KOSOVO: SERB RETURNS HAMPERED BY A COMPLEX MIX OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRISTINA 000404

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, SCRS, DRL, INL, PRM, AND S/WCI, NSC FOR
BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREF UNMIK EAID YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SERB RETURNS HAMPERED BY A COMPLEX MIX OF
FACTORS

REF: A. PRISTINA 56


B. PRISTINA 336


1. (C) SUMMARY: There have been 16,458 cases of known
minority returns to Kosovo since the 1999 conflict out of an
estimated population of 230,000 displaced persons. Current
impediments include most prominently lack of employment
opportunities, concerns (real and exaggerated) over security,
poor social services, residual property related issues, lack
of funds for major reconstruction of housing, and --
increasingly -- negative pressure from hardline Serb
political leaders. The Kosovo government has spent millions
of euro on returns projects, but the models used for these
returns vary and have a large impact on success. In the case
of large organized returns, the failure of several projects -
Zociste, Srbski Babush, Babljak, Svinjare, Belo Polje, and
Istog - make it clear that even if houses are rebuilt, Serbs
may not necessarily come back. In contrast, the
PRM-supported model of facilitated individual and small-group
return projects, as well as support after arrival to
spontaneous returns, has proven to be more economical and
sustainable. NGOs and representatives of Serb IDPs also
confirm that it will be important to support the existing
Serb community in Kosovo if there is hope for further
returns; we agree strongly, and will continue to press local
authorities as well as the relevant international agencies to
resolve property issues in particular as a sign of commitment
to future return. The government in Belgrade could help
avoid an exodus of existing Serb communities, as well, by
reassuring Serbs in Kosovo that no matter what the status
decision, financial support for salaries and pensions will
not be disrupted and will continue to flow. END SUMMARY.

RETURNS TO DATE


2. (U) International organizations including UNDP and
UNHCR, together with the PISG, NGOs, and bilateral donors,
have supported 16,458 minority individuals who have returned
to Kosovo since 1999. The USG, through State's Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM),supported from 25
to 50 percent of these returns on an annual basis. Of those
returning, 43 percent were Serbs, 26 percent
Askhali/Egyptian, 12 percent Roma, 9 percent Bosniak, 4
percent Gorani, and 4 percent Albanian. Returns per year
reached a peak of 3,801 in 2003, declining to only 1,622 in

2006. According to UNHCR statistics from 2006, 45 percent of
the returns were spontaneous, 25 percent organized, and 30
percent facilitated. Organized returns, or returns of
generally twenty or more families -- often to newly
constructed settlements -- have proven far more expensive
than individual returns. For example, a PRM-facilitated
returnee costs up to $10,000, including minor shelter repair
and income generation, whereas a returnee supported through
an organized project costs 22,000 to 40,000 euros, according
to UNMIK's Office of Communities, Returns, and Migration
(OCRM).

ORGANIZED RETURNS: IF YOU BUILD IT, WILL THEY COME?


3. (U) Despite (or perhaps because of) expenditures of
significant political and economic capital on returns, most
of the highest profile organized returns projects in Kosovo
have failed to attract permanent returnees. The reasons for
minorities not returning are case specific, ranging from
uncertainty over status, lack of employment opportunities,
unresolved property issues, security concerns, disputes among
local leaders, inadequate access to public services, and,
increasingly, pressure from the hardline Serb leadership in
Kosovo. Despite claims by some Serbs that security was the
driving factor in their reluctance to return, lack of jobs
and negative political pressure appeared to be the most
consistent obstacle to return across the spectrum of
large-scale projects: Zociste, Srbski Babush, Babljak,
Svinjare, Belo Polje, and Istog.


4. (SBU) Zociste village (Rahovec/Orahovac municipality)

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was the pet project of the former Minister for Communities
and Returns, Slavisa Petkovic, who was removed by PM Ceku
under a cloud of corruption charges in November 2006.
Started in 2003, the PISG spent 1.4 million euros on the
construction of 44 houses (41 Serb, 3 Albanian),
infrastructure, and a health clinic. During our visit in May
2007, only two Serb monks had returned. (Note: KFOR is
protecting the church where the monks live. End note.) Serbs
from Zociste are conditioning their return on the provision
of running water and sanitation, which the PISG has agreed to
provide. Current Minister of Communities and Returns
Branlslav Grbic told us that once these facilities exist, the
Serbs will return. However, the project contains no income
generation component, making its economic sustainability
questionable.


5. (SBU) At 2.4 million euros, Srbski Babush village
(Ferizaj/Urosevac municipality),located 40 kilometers south
of Pristina, is the largest and most expensive returns
project in Kosovo funded by the PISG. The reconstruction
work on 74 houses and a school was completed in December 2006
with a major balancing infrastructure component in the
neighboring Albanian village of Surcina. As of May 2007, no
Serbs had returned, although five had taken delivery of their
furniture. Serb village representatives expressed
dissatisfaction with their reconstructed homes, concerns
about the local school curriculum, and demanded additional
grants for furniture, income generation, a police substation,
and a communal poultry farm, which is currently out to
tender. One UNDP official told us "everything is perfect;
there is nothing more we can put in (Babush). It now depends
on people returning to make the (income generation) part
work." UNDP and the ministry cite pressure on village
leaders from former Minister Petkovic, who does not want to
see the project succeed without him, as a key driving force
against the returns.


6. (U) In the mixed rural community across from Babush,
Babljak village (Ferizaj/Urosevac municipality),the PISG
funded the reconstruction of 17 Serb houses, repaired two
Albanian houses, built a new school and a health clinic, and
completed electrical work on 32 Albanian and Serb houses.
There is no economic sustainability component to the project,
but the project implementer provides food and daily transport
from Babljak to the Serb-majority areas of Gusterica and
Gracanica. Twenty-three Serbs returned to Babljak in August
2003; as of May 2007, 15 of the 23 reportedly stay the night,
with the rest living elsewhere in Kosovo, where they found
jobs.


7. (SBU) Svinjare is a mixed agricultural community located
three kilometers south of Mitrovica whose residents
historically worked at the Trepca mine and battery factory.
The recent UNSC delegation that visited Kosovo drove through
Svinjare and received a briefing on reconstruction efforts
there (ref b). With PISG funding, and as one of the 13
Contact Group Priority Standards, 137 houses destroyed during
the March 2004 violence were rebuilt. Former Svinjare
residents expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of
construction, demanded reconstruction of secondary buildings,
grants of 2000 euros, and a local police station. To address
these concerns, the Ministry transferred 167,000 euros to the
municipality's budget. Secondary buildings were
reconstructed, and a local police station was established at
the entrance to the village. However, as of May 2007, only
one family (which returned almost immediately after the March
2004 riots) lives permanently in the village. In summer
months, other families visit daily to tend their gardens,
taking the 3 pm train back to Zvecan, where some live in
relative luxury and others in squalor (ref a). Seven Serbs
have sold their houses in Svinjare to Albanians; others have
expressed an interest in selling. Reported reasons for
Svinjare's failure include dissatisfaction with the
reconstruction, concerns about security, and political
pressure. UNMIK/OCRM told us -- and we have confirmed this
with several former Serb residents -- that the position of

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the hardline Serb leadership in Kosovo's north opposing any
return is the primary hindrance.


8. (U) Belo Polje is a suburb of Peja municipality, western
Kosovo, where 82 houses were reconstructed in 2002/2003 with
funds from the PISG and the Danish government. In the March
2004 violence, the houses were burned and the people
displaced again. After subsequent reconstruction, some
residents returned, but the numbers are declining because
there are no economic opportunities. As of May 2007, less
than ten Serbs remained. In one other major effort, the
Russian government granted two million dollars to the Serbian
Coordination Center for Kosovo (CCK) to fund the
reconstruction of 45 houses in Lug and Blagaca village
(Istog/Istok municipality). There are presently only fifteen
families who have returned; the municipality of Istog put in
a new water system after the Serbs requested it. Like
Babljak, the project includes no income generation component.


PISG: ORGANIZED RETURNS CAN BE SUCCESSFUL


9. (U) Since its creation, the PISG has spent more than 40
million euro on returns. Current Minister of Communities and
Returns Grbic gave us the following breakdown of the 2007
budget: four organized returns projects encompassing half of
the total budget of 5.2 million euro, 500,000 euro for
individual returns, and two million euro for community
projects. Grbic explained that the ministry will leverage
its relatively low investment in individual returns against
significant funding from UNDP for the reconstruction of
houses. Asked about the failure of previous PISG-funded
organized return projects, Grbic pointed to the large size of
the projects and political dynamics as the main sources of
problems. He stressed that the initial assessment process
needs to be expanded to provide a detailed profile with
information on returnees' technical skills that can inform
location and income generation decisions. He also said that
the ministry will prioritize urban returns, mid-sized
projects (20-30 families),and projects that build on
previous successful return sites, like Klinavac village in
Klina municipality. Grbic believes that by applying these
lessons, organized returns can be successful.

FACTORS FOR SUCCESS


10. (U) Despite the overall poor track record of organized
returns in Kosovo, some successes exist. These projects tend
to have in common a beneficiary-driven process, facilitation
of dialogue between the local community and the returnees to
prepare the community to accept their old neighbors back, and
an income generation component to ensure returnees have
economic opportunities. One such example is Klinavac village
(Klina municipality). Seventeen Serb and five Roma families
returned to Klinavac village in November 2006. The project,
implemented by Klina municipality in cooperation with UNDP,
included infrastructure work, 2,000 euro grants per family
for the acquisition of the necessary machines and tools, and
two communal tractors. UNDP also plans to build a milk
collection center. Returnees have expressed satisfaction
with the assistance provided, and requested a small grocery
and new school for the village.

COMMENT


11. (C) A complex mix of factors has hampered the return of
Serbs to Kosovo. Poor planning, an overall lack of economic
opportunity, real or perceived fears among Serbs about
freedom of movement and security, diminished resources from
international donors, and the reality of continued lack of
trust between the two ethnic communities makes these returns
a continuing challenge. The Kosovo government has gone a
distance towards trying to address some of these issues, and
has invested substantial sums in the reconstruction of homes,
but drags its feet on other key factors that might encourage
returns, including implementation of property provisions that

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would return agricultural and commercial properties to their
Serb owners.


12. (C) Increasingly, as well, the issue of returns has
become a political football used by the hardline Serb
leadership to demonstrate that an independent Kosovo cannot
be trusted to care for its minority population. The large
gathering of IDPs and refugees at the Serbian-Kosovo border
during the recent UN Security Council visit -- supposedly
spontaneously organized but in fact sponsored by the northern
Serb leadership -- was just the latest example of the
politicization of the IDP issue. We continue to work through
a variety of means to put in place the conditions for
returns, though we agree with the assessment of a Serb NGO
representative who made clear to COM recently that the
existing Serb population in Kosovo must be nurtured and
sustained if further returns are to succeed. The regime in
Belgrade could help with this by reassuring Serb residents of
Kosovo that, no matter what the status outcome, payments of
salaries and pensions will continue unabated and Kosovo Serbs
need not fear a cutoff of their financial support from
Belgrade under any circumstances. Whether Belgrade will
agree to do so is a test of their real concern for the Serb
community in Kosovo vice their intent to use Serbs here for
their own political purposes. End Comment.
KAIDANOW