Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PRISTINA362
2007-05-07 15:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Pristina
Cable title:  

KOSOVO: FUTURE STAND-UP OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN

Tags:  PGOV KJUS KCRM EAID KDEM UNMIK YI 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7329
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1144
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
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RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON PRIORITY
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE PRIORITY
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RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUFOANA/USNIC PRISTINA SR PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRISTINA 000362 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, DRL, INL, AND S/WCI, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN
FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017
TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCRM EAID KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: FUTURE STAND-UP OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS

Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4(B) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRISTINA 000362

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, DRL, INL, AND S/WCI, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN
FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017
TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCRM EAID KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: FUTURE STAND-UP OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS

Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4(B) and (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) has
the lead and has made progress on plans to stand up a new
Kosovo Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) after the status
decision is made. Budget, organizational structure, and
necessary legislation have already been drafted as part of
the larger post-status transition from UNMIK to the Kosovo
government. Some tasks remain, such as renovating the UNMIK
annex currently planned to house the MFA, completing office
and position descriptions, and recruiting and training staff.
OPM believes this progress has been possible because the
work has taken place largely outside of the sometimes
cumbersome transition working group structure. However, this
relatively non-transparent process remains a sore point for
some, in particular the opposition ORA party, which says it
only learned about the MFA planning through the media.
Although the OPM is committed to a professional diplomatic
service in the longer term, in the short term political
battles loom over the locations and number of embassies, and
appointments of Kosovo,s first Minister of Foreign Affairs
and ambassadors. It is highly likely that the minister and
most other politically-appointed staff will come from the
senior governing coalition partner, the Democratic League of
Kosovo (LDK). At this point, Austria appears to be the lead
country in providing diplomatic training and assistance; at
the appropriate time, we could look for ways to plug into
this, including possibly bringing the head of training to the
Foreign Service Institute. END SUMMARY.

Status of the Transition Planning Process


2. (SBU) Besnik Tahiri, public policy adviser to PM Ceku and
co-Chair of the Governance Working Group (GWG),along with
the British development agency DFID, the office of the Deputy

Prime Minister, and the former head of the British Office
(now funded by the EU),began the technical work on standing
up an MFA in fall 2006. The two laws this group drafted -
establishing the MFA and addressing diplomatic status,
immunities, and privileges in Kosovo - were presented in
February 2007 to the GWG along with a draft resolution
confirming Kosovo's voluntary adherence to ten pages of
international treaties and conventions. These two laws and
the resolution are set to be introduced and passed during the
120-day transition period after a new UNSC resolution on
Kosovo has been approved, together with a raft of other
transition-related legislation.


3. (SBU) Outside the framework of the GWG, however, and
without explicit sanction from opposition parties, the Prime
Minister's office has also drafted a 140-page report (later
leaked to the media) that lays out a proposed budget,
salaries, locations of the initial fourteen embassies,
organizational structure, and MFA objectives for the first
eighteen months. Work is now beginning on a comprehensive
training strategy, detailed office descriptions, and position
descriptions. Negotiations are ongoing for the MFA to be
located in the UNMIK annex building in Pristina after that
building reverts to the Kosovo government. Complications
have primarily centered on the date that UNMIK would be able
to transfer the building. Since some renovations would be
required, the OPM would like to have access to the building
as soon as possible to reduce the period when temporary
accommodations would be required. Tahiri is pushing for the
recruitment of civil servants to begin in the near future,
but the plan assumes that formal recruitment would not be
completed until the end of the summer. Final political
decisions remain on salaries, exactly which embassies to open
within the first year, and how many of the ambassadors and
ministry staff will be political appointees.

Objectives for the First Eighteen Months


4. (SBU) The draft law establishing the MFA sets forth as
objectives early membership in the UN, World Bank, IMF, and
Council of Europe, and achieving broad support among other
members in organizations subject to a Serbian veto. Other

PRISTINA 00000362 002 OF 004


stated (and probably unachievable in this timeframe) aims
include: receiving a Partnership for Peace invitation from
the NATO Summit in 2008; completing the process of treaty
succession with key bilateral partners and multilateral
organizations; assisting with one or more peacekeeping
operations; and supporting other ministries in negotiating
treaties of significance to foreign investors or to the rule
of law.


5. (SBU) In relation to Serbia, the draft calls for
negotiating a reapportioning of Serbian sovereign debt,
initiating a policy dialogue, and influencing Serbian public
opinion in a more favorable direction with regard to Kosovo,
as well as developing a strategy to address unresolved
Kosovar claims (e.g., pensions, frozen foreign currency
deposits) and pursuing solutions to economic issues (e.g.,
overflight rights). More broadly, the draft describes other
key goals: finally and officially resolving the border issue
with Macedonia, replacing the Kosovo-Macedonian provisional
Free Trade Agreement with a permanent treaty, providing
consular assistance abroad for Kosovar citizens, and
initiating close contacts with diaspora organizations, who
are seen as the most likely initial foreign investors in
Kosovo.

Structure of the Ministry


6. (SBU) Under the OPM plan, the ministry would be organized
with a Minister,s Office, a Deputy Minister, a Principal
Political Adviser, and a Permanent Secretary reporting
directly to the Minister. Reporting to the Permanent
Secretary would be five offices: Consular Affairs; Legal

SIPDIS
Affairs and Human Rights; Media; Protocol; and Internal
Audit. There are also three individuals who would report
directly to the Permanent Secretary: the Director General,
who has under him/her a Deputy and three policy sections
(Strategy and Economic Affairs, International Relations and
Security Policy, and Regional Affairs); a Director of Budget
and Finance; and a Director of General Administration (Human
Resources, Administration, Procurement, and Translation). By
the end of the first year, the MFA would according to the
plan have 148 staff, with 64 individuals in the main ministry
and 84 individuals in fourteen embassies.


7. (C) These embassies, ranging in size from 2-10 people,
would be in the following countries: the U.S. (Washington
D.C., also covering the World Bank and the IMF); UK; France;
Germany; Italy; Austria (also covering the OSCE);
Switzerland; Albania; Croatia; Macedonia; Montenegro;
Slovenia; the United Nations (New York - initially a
Consulate-General); and the European Commission/European
Union (Brussels). Tahiri pointed to funding limitations, and
said there might be pressure to add Greece, Turkey, China,
Russia, and Serbia to the list. He argued that Greece's
proximity makes it possible to fulfill those diplomatic
functions from Pristina. He also acknowledged that China,
Russia, and Serbia are unlikely to recognize Kosovo's
independence and allow the opening of an embassy, but
speculated that a liaison office of some sort would be needed
with at least Serbia, even if done under an economic rubric.


8. (SBU) There is some debate on how much of a role the new
embassies should play in consular affairs versus carrying out
Kosovo,s international diplomatic strategy. Kosovo has a
large diaspora in the U.S, Germany, Switzerland, and Austria;
under the proposed Ahtisaari settlement &all persons...
residing outside Kosovo who left Kosovo on or after 1 January
1998 and on the date of the entry into force of this
Settlement meet the criteria for being registered as a
habitual resident shall have the right to vote.8
Significant numbers may either want to return to Kosovo, or
be forced to return to Kosovo by their current host nation.
There is a risk that embassies would be overwhelmed with
issues related to immigration, repatriation, voting, and
documentation. Discussions are ongoing, but planning
recognizes that the new embassies will have some consular
role.

PRISTINA 00000362 003 OF 004



Budget


9. (SBU) The total MFA budget for the first full year
(mid-2007 to mid-2008) is estimated at 6.833 million euro.
This amount assumes legislation establishing the ministry is
passed in late summer, embassies are established in
Fall-Winter 2007 in rudimentary, medium-cost hotel rooms, a
rent-free ministry headquarters building is located, and
there is donor-funded training. In subsequent years the
budget is projected to increase as embassies transition from
hotels to permanent locations and as the number of locations
increase; the budget in 2010 (highly speculative) is
estimated at 15 million euro. The budget has been initially
reviewed by the Ministry of Finance and Economy. It will be
revised again before being integrated into the Kosovo
Comprehensive Budget in June. The OPM and its advisors are
considering a variety of cost-saving measures, including
using volunteer staff and donated space for embassies and
co-locating embassies.

The Looming Question: Who Will Fill the Positions?


10. (C) The ruling LDK party sees the MFA as their ministry,
and will likely determine who becomes foreign minister. LDK
names that have been floated to USOP staff include Skender
Hyseni (chief political advisor to President Sejdiu),Sabri
Hamiti (General Council Member and party representative to
the Kosovo Assembly presidency, also the Chair of the
Assembly's Committee on International Cooperation and
Integration into the EU),and Lutfi Haziri (Deputy PM and
Minister of Local Government). Hyseni has been cited at
least once in the press as a candidate. (Comment: It is a
widely known secret that Veton Surroi, chair of the small ORA
party and whose father was a prominent Yugoslav diplomat,
sees himself as Kosovo,s first foreign minister. This may
explain ORA,s irritation at the overall non-transparency of
the planning by the Prime Minister's office. End Comment.)


11. (SBU) Whatever the outcome, our conversations with those
involved suggest ambassadorial posts will clearly be
determined in the short term by political agreements in
Pristina. While some parties have raised the idea of using
members of the Kosovar diaspora as ambassadors, most if not
all of the initial fourteen will likely be political
appointees from the larger parties. However, the draft law
on the establishment of the foreign ministry states that
after five years, at least fifty percent of new appointments
of heads of mission or ambassadors must come from serving
members of the Kosovo Diplomatic Service. OPM and its
advisors emphasize their commitment to professionalize this
service, and have said repeatedly that one of their measures
of success in the short term is the recruitment of young,
energetic, professional civil servants, and in the longer
term, a reduction in the number of political appointees
serving as heads of mission.

Austria Lead Donor Country, Other Needed Assistance


12. (SBU) The OPM and its advisers favor a Kosovo-based
training program, assisted by one primary donor. Given its
ongoing conversations with Pristina University, Austria
appears to be the most likely candidate to lead. OPM
advisers have raised the need for a Human
Rights/International Law expert to work with the ministry,
which would most appropriately be filled by a European, as
well as the need for secure communications equipment. OPM,s
British adviser expressed concern to us that a comprehensive
training strategy is lacking, and that donors will offer
one-off programs that will not be well coordinated or help
train ministry staff in skills like cable writing and
classification of documents. The OPM advisers' preference is
for a &virtual academy8 in Kosovo, where either Pristina
University or the Kosovo Institute of Public Administration
would contract out courses, but retain central control of the
comprehensive training program. Austria,s Diplomatic
Academy of Vienna has already been in conversations with

PRISTINA 00000362 004 OF 004


Pristina University on developing a joint training program to
do this; DFID and other donors have begun to propose programs
as well.


13. (C) COMMENT: The PISG, aided by some able international
advisers, has made some good progress on planning to
establish Kosovo's first Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but at
the cost of excluding opposition parties from much of the
planning, which will almost certainly cause problems down the
road. The lack of transparency -- different from most other
aspects of the transition planning process -- was in some
measure dictated by the EU and British approach, which
focused on the government and the PM's office as the locus of
planning. With regard to the future development of the
diplomatic service, it makes sense that one country -- in
this instance, Austria -- has stepped forward to take the
lead on providing diplomatic training and assistance. We may
in future look for ways to add value, including possibly
bringing the head of the training program to the Foreign
Service Institute and/or local universities such as
Georgetown, to share best practices and information on
structuring diplomatic corps training programs.
KAIDANOW