Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PRISTINA492
2007-06-25 07:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Pristina
Cable title:  

KOSOVO: KFOR AND UNMIK POLICE BRIEF ON READINESS

Tags:  PGOV KJUS KCRM EAID KDEM UNMIK YI 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000492 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, DRL, INL, AND S/WCI, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN
FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER, OPDAT FOR
ACKER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCRM EAID KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: KFOR AND UNMIK POLICE BRIEF ON READINESS


Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000492

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, DRL, INL, AND S/WCI, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN
FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER, OPDAT FOR
ACKER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCRM EAID KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: KFOR AND UNMIK POLICE BRIEF ON READINESS


Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The KFOR commander and UNMIK police
commissioner recently provided updates on their readiness
posture as the status process moves into July and beyond.
Both have focused on immediate challenges, including the June
23-28 presence in Kosovo of "marchers" from Serbia who will
culminate their visit with the construction of a provocative
monument in north Mitrovica on June 27 and then continue
south to Gazimestan on June 28 (the Serbian Vidovdan
holiday),as well as the projected June 30 demonstration in
Pristina organized by the Self-Determination Movement. KFOR
and UNMIK police have also, individually and jointly, engaged
in planning for longer-term scenarios as well as operational
exercises designed to enhance readiness. Both acknowledge,
however, that while the situation on the ground remains calm,
it is, in COMKFOR's words, "complex and volatile" and
watchfulness remains the key mantra on the security front.
End summary.

UNMIK Commissioner Monk: UNMIK (P) Planning


2. (C) On June 20, UNMIK Police Commissioner Monk gave
assembled Contact Group liaison offices a fairly upbeat
assessment of UNMIK police capabilities and planning. He
noted in particular that by August, UNMIK will have nearly
its full complement of 1565 officers, up from the current

1497. Monk cited excellent cooperation with the EU Planning
Team in putting together transition plans for handover to the
ESDP Rule of Law mission following a UNSC resolution, and
claimed that special efforts were underway to ensure that
sensitive police investigations would not fall through the
cracks during the transition.


3. (C) Monk raised two immediate challenges faced by UNMIK
police, the first occurring in the June 23-28 timeframe as
marchers from Serbia make their way into northern Kosovo for

a week-long celebration of the Serbian "Vidovdan" holiday,
culminating in the commemoration of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo
Polje at the Gazimestan monument near Pristina on June 28.
Monk expressed confidence that UNMIK police, working closely
with KFOR, could handle the events associated with the march.



4. (C) UNMIK and KFOR plan to escort buses carrying
participants from Gate 1 of the administrative boundary line
with Serbia and from Serb enclaves, such as Gracanica, to the
Gazimestan site. (An associated ceremony, also being closely
followed by KFOR and UNMIK police, is planned on June 27 in
north Mitrovica, where participants will place an angel on
the top of already existing monument to symbolize the plight
of the Serb community in Kosovo.) Participants are not
expected to number more than 100, though there is the
possibility of radical Serbian elements, such as the "Tsar
Lazar" movement, joining the activities. UNMIK police are
working through police contacts in Serbia to try and ensure
that such radical elements are contained or prevented from
joining the march. (Note: Embassy Belgrade will also
intercede with Serbian Interior Minister Jocic to make this
point.)


5. (C) Monk's other focus was on the projected June 30
demonstration of the Self-Determination Movement.
Acknowledging the mistakes made during the February 10 SDM
protest, in which two demonstrators were killed by Romanian
riot control police, Monk and his aides indicated that the
same successful tactics would be employed on June 30 that had
kept the last SDM event peaceful on March 31: close
cooperation with KFOR and defining in advance the route that
protesters would take. (Comment: With firebrand SDM leader
Kurti still in pre-trial detention, it is unlikely the June
30 event will escalate into anything significant. However,
SDM leaders have thus far refused to meet with the KPS
spokesman Veton Elshani, as they have done in the past, to
agree on details. Elshani tells us he is still pursuing this
channel of communication. There are also rumblings that war
veterans, frustrated by the delay in status, may throw in

PRISTINA 00000492 002 OF 002


their lot with MSD, though thus far USOP intercession has
helped convince the veterans to avoid such a course. End
Comment.)

KFOR: Keeping an ear to the ground, ready for contingencies


6. (C) COMKFOR LTG Roland Kather (Germany) assembled heads
of liaison offices the evening of June 20 for a similar
briefing, this one focusing on KFOR preparations for the
uncertainties accompanying a prolonged status process.
Kather and his Chief of Staff BG Al Bryant (U.S.) described
their view of the security situation as "calm but volatile
and complex," noting that they viewed the period immediately
following the Bush/Putin summit at the beginning of July as
the next potentially sensitive time given mounting public
expectations of the summit's outcome. COSKFOR outlined
KFOR's operational objectives during this period of
uncertainty and public anxiety: reassuring the population of
KFOR's commitment to security; increasing situational
awareness through increased patrols and interaction with the
people; deterring non-compliant groups; and engaging with
other members of the international community to ensure full
coordination. COSKFOR made it clear that KFOR was watching a
number of potential hot spots, including Pristina and
Mitrovica, but also a variety of smaller towns and villages
primarily in eastern and central Kosovo.


7. (C) COSKFOR reviewed what he termed KFOR's "enhanced
readiness posture," which involved the presence and rehearsal
of out-of-theater forces (including, currently, a 500-man
Italian infantry battalion which KFOR has requested remain in
Kosovo till July 12, operating in the Zubin Potok and upper
Drenica areas, and a 200-man Czech reinforced company in the
Podujevo region; German ORF forces were also in Kosovo in the
April-March timeframe) and the exercising of MNTF reserve
forces from within Kosovo (9 companies on a 12-hour alert)
and from the EU TacRes in Bosnia (which recently rehearsed
movements into Kosovo from Bosnia through both Serbian and
Montenegrin routes). COSKFOR also detailed a marked increase
in the number of focused KFOR operations over the last 30
days throughout Kosovo, each consisting of 2-3 companies
(100-300 soldiers) over 3-5 days -- all in addition to KFOR's
daily patrol activities consisting of some 220 individual
patrols and 60 vehicle checkpoints.


8. (C) COM and COSKFOR pointed to other planning and
coordination efforts with a wide range of interlocutors and
organizations, starting with UNMIK police and KPS, but
including as well the Serbian CHOD and the Serbian Minister
for Kosovo. Noting the difficulty of planning for every
possible political scenario, they nevertheless emphasized the
value of readiness, and gave at least tentative outlines of
their posture in the pre-UNSCR phase, on resolution day (or a
day in which the Kosovars declare independence unilaterally),
and in the post-resolution period. COMKFOR asserted that he
had instituted a "ten-minute rule": whatever happens, KFOR
can be on the spot within ten minutes. He also reviewed with
liaison office heads KFOR's policy with regard to assisting
members of the international community in the event of a mass
evacuation; he underscored that KFOR's primary mission
remained the maintenance of a safe and secure environment in
Kosovo, but said KFOR would assist within "means and
capabilities" to help get everyone out.


9. (C) Comment: There is an elevated level of planning and
coordination within and among key security elements in
Kosovo, but the uncertainty of the status process leaves
planners hamstrung in their effort to ensure full
preparedness. We continue to review with KFOR and with UNMIK
(P) the possible parameters of security threats in this
volatile time, and we will provide back insights they glean
from interaction with Kosovars on the ground.
KAIDANOW