donor base) has had to fund
Haradinaj's multimillion-euro war crimes defense in The
Hague. Maloku said the party's strategy focuses on having
its key leaders campaign in their home regions, where they
are trying to drum up support through friends and family
connections, and where some were funding their own campaigns.
Syla noted that the AAK would rely heavily on door-to-door
and other low-budget campaigning. (While Haradinaj's defense
has undoubtedly been a hardship for AAK fundraising efforts,
the ubiquitous "With Ramush" and new "With the Prime
Minister" billboards suggest that the party still has some
available funds.) Maloku claimed the AAK expected to win 10
or 11 percent of the vote, but not more. Turning to
post-election politics, Maloku said the AAK wants Haradinaj
to return as Prime Minister, and implied that the party will
be flexible in its choice of coalition partners.
Interestingly, we have heard that clandestine approaches have
been made by PDK and its party leader, Hashim Thaci, to the
AAK, long arch-rivals for the affections of former KLA
supporters. AAK's position -- cautious but not outright
hostile -- has been to wait for the outcome of the vote and
calculate options on that basis.

PDK Prepared With Detailed Program


5. (C) PDK officials Bajram Rexhepi, Enver Hoxhaj, Flora
Brovina, and Hajredin Kuci told poloffs in separate meetings
that the PDK plans to avoid negative campaigning and will
instead stress its proposals for addressing concrete issues
of concern to citizens. Rexhepi noted that the party will
focus on rule of law, economic reform, energy, education, and
health care, and said the party had taken care to remove "old
communist-style thinkers" to sharpen its focus on
privatization and economic reform. Hoxhaj, the party's point
man for education and a knowledgeable observer of economic
policy, gave poloff a detailed readout of the party's
specific proposals on reforming the tax structure to
encourage domestic production, retooling the education system
to generate a workforce with the most marketable skills, and
other issues. Already looking ahead to appointments, Kuci
floated the idea of a PDK government putting the Ministry of
Justice, rather than the Ministry of Agriculture, under Serb
leadership and making Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija
(SLKM) MP Dragisa Krstovic Justice Minister. Well-known and
often controversial figure Edita Tahiri, who joined the PDK's
election list along with her Democratic Alternative of Kosovo
(ADK) party, told poloffs separately that she allied with the
PDK because she was impressed with its "center-right"
economic reform plans and Thaci's statement to her that he
would choose whichever coalition partner and appointees
receive U.S. and EU support.


6. (C) PDK leaders have not publicly stated their coalition
preferences, but Rexhepi echoed to poloff what has been
patently obvious for months: that the party's first choice
would be a coalition with the LDK, giving Hashim Thaci the
undisputed shot at the prime ministership. Rexhepi --
loyally following the party line -- observed that relations
between the parties had improved considerably since the
bitter postwar period (and even further with the leadership
succession in the LDK) and was optimistic a coalition could
work. Flora Brovina likewise observed that the LDK would be
the best coalition partner, since it was comparatively
uncorrupt relative to the LDD or AAK. In the past week,

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numerous PDK billboards have gone up around Kosovo,
prominently featuring PDK leader Hashim Thaci and the slogan
"Proud of Kosovo."

ORA Pledges Positive Campaign


7. (C) Like the PDK, ORA Deputy President Ylber Hysa told
poloff on October 17 that ORA intended to run a "positive"
campaign focused on economic and social issues rather than on
Kosovo's final status or on criticizing the government. He
estimated that the party would receive 9 or 10 percent of the
vote (we think that's a vast overestimate; ORA may struggle
to even reach the 5 percent threshhold for Albanian parties),
but declined to speculate on preferred coalition partners,
instead noting that the party could see itself either in
government or in opposition, depending on available options.
Building on its traditional base of younger voters, ORA has
begun sponsoring rock concerts around Kosovo. (Comment:
Entirely shameless, ORA posters around Kosovo feature ORA
leader Veton Surroi shaking hands with President Bush. The
photo was taken from a meeting earlier this year in Prague
between President Bush and democratic activists from around
the world. End Comment.)

LDD Stresses Appeal of Individual Candidates


8. (C) LDD General Secretary Lulzim Zeneli told poloff on
October 16 that the party was relying on voters' trust in its
candidates, since voters' "Balkan mentality" disposed them to
look at specific candidates rather than parties. LDD leaders
are counting on voters' confidence in their "sincerity,"
which they plan to bolster by not making promises they cannot
keep, such as specific dates for Kosovo's independence.
(Zeneli gave no sign of concern that party chairman Daci's
role in past corruption scandals might affect voters' trust
in the LDD's candidates.) Zeneli noted that the LDD's strong
women's forum and youth forum would help its campaign
prospects. The LDD also plans some large rallies and
additional smaller, more informal meetings. Zeneli observed
-- and we agree -- that LDD has particularly good prospects
in municipal elections in some areas of eastern Kosovo, and
that the party's coalition with the Albanian Christian
Democratic Party (PSHDK) would help it in Klina and Gjakova.
Asked about post-election coalition prospects, Zeneli argued
that "the era of big parties" is over and that several
parties would be necessary to form a majority coalition, so
the LDD would evaluate its options after the election.
Perhaps reflecting its strong diaspora ties, LDD has a slick
website with frequent election-related updates. Unlike the
other parties, as of October 24 LDD did not appear to have
any campaign billboards up around town.

AKR Emphasizes Economic Policy and Pacolli


9. (C) At a meeting with poloffs on October 18, AKR Deputy
Presidents Ibrahim Gashi and Fadil Maloku and Women's Forum
head Rita Hazeraj said the AKR is a "liberal democratic
party" focused on economic policy. They criticized the
established parties' focus on Kosovo's status to the
exclusion of post-status issues, noting that "Kosovo needs
not only independence, but also independence from poverty."
(Note: This is Pacolli's stump speech, and his ubiquitous TV
and billboad ads are about jobs, jobs and more jobs. His
party also has the most visible presence on the ground, with
offices even in remote communities.) AKR officials detailed
the party's tax and economic reform plans, including efforts
to create jobs through improved agricultural productivity and
an improved climate for small businesses. They noted their
support for regional economic cooperation, including on
energy issues, and stressed the need for foreign investment,
especially by the U.S. They also claimed to support
instituting a U.S.-style presidential system, including
direct election of the president.


10. (C) Gashi and Maloku told poloffs that the AKR would
only join a coalition if other parties would accept its
platform, so was unlikely to join a coalition led by another

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party. In an implicit recognition that an AKR-led coalition
is unlikely to result from this election, the AKR leaders
said they regarded Kosovo politics as "a marathon, not a
sprint" and that they would use a role in opposition or in
power at the municipal level to gain support for their
policies in preparation for future elections. Maloku
acknowledged that the party recognizes it is viewed with
suspicion by other parties and some members of the public due
to party leader Pacolli's prior experience working on
construction projects for Russian authorities, and said he
had advised Pacolli to "never mention Russia again" in his
public comments. (Comments by leaders of other parties this
week suggest the AKR leaders' concerns about the party's
image are valid. Officials of the LDK, PDK, and ADK all
brought up the AKR as an example of a party with which they
would be reluctant to seek a coalition because of suspicion
about Pacolli's prior connections. Pacolli's image has also
been damaged in the aftermath of the recent murder of KPS
officer Triumf Riza, with much popular speculation regarding
Pacolli's alleged ties to suspected mobster Enver Sekiraqa,
thought to be involved in the murder. END COMMENT.)


11. (C) COMMENT: Boastful predictions and doubtful
projections aside, it appears that most of the parties have a
realistic understanding of their chances in these elections
and are keen to keep their options open for post-election
coalition making. That augurs well for both the civility of
the election campaign itself and the behavior of key leaders
as part of the continuing Unity Team effort. Still, the
coalition-building process after elections is bound to be
contentious and sensitive. Much will depend on the
performance of the parties, which is almost impossible to
predict accurately in Kosovo, with the heavy influence of
clan leaders and parties' geographic ties playing a large
role in determining outcomes. We would be rash to make our
own predictions, or to give too much credence to the polls
that favor one party or another; rather, we should be
prepared to urge that Kosovo's leaders act responsibly and
quickly in the wake of elections to form a government that
reflects the larger interests of the status process and
Kosovo's Ahtisaari commitments. We will continue to follow
developments and prompt all sides to remember their pledge to
conduct themselves with restraint throughout the campaign.
End comment.


KAIDANOW